City of Macon v. Benson

• Decision Date: 13 July 1932
• Docket Number: 8682.
• Parties: CITY OF MACON v. BENSON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

166 S.E. 26

175 Ga. 502

CITY OF MACON v. BENSON.

No. 8682.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 13, 1932

Judgment Adhered to After Rehearing September 27, 1932.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Compensation Act provision that "employers" include any municipal corporation held not unconstitutional as granting gratuity (Park's Ann. Civ. Code Supp. 1922, § 3154 (b), subd. a; Const. art. 7, § 16, par. 1).

Statute must be construed, if fairly possible, to avoid, not only finding of unconstitutionality, but also grave doubts thereof.

Compensation Act, in so far as imposing liability without fault on employers, and including municipal corporations within classification of "employers," held not unconstitutional as authorizing municipal corporations to appropriate money for noncharitable purposes (Park's Ann Civ. Code Supp. 1922, § 3154 (a) et seq., as amended and § 3154 (b), subd. a; Const. art. 7, § 6, par. 1).

Compensation Act provision requiring employer accepting act to keep his liability fully insured, as applied to municipal corporations, held not unconstitutional as requiring municipality to donate money, become stockholder in mutual insurance association, and lend its credit to association (Park's Ann. Civ. Code Supp. 1922, § 3154 (nnn); Const art. 7, § 6, par. 1).

Compensation Act provision regarding finality of award and commission's fact findings held not to deny due process (Park's Ann. Civ. Code Supp. 1922, § 3154 (ggg); Const. Ga. art. 1, § 1, par. 3; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

Park's Ann. Civ. Code Supp. 1922, § 3154 (ggg), providing that awards of the commission shall, subject to other provisions of the Compensation Act, be final and conclusive as to all fact questions, and that fact findings of the commission within its power shall, absent fraud, be conclusive, does not deny due process as against the contention that so much of the section as makes the commission's fact findings conclusive on the courts takes from municipality its property without due process, and that the Industrial Commission is not a court, and in no way are employers given the benefit of the independent judgment of a judicial tribunal on both the law and facts of the case.

"Due process" clause requirements are satisfied if party has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and present his claim or defense (Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

"Due process of law" does not require judicial procedure (Const. Ga. art. 1, § 1, par. 3; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

Compensation Act provision that municipal corporations cannot reject provisions regarding payment and acceptance of compensation held not to deny due process or equal protection (Park's Ann. Civ. Code Supp. 1922, § 3154 (h); Const. Ga art. 1, § 1, par. 3; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

Error from Superior Court, Bibb County; Malcolm D. Jones, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. M. H Benson, for the death of her husband, Hugh H. Benson, opposed by the City of Macon, employer. Award of compensation was affirmed by the superior court, and the employer brings error.

Affirmed.

Compensation Act provision that municipal corporations cannot reject provisions regarding payment and acceptance of compensation held not to deny equal protection (Park's Ann.Civ.Code Supp.1922, § 3154(h); Const.Ga. art. 1,§ 1, par. 3; Const.U.S. Amend. 14).

Mrs. M. H. Benson filed her application to the Industrial Commission of Georgia for an award, as provided by the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, against the city of Macon; the application being based upon the death of her husband, caused by sunstroke suffered while in the performance of his duties as street sweeper in the employ of the city of Macon. The application was heard by a single commissioner, and upon the hearing the city of Macon filed a motion to dismiss the application on certain constitutional grounds. The single commissioner found in favor of the applicant, and allowed compensation in a stated amount and funeral expenses to be paid by the city of Macon. An appeal was taken to the entire commission, which affirmed the award made by the single commissioner. An appeal from this decision was taken to the superior court, and the finding of the commission was there affirmed. The following stipulation was entered into by the parties on the hearing before the commission: "The parties to the above controversy agree that the following statement of facts shall be accepted by the Industrial Commission as true, without further proof, said agreement to be effective and not binding for any purpose except as contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation Act: 1. That Hugh H. Benson, deceased, was, on the 26th day of June, 1930, a member of the Macon Sanitary Department in the capacity of street-sweeper, earning and drawing a salary of $13.00 per week, and had received such named salary for a period of six months prior to said date. 2. That the City of Macon on said date was an employer within the purview of section 3154 (2)(a) of the Code, and was operating under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act as a self-insurer by permission of the Industrial Commission of Georgia. 3. That on said date the said Hugh H. Benson, while engaged in sweeping the streets of said city, succumbed to excessive heat, and died the same day from sunstroke. 4. That the said fatality was not the result of any negligence on the part of the City of Macon, but was the immediate result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, not by injury caused by the lawful act of a third person directed against the employee, nor as a result of any wilful misconduct of the said Hugh H. Benson, as defined in section 3154 (14) of the Code. 5. That the City of Macon paid none of the funeral expenses of the said Hugh H. Benson, but cared for said Benson at the Macon hospital and bore all expenses of his illness. 6. That the said Mrs. Mary H. Benson has complied with the provisions of section 3154 (23) of the Code of Georgia."

The appeal set forth that the award by the Industrial Commission was contrary to law as presented in the motions of the city of Macon to dismiss the application of the claimant, in that the award was in violation of the Constitution of the state of Georgia and of the United States; for that so much of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Georgia as requires municipal corporations to insure their employees against or pay them compensation for personal injuries, or for their deaths while in the employ of municipalities, and particularly section 2(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ga. L. 1920, p. 167 et seq., approved August 17, 1920, and amended August 16, 1922 [Laws 1922. p. 185], August 19, 1922 [Laws 1922, p. 77], August 18, 1923 [Laws 1923, p. 92], August 27, 1925 [Laws 1925, p. 282], and August 27, 1929 [Laws 1929, p. 358]), which provides in part as follows: "'Employers' shall include any municipal corporation within the State and any political division thereof," in so far as it applies to municipal corporations, violates article 7, § 16, par. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia (Civil Code of 1910, § 6573), which declares that "the General Assembly shall not, by vote, resolution, or order, grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association."

That said act, in so far as it imposes liability without fault upon employers, and, by section 2(a) of the act as above quoted, includes municipal corporations within the classification of employers, isin conflict with article 7, § 6, par. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia (Civil Code of 1910, § 6561), which declares that "the General Assembly shall not authorize any county, municipal corporation, or political division of this State to become a stockholder in any company, corporation, or association, or to appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, company, association, institution, or individual, except for purely charitable purposes. This restriction shall not operate to prevent the support of schools by municipal corporations within their respective limits: Provided, that if any municipal corporation shall offer to the State any property for locating or building a capitol, and the State accepts such offer, the corporation may comply with such offer," for that said act requires an appropriation of money for an injured employee without consideration, and not for any charitable purpose.

That the following portion of said act: "Every employer who accepts the provisions of this Act relative to the payment of compensation shall fully insure and keep fully insured, unless otherwise ordered or permitted by the Commission, his liability thereunder in some corporation, association, or organization, licensed as provided by law, to transact the business of Workmen's Compensation Insurance in this State, or in some mutual insurance association formed by a group of employers so licensed" (section 3154 (66) of the Code), is in violation of article 7, § 6, par. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia, quoted above, for the reason that said portion of the act requires a municipal corporation to appropriate and donate money to a corporation to insure the municipal corporation against loss caused by injury, and also requires that a municipal corporation become a stockholder in a mutual insurance association and to lend its credit to said corporation or said association.

That the following portions of section 59 of the Workmen's Compensation Law: "Any award of the Commission, provided for in Section 3154 (57), with respect to which no application for a review thereof be filed in due time, or an award of the Commission upon such review as provided in Section 3154 (58) shall, in either event, as...