City of Marlborough v. City of Lynn

• Decision Date: 27 May 1931
• Citation: 176 N.E. 214,275 Mass. 394
• Parties: CITY OF MARLBOROUGH v. CITY OF LYNN. SAME v. CITY OF BOSTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

275 Mass. 394

176 N.E. 214

CITY OF MARLBOROUGH

v.CITY OF LYNN.

SAME

v.CITY OF BOSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 27, 1931.

Report from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Stanley E. Qua, Judge.

Actions by the City of Marlborough against the City of Lynn and against the City of Boston. On report.

In first action, judgment for defendant, and, in second action, judgment for plaintiff.

W. L. Temple, of Marlboro, for plaintiff.

H. M. Pakulski, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Boston, for defendant City of Boston.

John M. Cashman, Asst. City Sol., and Patrick F. Shanahan, City Sol., both of Lynn, for defendant City of Lynn.

RUGG, C. J.

By these actions of contract, one against the city of Lynn and the other against the city of Boston, the plaintiff seeks to recover the amount expended by it for the support of the family of Ralph Halliwell. No question is raised as to the amount so expended, or as to compliance with all preliminary statutory requirements as to notice. The only issue is whether either defendant is liable. The cases were submitted to the court sitting without a jury upon agreed facts in substance as follows: Ralph Halliwell, born in Michigan, acquired a settlement in Lynn but moved with his family to Marlborough to live in 1915. In February, 1917, he deserted his family, went to Boston, and there resided at 222 West Springfield street and was employed at 1042 Boylston street. In July, 1917, he was arrested for nonsupport of his family and gave his residence as 222 West Springfield street, Boston. The records of the probation officer show that he resided in Boston from August 10, 1917, to July 18, 1918. The draft records of the War Department show that he registered with the draft board in Boston on June 5, 1917, giving his home address and his place of employment in Boston as stated above. On January 4, 1918, he executed a questionnaire giving the same address in Boston. On July 18, 1918, he left Boston, removing all his personal effects, paying his final bill at his rooming house, and indicated no intention of returning, and did not return, to that or any other place in Boston. After receiving notice to report for military service, the date of which is not stated, but which manifestly could not have been earlier than July 18, 1918, he went to his brother's home at 573 Essex street, Lynn, and remained there until July 21, 1918. While at his brother's home he did not arrange with his brother, or any member of his brother's family, to establish a residence there, and upon departing did not leave at his brother's home any personal or other effects. He was inducted into the military service of the United States on July 22, 1918, giving his address at the time of enlistment as 573 Essex street, Lynn, Massachusetts. After his discharge from the service in November, 1918, he lived at his brother's home above described for a period of two weeks. Since then his whereabouts is unknown.

The trial judge states in his report: ‘In each case I infer from the facts agreed that Halliwell actually resided and was domiciled in Boston on July 18, 1918, and there is nothing in the agreed facts in either case which satisfies me or from which I feel I ought to infer as a fact that, in the four days between July 18 when Halliwell left Boston and July 22 when he was inducted into the service of the United States, he changed his residence or domicile to any other place. I therefore infer in each case that Halliwell's actual residence and domicile remained in Boston on July 22.’

[1] The rights of the parties depend upon the interpretation of the part of G. L. c. 116, § 1, clause fifth, as amended by St. 1922, c. 177, which so far as material is in these words: ‘Any person who was inducted into the military or naval forces of the United States under the federal selective service act * * * whether he served as a part of the quota of the commonwealth or not, * * * shall be deemed to have acquired a settlement in the place where he actually resided in this commonwealth at the time of his induction. * * *’ The vital words of this statute with respect to the facts of the case at bar are ‘actually resided.’ The question to be decided is one of statutory construction. ‘Resided’ like most other words may have different meanings or shades of significantion dependent upon the connection in which it occurs and the result designed to be accomplished by its use. ‘Reside’ not infrequently is employed in common speech to express the same idea as to live, dwell,...