City of Marion v. Public Utilities Commission

• Decision Date: 31 March 1954
• Docket Number: 33642,Nos. 33641,s. 33641
• Citation: 161 Ohio St. 276,119 N.E.2d 67
• Parties: , 53 O.O. 148, 5 P.U.R.3d 490 CITY OF MARION et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 276

161 Ohio St. 276

119 N.E.2d 67, 53 O.O. 148, 5 P.U.R.3d 490

CITY OF MARION et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

CITY OF CAMBRIDGE et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

Nos. 33641, 33642.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 31, 1954.

G. A. Piacentino, City Sol., Marion, Don Williamson, Marion, Clair P. Hoffman, City Sol., New Philadelphia, David G. Howell, Jackson, and Charles J. Chastang, Columbus, for appellants City of Marion et al.

Daniel D. Knowlton, City Sol., Cambridge, Walter E. Schutt, City Sol., Lawrence R. Lyons, Village

Sol., Wilmington, Richard W. Penn, Circleville, and Charles J. Chastang, Columbus, for appellants City of Cambridge et al.

Power, Griffith & Jones, Columbus, Kimble, Kimble & Shapiro, Portsmouth, and Arthur E. Nelson, Chicago, Ill., for appellee Ohio Consolidated Tel. Co.

C. William O'Neill, Atty. Gen., James M. Burtch, Jr., Columbus, and Everett H. Krueger, Jr., Cleveland, for appellee Public Utilities Commission.

Power, Griffith & Jones, Columbus, for appellee General Tel. Co.

PER CURIAM.

The two appeals presently before the court are by certain Ohio municipalities from orders of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approving a permanent increase in telephone charges and rates in different areas of this state by the General Telephone Company of Ohio and the Ohio Consolidated Telephone Company, both Ohio corporations, pursuant to the applications of the companies therefor.

In both cases the assignments of error are practically the same and read:

'1. The commission did not have jurisdiction to hear the application of the company for increases in rates and charges and to make an order therein.

'2. The commission erred in hearing, considering, and determining the application of the company for increases in rates and charges on a so-called 'company-wide basis,' that is, on the basis of the combined valuations, the combined expenses, and the combined net operating income of its * * * [136 separate exchanges of the General Telephone Company of Ohio and 39 separate exchanges of the Ohio Consolidated Telephone Company] and in failing and refusing to hear, consider, and determine the application on an 'exchange or local basis,' that is, on the basis of the value of the company's property used and useful in rendering telephone service in each separate exchange; the gross operating income of the company in each separate exchange; the operating expenses of the company in each separate exchange; and the net operating income of the company in each separate exchange.'

Section 543, General Code, Section 4903.10, Revised Code, provides, inter alia, that no person or corporation shall in any court urge or rely on any ground not set forth specifically in the application for rehearing before the commission.

An examination of the applications for rehearing filed with the commission by the appellants in both the instant cases discloses nine specified grounds. On the appeals to this court but two assignments of error, quoted above, are set forth and argued.

The first assignment of error is identical with the first ground for rehearing presented to the commission and the second assignment of error herein is a combination of the fourth and fifth grounds for rehearing embodied in the applications for rehearing before the commission.

The first assignment of error in this court and the first ground for rehearing before the commission are broad and general and state no more than a conclusion; they completely fail to allege in what respect the commission lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the applications for increased telephone rates.

Under our statutes, the commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application of a telephone company for increased rates. The assignment of error under discussion does not state any specific reason or ground as to why the commission did not have such jurisdiction with respect to these particular applications.

It would, therefore, seem evident that the plain requirements of Section 543, General Code, demanding a specific statement of the grounds on which an order of the commission is deemed unreasonable or unlawful have not been met.

In the seventeenth paragraph of the syllabus in the case of City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 151 Ohio St. 353, 86 N.E.2d 10, 14, this court laid down the following principle of law:

'On an appeal from an order of the Public Utilities Commission, the Supreme Court cannot consider any matter which was not specifically set forth in an application to the commission for a rehearing as a ground on which the appellant considered the order of the commission to be unreasonable or unlawful. Section 543, General Code,...