City of Margate v. Amoco Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 21 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-0920,87-0920 |
| Citation | 546 So.2d 1091,14 Fla. L. Weekly 1496 |
| Parties | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1496 CITY OF MARGATE, Florida, Appellant, v. AMOCO OIL COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appellee, Amoco Oil Company (Amoco), applied to appellant, City of Margate (the City), for a permit to construct a gasoline service station and mini-mart upon a parcel of land within the city, which Amoco held under contract. The City denied the requested permit and Amoco instituted this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. From a final judgment in favor of Amoco, holding that Margate acted illegally in the premises, the City has perfected this appeal.
The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that the City acted illegally in denying the permit requested in 1980. Secondary issues involve the question of what law applies--the law in existence at the time of the application or, as the City describes it, "current law," which we take to mean the law in effect at the time of the judgment.
The case was tried before the court for approximately eight days over a ten-month period, after which the chancellor entered a very comprehensive, analytical final judgment, including extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, which have facilitated our appellate review. Based on our consideration of the appellate briefs, the exhibits, and the record generally, we conclude that reversible error has not been demonstrated.
A brief resume of the facts as found by the trial court reveals that Amoco filed an application for a permit with the City to construct and operate a gasoline service station and mini-mart within the city in a zoning district designated "B-2." Both "service stations" and "filling stations" were permitted uses within said district; however, pursuant to section 3.18 of the Code, "filling stations" had certain special conditions, while "service stations" had none. Among the limitations on the use of the property for "filling stations" was that such use was not permitted within 750 feet of another plot used as a filling station nor within 250 feet of any plot used as a church, playground, hospital, or public school. These limitations were prompted for "filling stations" as opposed to "service stations" because the former, by definition, allowed a more intensive use of the property. For example, a service station was permitted to dispense at retail only automobile fuels and oil; whereas, a filling station was authorized to furnish, in addition, supplies, equipment, and minor repair services. The latter is defined in the Code as "incidental body or fender work, or other minor repairs, painting or upholstering, replacement of parts, and motor service to passenger cars and trucks not exceeding 1 1/2 tons capacity."
Amoco's application was referred to the City Development Review Committee, which the court found refused to follow the distinction between service and filling stations and characterized Amoco's application as an application for filling station use. Having taken that position, the committee naturally applied section 3.18 of the Code and noted that the site in question was within 250 feet of a commercial nursery known as The Country Day School, which had a fenced-in play area. The committee thus denied approval of the Amoco application because of the 250 foot playground limitation of section 3.18 and because it violated the platting requirements of section 3.10.1 of the Code. It is interesting to note that the evidence showed that this 250 foot limitation had never been invoked before in a similar situation; that it was seriously suspected to be constitutionally flawed because there was no inverse requirement prohibiting playgrounds from being located in close proximity to filling stations. City of Miami v. Woolin, 387 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.1968); Saar v. Town of Davie, 308 F.Supp. 207 (S.D.Fla.1969). In addition, the City dropped the alleged platting ordinance violation as a ground for denial of the permit because it, too, was recognized as probably unconstitutional and it was subsequently repealed.
Amoco then requested the matter be referred to the city attorney, who in turn placed it on an agenda to be considered by the city commission. After a hearing, and extensive discussion, the commission supported the Development Review Committee's decision and rejected the application. Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the commission determined that, regardless of the Code provisions, they did not want a gasoline station in this locality. 1
The trial court found that Amoco took no immediate action to challenge the City's rejection because it wanted to try to resolve the problem amicably and avoid litigation with the city in which it would be operating. Instead, Amoco applied for a rezoning of the property to a B-3 classification, which would permit its contemplated use. When all else seemed futile, Amoco commenced this suit in July 1982 to enforce its rights as it envisioned them. The court found that, after the City originally denied Amoco's permit application, it set about to change the Code so that Amoco's intended use of the property could not be legally permitted. Thus, on September 24, 1980, the City enacted Ordinance 1500.191, which the trial judge characterized as having the effect of devastating the Amoco site plan. The new ordinance abolished the distinction between...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coral Springs Street Systems v. City of Sunrise, No. 03-11497.
...subsequent ordinance enacted in bad faith, the law at the time of the application should be applied."); City of Margate v. Amoco Oil Co., 546 So.2d 1091, 1092-94 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (affirming an order for injunctive relief in which the trial court found that the City acted" `arbitrarily......
- Davis v. State, 87-02085