City of Meriden v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n

Decision Date12 March 2021
Docket NumberSC 20378
Citation338 Conn. 310,258 A.3d 1
Parties CITY OF MERIDEN et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, Hartford, general counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).

Stephanie Dellolio, city attorney, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Proloy K. Das, Kari L. Olson, and Matthew A. Ciarleglio, New Haven, filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

McDONALD, J.

Although all meetings of individuals may be gatherings, the general question before us is whether all gatherings of individuals are necessarily meetings. More specifically, this certified appeal requires us to construe the meaning of the term "meeting" as it is defined in the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. Even more precisely, the narrow issue we must decide is whether a gathering of individuals comprising less than a quorum of the members of a city council, together with the mayor and the city manager, constitutes a "hearing or other proceeding of a public agency"; General Statutes § 1-200 (2) ; and, therefore, a "meeting" within the meaning of the act. If that gathering was a meeting, it was subject to the open meeting requirements of the act. See General Statutes § 1-225 (a).

The defendant Freedom of Information Commission appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the plaintiffs, the city of Meriden and the Meriden City Council,1 did not violate the open meeting requirements of the act. Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 191 Conn. App. 648, 650, 663, 665, 216 A.3d 847 (2019). On appeal, the commission claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that a "hearing or other proceeding" refers to a process of adjudication, which fell outside the scope of the activities conducted during the gathering at issue in this case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 659, 216 A.3d 847.

The Appellate Court's decision sets forth the facts and procedural history; see id., at 651–53, 216 A.3d 847 ; which we summarize in relevant part. In January, 2016, four members of the twelve member city council, namely, the majority and minority leaders and their respective deputies (leadership group), gathered at the city hall with the mayor and the retiring city manager to discuss the upcoming search for a new city manager.2 At the gathering, the leadership group agreed to submit a resolution to create a city manager search committee to the full city council for its consideration at an upcoming meeting. The leadership group drafted a one page proposed resolution, which listed the names of people to be considered for appointment to the committee and detailed the duties of the committee, including recommending to the city council suitable candidates for the city manager position. At a city council meeting later that month, the leadership group introduced the resolution, which subsequently was placed on the city council's consent calendar and was unanimously adopted.

Following the city council's meeting, an editor from the Meriden Record Journal3 filed a complaint with the commission, alleging that the leadership group gathering was an unnoticed and private meeting, in violation of § 1-225 (a).4 The commission held a hearing at which both parties appeared and presented evidence. The commission then issued a final decision, concluding that the leadership group gathering violated the act. It found that the leadership group "gather[s] regularly with the mayor and the city manager" to remain informed about issues that the city council may need to address. Brechlin v. City Council , Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2016-0066 (November 16, 2016) p. 2. During these gatherings, the group "decides whether an issue requires city council action, and when necessary ... discusses and drafts a resolution to go on the agenda of a city council meeting." Id. The commission also found that these gatherings are not intended to constitute a quorum of the city council, which requires a meeting of at least seven council members. Id. Additionally, the commission explained that, in gathering to discuss the formation of a city manager search committee and drafting the resolution, "the leadership group [had] met to discuss or act upon a matter over which the leadership [group] and the city council as a whole ha[d] supervision and control." Id. The commission took administrative notice of the city council's minutes of the January, 2016 meeting and found that the resolution was adopted at the city council meeting. Id.

The commission rejected the plaintiff's claim that the leadership group gathering was not a "meeting" under § 1-200 (2) because the commission found that, contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, the communications at the leadership group gathering were not limited to notice of meetings or the setting of agendas. Id. The commission also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the gathering was not a "meeting" because a quorum was not present. Id. The commission considered the Appellate Court's decision in Emergency Medical Services Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission , 19 Conn. App. 352, 561 A.2d 981 (1989), in which the court held that the plain language of the predecessor statute to § 1-200 (2) "does not require a quorum as a necessary precondition to ‘any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency ....’ " Id., at 355, 561 A.2d 981 ; see Brechlin v. City Council , supra, Docket No. FIC 2016-0066, p. 3. It also considered the Appellate Court's decision in Windham v. Freedom of Information Commission , 48 Conn. App. 529, 711 A.2d 741 (1998), appeal dismissed, 249 Conn. 291, 732 A.2d 752 (1999), in which the court held that a gathering, akin to a convening or assembly, of less than a quorum of members of a public agency, generally does not constitute a meeting. See id., at 531, 711 A.2d 741 ; see also Brechlin v. City Council , supra, p. 2. The commission explained that the former decision was more applicable to the facts of the present case. The commission concluded that the gathering was a "proceeding" within the meaning of § 1-200 (2), and that such a proceeding constituted a "meeting" within the meaning of that subdivision. Brechlin v. City Council , supra, p. 6. As a result, the commission concluded that the plaintiff had violated § 1-225 (a) by failing to properly notice the leadership group gathering and conduct it in public view. Id. The commission ordered the plaintiff to "strictly comply" with the open meeting requirements of § 1-225 (a) and, although not raised in the complaint, "advised the plaintiff that the leadership group may, in its own right, constitute a ‘committee of’ the city council pursuant to § 1-200 (1) ...." Id.; see also footnote 6 of this opinion.

The plaintiff appealed from the commission's decision to the Superior Court, arguing that a gathering of elected officials without a quorum present does not constitute a "meeting" in accordance with Windham v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 48 Conn. App. at 529, 711 A.2d 741. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that the Appellate Court's holding in Windham "is not completely determinative and, therefore, [is] not binding on the issue" of whether the leadership group gathering fell within the definition of "meeting" under § 1-200 (2). The trial court explained that "there are times, factually, [when] certain agency members are merely ‘convening’ and there is a requirement of a quorum under § 1-200 (2), and there are times, factually, [when] agency members, in the language of the [commission] ... are gathering with the implicit authorization of the city council as a whole, and this gathering ‘constituted a step in the process of agency-member activity.’ " The court stated that the "commission's factual findings and ... conclusions ... [were] supported by substantial evidence" and concluded that the leadership group gathering constituted a meeting under § 1-200 (2). See Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 191 Conn. App. at 653, 216 A.3d 847.

Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court "disagree[d] with the trial court's interpretation of ... ‘hearing or other proceeding’ ... as meaning a gathering among agency members that constitutes ‘a step in the process of agency-member activity ....’ " Id., at 659, 216 A.3d 847. The Appellate Court considered the definitions of "proceeding" and "hearing"; id., at 658–59, 216 A.3d 847 ; and explained that they "allude to adjudicative activities." Id., at 659, 216 A.3d 847. The court also explained that it was bound by its "holding in Windham v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 48 Conn. App. at 531, 711 A.2d 741, that a gathering, akin to a ‘convening or assembly’ as opposed to a ‘hearing or other proceeding,’ of less than a quorum of members of a public agency generally does not constitute a ‘meeting’ within the meaning of § 1-200 (2)." Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 191 Conn. App. at 662, 216 A.3d 847. The court noted that this holding was not in conflict with its holding in Emergency Medical Services Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 19 Conn. App. at 355, 561 A.2d 981. See Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, at 663, 216 A.3d 847. The court explained that, consistent with the legal dictionary definitions of "proceeding" and "hearing," the "proper reading of [ § 1-200 (2) ] is that ‘hearing or other proceeding’ refers to a process of adjudication, which falls outside the scope of activities conducted during the leadership group gathering in the present...

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