City of Mansfield v. Richland-Crawford Area #10 Workforce Invest. Act Bd., 2006 Ohio 4699 (Ohio App. 9/11/2006), 05 CA 110.
| Decision Date | 11 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05 CA 110.,05 CA 110. |
| Citation | 2006 Ohio 4699 |
| Parties | City of Mansfield, Ohio (Neighborhood Youth Corps), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richland-Crawford Area #10 Workforce Investment Act Board, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
David L. Remy, Law Director, City of Mansfield, 30 North Diamond Street, Mansfield, Ohio 44902, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michael J. Murray, Nancy H. Massie, Assistant Prosecutors, 38 South Park Street, Mansfield, Ohio 44902, and Kimberly J. Brown, Bricker & Eckler LLP, 100 South Third Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hon. John W. Wise, P. J., Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J., Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
{¶1} Appellant City of Mansfield (Neighborhood Youth Corps) appeals the decision of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed a declaratory judgment action regarding the provision of youth services pursuant to the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On March 22, 2005, the Richland County Department of Job and Family Services ("RCDJFS") released a "request for proposal" seeking qualified providers of youth services for Richland and Crawford Counties under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. A total of seven providers timely responded to the request for proposal, which was to cover the one-year period from July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006. Among these responding providers were Appellee Mid-Ohio Education Service Center ("MOESC") and Appellant Neighborhood Youth Corps ("NYC").
{¶3} All proposals were reviewed by the Richland-Crawford Youth Council in accordance with the language of the request for proposal. The reviewers, using a ratings score system, gave MOESC a score of 86.7, the highest among the seven providers, followed by NYC, with a score of 81.7. The Youth Council thus recommended to the Area #10 Workforce Investment Act ("WIA") Board that MOESC be awarded the contract for youth services for the one-year period in question. The Youth Council's recommendation was adopted by a unanimous vote of said Area #10 WIA Board, and subsequently by the WIA Board of Governors.
{¶4} Pursuant to the process set forth in the request for proposal, appellant appealed to a two-person RCDJFS designated panel. On June 24, 2005, the panel issued a written finding that the scoring decision and overall processes were fair and equitable. No appeal was taken therefrom to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services.
{¶5} On June 29, 2005, appellant NYC filed a declaratory judgment action as to the funding award in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, naming as defendants the Area #10 Workforce Investment Act Board, the Area #10 Workforce Investment Act Board of Governors, and RCDJFS. Appellee MOESC was subsequently added as a fourth defendant. In July 2005, RCDJFS and MOESC each filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 3, 2005, the trial court issued a final order granting both motions for summary judgment, based on the court's conclusion that appellant had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as required under federal law: "The City should have used the administrative procedure provided by the ODJFS pursuant to CFR 667.600 to take its appeal to the State agency and perhaps to the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals." Judgment Entry, October 3, 2005, at 2-3.
{¶6} Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 31, 2005, and herein raises the following sole Assignment of Error:
{¶7}
I.
{¶8} In its sole Assignment of Error, appellant argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We disagree.
{¶9} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212. As such, we must refer to Civ.R. 56 which provides, in pertinent part: "Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * " A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter summary judgment if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion that the non-moving party has no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some evidence which demonstrates the non-moving party cannot support its claim. If the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila v. Hall (1997) 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 674 N.E.2d 1164, citing Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264.
{¶10} In this matter, a consideration of the summary judgment decision before us essentially entails jurisdictional questions connected with the WIA administrative appeal process. The case of Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I. v. Chao (D.R.I.2003), 248 F.Supp.2d 48, which was cited by the trial court in its decision, sheds light on this issue. In that case, the Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Indian Council both sought a federal grant, pursuant to § 166 of the WIA, 29 U.S.C. § 2911, to provide job training for Rhode Island's Native American population. A Department of Labor grant officer awarded the grant to the Council instead of the Tribe. The Tribe, dissatisfied with the grant officer's decision, petitioned for an administrative review by an Administrative Law Judge, who later issued a decision and order denying the Tribe's Petition for Review. Following this denial, the Tribe filed an additional Petition for Review with the Administrative Review Board, which thereafter issued an order affirming the ALJ's denial of the Tribe's Petition for Review. Instead of appealing the ARB's order to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, as required by 29 U.S.C. 2937(a)(1), the Tribe filed an action in federal district court. Id. at 48-49.
{¶11} The District Court ultimately dismissed the Tribe's action, noting in pertinent part: Id. at 50.
{¶12} We are cognizant that Narragansett addresses different federal regulations than 20 CFR 667.600, the provision cited in the judgment entry in the present appeal. However, we are persuaded that Narragansett at least confirms the principle that a dissatisfied WIA applicant must exhaust its administrative remedies in circumstances such as in the present case, prior to seeking declaratory relief in the trial court. In the case sub judice, the pertinent provisions of the ODJFS Manual state, inter alia, that "LWIA/Ohio Option sub area recipients shall follow the procedures set forth at 20 CFR 667.600, et. (sic) seq. for resolving any complaint alleging a violation of WIA ("the Act"), the regulations promulgated thereunder, grants or other agreements under the Act."
{¶13} In turn, 20 CFR 667.600(c) requires that "[l]ocal area procedures" provide:
{¶14} "(1) A process for dealing with grievances and complaints from participants and other interested parties affected by the local Workforce Investment System, including One-Stop partners and service providers;
{¶15} "(2) An opportunity for an informal resolution and a hearing to be completed within 60 days of the filing of the grievance or complaint;
{¶16} "(3) A process which allows an individual alleging a labor standards violation to submit the grievance to a binding arbitration procedure, if a...
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