City of Memphis v. Bolton

• Decision Date: 30 April 1872
• Parties: THE CITY OF MEMPHIS v. SARAH W. BOLTON, Executrix, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

56 Tenn. 508

THE CITY OF MEMPHIS

v.SARAH W. BOLTON, Executrix, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April Term, 1872.

FROM SHELBY.

Appeal in error from the judgment of the 1st Circuit Court, September Term, 1871. C. W. HEISKELL, J.

W. M. RANDOLPH for appellant.

LUKE W. FINLAY for appellee.

NICHOLSON, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The city of Memphis took possession of and appropriated the real estate of defendants to the public use, in the extension of one of its public streets. Commissioners were appointed, in pursuance of a provision in the city charter, who assessed the cash value of the land so appropriated at nine thousand one hundred and fifty dollars ($9,150). They also reported that the residue of the real estate of defendants was increased in value twenty-one hundred dollars ($2,100) by the extension of the street. Upon appeal to the 1st Circuit Court the question submitted to the court was, whether the twenty-one hundred dollars ($2,100), the enhanced value of the remaining portions of defendant's land, should be deducted from the nine thousand one hundred and fifty dollars ($9,150), the cash value of the land appropriated, in determining the “just compensation” to which defendants were entitled under the Constitution for the appropriation of their land to the public use.

The Circuit Judge held that defendants were entitled to the whole cash value of the property appropriated, viz.: $9,150, and gave judgment accordingly. The rule laid down in the case of Woodfolk v. The Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Co., 2 Swan, 437, was this: “The fair cash value of the land taken for public use, if the owner were willing to sell, and the company desired to buy that particular quantity, at that place and in that form, would be the measure of compensation.” To which is added: “From this definition of the nature of the transaction, it will follow that there can be nothing added to the price on account of the unwillingness of the owner to part with his land, or to have the improvements there, or because he may have to build fences and walls, or be put to inconvenience in getting to his out buildings, or have them to remove, or such like inconveniences. These considerations are not to enter into the estimate of the jury to enhance the price; but, on the other side, the value is not to be reduced by the consideration that the improvement about to be made will be advantageous to the owner in the amelioration and enhanced value of...