City of Memphis v. State

• Decision Date: 23 October 1915
• Citation: 179 S.W. 631,133 Tenn. 83
• Parties: CITY OF MEMPHIS ET AL. v. STATE EX REL. RYALS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

179 S.W. 631

133 Tenn. 83

CITY OF MEMPHIS ET AL. v. STATE EX REL. RYALS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 23, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; A. B. Pittman, Judge.

Habeas corpus by the State of Tennessee, on the relation of S. B Ryals, against the City of Memphis and others. From an order releasing the relator, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

C. M Bryan and Leo Goodman, both of Memphis, and Chas. T. Cates of Maryville, for appellants.

Caruthers Ewing, of Memphis, for appellee.

WILLIAMS J.

Ryals, as relator, sued out a writ of habeas corpus to effect his release from the custody of the chief of police of the city of Memphis; he having been arrested for a violation of Acts 1915, c. 60. The circuit judge released the relator, holding that act void, because violative of the constitutional provisions that inhibit arbitrary class legislation. Const. Tenn. art. 1, § 8, and article 11, § 8; fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The act thus attacked was evidently passed for the regulation of a class of motor vehicles recently brought into service in the principal cities of the state, commonly known as "jitneys."

By section 1 of the act it is provided that any person, firm, or corporation operating for hire any public conveyance propelled by steam, gasoline, or other power, "for the purpose of affording a means of street transportation similar to that ordinarily afforded by street railways (but not operated upon fixed tracks) by indiscriminately accepting and discharging such persons as may offer themselves for transportation," is declared a common carrier, and the business of all such carriers is declared to be a privilege.

Section 2 of the act makes unlawful the use and occupation of any street or alley or other public place in any incorporated city or town without first obtaining from such city or town a permit or license by ordinance giving the right to so use or occupy such street, alley or other public place--the permit or license to embody "such routes, terms and conditions as such city or town may elect to impose: Provided, however, that no such permit or license shall be granted which does not require the execution and filing of a bond," as provided by section 3.

Section 3 provides that before such common carrier may conduct his business he must execute a bond, with good and sufficient surety or sureties, in no case to exceed $5,000 for each car operated, conditioned that such common carrier will pay any damage that may be adjudged finally against such carrier as compensation for loss of life or injury to person or property inflicted by such carrier or caused by his negligence.

Section 4 makes it unlawful for such common carrier to use or occupy any street or alley or other public place without the permit or license aforesaid or without first executing and filing the bond as required by section 3.

The subsequent sections need not be outlined, since the provision requiring the execution of a bond is the only one inveighed against by relator, charged as he was with the operation of a jitney automobile without having executed such bond.

The circuit judge, after calling attention in his opinion to the fact that the act does not limit the condition of the bond to a protection of the passengers of such a common carrier, but includes the payment of damages by reason of negligence resulting in injury to pedestrians or to property generally, expressed the view that the provision of the statute might be upheld if the bond required had to do only with the protection of passengers, and further said:

"This act imposes upon the carrier burdens not only in his character of common carrier, but also burdens in his capacity of an ordinary user of the streets. Using the same kind of vehicle, with the same motor power, in identically the same manner as private operators of automobiles, he is required to give a bond to protect other users of the streets against his negligence. No such requirement is made of any other person using similar vehicles."

The act was therefore held invalid, with result that the city has appealed to this court.

Under the provisions of the state and national Constitutions, above referred to, the same rules are applied as to the validity of classifications made in legislative enactments. When an effort is thus made to distinguish and classify as between citizens, the basis therefor must be natural, and not arbitrary or capricious. The classification must rest on some substantial difference between the situation of the class created and other persons to whom it does not apply. State ex rel. v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 730, 59 S.W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941, and cases cited.

However, classification for such purposes is not invalid because not depending on scientific or marked differences in things and persons, or in their relations. It suffices if it is practical, and it is not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary. Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 562, 19 S.Ct. 281, 43 L.Ed. 552, cited with approval in State ex rel. v. Schlitz Brewing Co., supra.

"When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the hurden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177, following Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160.

Having these principles in mind for guidance, we may conceive that, from the experience developed by the operation of jitney automobiles at the time of the enactment of the regulatory statute, the Legislature deemed the provision for a bond to be necessary because it realized that by reason of the small fare charged by such operators the tendency would be for them to invest in cheap or secondhand machines, oftentimes fragile in character; that frequently the vehicle would not be owned outright, but only subject to a lien or by way of lease; that, by reason of the limited size and carrying capacity of the conveyances, an increased congestion of the streets and public places would follow, as well as an overtaxing of the capacity of the given conveyance; that they would have no fixed track upon which to run, moving at will over the entire street surface, and in their crossing over and stopping along the curb between crossings, or at street crossings, danger to persons and property would be augmented; that, by reason of the competition of the many engaged in the business, frequent contests between the operators for points of vantage in the streets would follow; that there was a tendency fraught with danger in the many so engaged seeking the streets of heaviest travel for passengers, thus leading to congestion, as well as in hasty efforts made to head off and divert those waiting on the curb as offerers for passage on street railways; that the desire and necessity to collect many small fares would tempt operators to indulge in swift and careless running; that by reason of receiving and discharging passengers at short, unscheduled intervals, there would be an interruption of traffic and an endangering of other vehicles in the streets; that by reason of the small investment required many who are financially irresponsible would embark in the business; that the collection of damages from the operators would be difficult, and in many instances impossible.

We come now to the test of the law made by the circuit judge, and which led him to denounce the classification--the inclusion of jitney automobiles and the exclusion of automobiles privately owned and used. We think that such a classification is easily sustainable by reason of the applicability of many of the considerations above enumerated. The privately owned vehicle ordinarily has but a single destination, at which it comes to rest. Its use is not urged to or towards the limit in order to the reaping of profits. We are unable to see merit in the distinction taken by the circuit judge, when he intimated the opinion that a classification of the jitney from privately used automobiles might be sustained only so far as indemnity for damages done to passengers was concerned. Most of the dangers that surround such passengers in a substantial sense beset also the users of the street.

Contrasting the jitney with street railway cars,...