City of Medina ex rel. Jocke v. City of Medina
| Decision Date | 13 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20CA0044-M |
| Citation | 2021 Ohio 4353 |
| Parties | CITY OF MEDINA ex rel. RALPH E. JOCKE, et al. Relators-Appellants v. CITY OF MEDINA, OHIO Respondent-Appellee |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court), Trial Court Case No 19CIV1032
PATRICIA A. WALKER, Atty. Reg. No. 0001779 and RALPH E JOCKE, Atty. Reg. No. 0011642, 231Attorneys for Relators-Appellants
GREGORY A. HUBER, Atty. Reg. No. 0013857, Attorney for Respondent-Appellee
{¶ 1} Ralph E. Jocke, Patricia A. Walker, and Keith Rasey appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment against them on a complaint they filed on behalf of the taxpayers of the City of Medina. The lawsuit challenges the Medina City Council's enactment of two ordinances. The first authorized the Mayor to contract with the Medina County Board of Commissioners to share expenses related to design, planning, and construction-management services for a proposed shared courthouse. The second ordinance amended the first by increasing the amount authorized to be paid under the cost-sharing agreement and by clarifying that the City's payment was to be made to the County.
{¶ 2} The appellants argued below that both ordinances were invalid for various reasons, including that City Council improperly had passed the first ordinance as an emergency measure. The trial court held that the appellants lost their ability to challenge the emergency enactment by not bringing a successful referendum petition. It also expressed its belief that the emergency enactment was proper. Finally, the trial court quoted a page from the City's summary-judgment brief in an apparent finding of no irregularity in the enactment of either ordinance.
{¶ 3} We conclude that the appellants' failure to bring a successful referendum petition is not dispositive of their lawsuit. Regardless of whether it qualified as an emergency measure, the first ordinance took effect no later than 30 days after its passage by the Medina City Council. At that time, whether the ordinance properly had been enacted on an emergency basis became immaterial. The appellants' lawsuit also challenges the legality of both ordinances on multiple other grounds. Although the trial court did not specifically address most of these arguments, it was not required to render findings of fact or conclusions of law when entering summary judgment for the City. In any event, our de novo review reveals that none of the appellants' arguments are persuasive. Finally, this appeal is not moot, as both ordinances remain in effect notwithstanding events that have transpired since their enactment.
{¶ 4} For the reasons to follow, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Medina.
{¶ 5} The Medina City Council passed the first ordinance on June 24, 2019. The legislation, Ordinance No. 98-19, was enacted as an emergency measure. It authorized the Mayor to enter into a cost-sharing agreement with the County for the planning phase of a joint courthouse project. The approved funding was not to exceed $133, 000. The Mayor promptly entered into the cost-sharing agreement. A citizen group responded with an initiative petition to allow electors to vote on the courthouse project. The attempt failed, however, because not enough valid signatures were obtained.
{¶ 6} On March 9, 2020, the Medina City Council passed Ordinance No. 49-20. It amended Ordinance No. 98-19 in two ways. First, it increased the authorized funding for the cost-sharing agreement to $171, 000. Second, it made the funds payable to Medina County rather than the chosen architectural firm.
{¶ 7} The appellants filed the present lawsuit on October 22, 2019 on behalf of the taxpayers of the City of Medina. They alleged that Ordinance No. 98-19 was invalid for several reasons, including its enactment as an emergency measure. The appellants filed a supplemental complaint on March 23, 2020 after the City Council passed Ordinance No. 49-20. The supplemental complaint added challenges to the validity of Ordinance No. 49-20. It requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the City from taking any action authorized by either ordinance. The supplemental complaint also sought a return to the City of money paid pursuant to either ordinance. Finally, the supplemental complaint requested the assessment of costs (but not attorney fees) against the City. The parties proceeded to file competing dispositive motions. In a brief June 24, 2020 written decision, the trial court found the City entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed.
{¶ 8} We review an award of summary judgment de novo. Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civil Rule 56(C), summary judgment is proper when "(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). With these standards in mind, we turn to the issues on appeal.
{¶ 9} The appellants' first two assignments of error state:
I. The trial court erred when it found that the Taxpayers' lawsuit, concerning Medina City Ordinance No. 98-19, was untimely filed.
II. The trial court erred when it found that Medina City Ordinance No. 98-19 did not violate the City Charter and that Ordinance was correctly passed as emergency legislation.
{¶ 10} In their first assignment of error, the appellants contend (1) an emergency ordinance cannot be challenged via referendum, (2) their lawsuit was timely because R.C. 733.60 provides a one-year statute of limitation to enjoin the performance of a municipal contract, and (3) equitable principles favor permitting them to challenge both ordinances.
{¶ 11} In their second assignment of error, the appellants challenge the trial court's finding that emergency enactment of the first ordinance was proper and, therefore, did not violate the Medina City Charter. The appellants note that the Charter prohibits passing, as an emergency measure, any ordinance authorizing the "surrender" or "joint exercise" of any City power. They argue that Ordinance No. 98-19 violated this prohibition by allowing the Mayor to contract with the County to share expenses related to design, planning, and construction-management services for a proposed shared courthouse. The appellants assert that Ordinance No. 98-19 is invalid for this reason and, further, that Ordinance No. 49-20 is invalid because it amended an invalid ordinance.
{¶ 12} Upon review, we find both assignments of error to be without merit. With regard to the first assignment of error, the trial court does not appear to have found the appellants' entire lawsuit untimely. Instead, it reasoned that the appellants "lost the ability to challenge the emergency enactment [of the first ordinance] when they did not bring a successful referendum petition as contemplated by R.C. 731.29." The trial court opined that "[t]he principal allegation" underlying the appellants' request for injunctive relief concerned the Medina City Council's passing the first ordinance as an emergency measure. In the trial court's view, the appellants were required to raise this issue through a referendum petition under R.C. 731.29. In other words, the trial court opined that the appellants were required to seek a different form of relief to challenge the emergency nature of the enactment. The trial court did not dismiss the lawsuit itself on the basis of untimeliness. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13} With regard to the second assignment of error, any issues involving the emergency enactment of Ordinance No. 98-19 are now moot. The general rule is that an ordinance passed by a city council does not take effect for 30 days. During that period, electors may file a referendum petition requiring the ordinance to be placed on the ballot for approval or rejection. R.C. 731.29. However, emergency ordinances "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety" are not subject to referendum and "shall go into immediate effect." R.C. 731.30.
{¶ 14} Here the appellants challenge whether Ordinance No. 98-19 qualified as an emergency measure. If it did, then it went into effect immediately, and a referendum petition was not available. On the other hand, if it did not meet the statutory requirements for an emergency measure, then it did not take effect for 30 days and could have been challenged through a timely referendum (if the appellants wished to pursue that remedy). But because the appellants did not pursue a timely referendum, or initiate any other legal challenge during the 30-day window, Ordinance No. 98-19 necessarily took effect no later than 30 days after its passage, regardless of whether it qualified as an emergency measure. City of Youngstown v. Aiello, 156 Ohio St 32, 37-38, 100 N.E.2d 62 (1951); McNair v. City of Brecksville, 2017-Ohio-7401, 96 N.E.3d 1078, ¶ 17-27 (8th Dist.) (). At this point, then, it matters not whether Ordinance No. 98-19 qualified as an emergency measure. The ordinance took effect in due time as a regular ordinance even if it lacked true...
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