City of Miami Beach v. Kaiser, 67--754

Decision Date20 August 1968
Docket NumberNo. 67--754,67--754
PartiesCITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Frank KAISER and Ronnie Kaiser, d/b/a Acme Coin Metered Laundry, et al., Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Joseph A. Wanick, City Atty., for appellant.

Irving Cypen Law Offices and Arnold Nevins, Miami Beach, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C.J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

CHARLES CARROLL, Chief Judge.

This appeal is by the City of Miami Beach, the defendant below, from a judgment which held invalid an amendment of a subsection of the city's ordinance enacted under its charter power to impose a license tax on occupations, professions and businesses.

The occupational license tax involved here related to the business of distributors of automatic coin operated laundry washing machines. The suit was filed by a number of persons alleging themselves to be distributors of coin operated washing machines who had paid the flat occupational license tax of $110 then in effect as to such distributors. The objection they voiced was that the city was seeking additionally to collect an occupational tax of $4.40 on each machine (as provided for in the subsection dealing with distributors) and also $8 or $12 for each machine (depending on the nature of the machine) imposed by another subsection.

It was disclosed that under the applicable section of the city code as it stood in 1950 for the scheduling of fees for occupational license taxes, subsection 17 imposed an annual occupational license tax of $100 on persons engaged in the business of distributor of such machines, where 'not in connection with a licensed laundry.' Originally that subsection did not contain, in addition to the license fee of $100, a requirement that the distributor pay any amount on individual machines involved. A separate subsection, No. 54, imposed a $4 license tax for each coin operated machine or service vending machine 'not otherwise provided for herein,' with certain stated exceptions. Subsection 112 imposed on laundries and dry cleaning businesses and their agencies an annual license tax of $40.25 for such a business and $20.15 for each agency location, and $40.25 for each delivery vehicle used therein.

On September 17, 1964, the above provisions of the code were amended by the city council. In subsection 17 relating to distributors of such machines the annual business license tax was raised from $100 to $110, and additionally there was imposed on such distributors a license tax of $4.40 for each machine involved. Subsection 54, the catch-all provision relating to vending machines generally, which previously had specified a license tax of $4 per machine, as amended presented a revised scale of $4.40 for each one-cent machine, $8 for each coin machine requiring a deposit of two through fifteen cents, and $12 for each coin machine which required sixteen cents or over. Under subsection 54 those taxes were on machines as to which a license tax was 'not otherwise provided for herein.' As to subsection 112, relating to laundry and dry cleaning businesses and their agencies, the annual occupational license tax on laundry businesses was raised from $40.25 to $100; the tax on dry cleaning businesses was raised from $40.25 to $44.30; the tax on the separate agency locations thereof was raised from $20.15 to $22.15; and for delivery vehicles used, from $40.25 to $44.30.

The objection voiced by the plaintiffs in their complaint was that as a result of the 1964 amendment the city was seeking to collect from them (in addition to the $110 license fee which they alleged they had paid as distributors) $4.40 for each machine (as provided for in the amendment to subsection 17 with respect to distributors) and also, under subsection 54, the sum of $8 for each of their ten cent machines and $12 for each of their twenty-five cent machines. Plaintiffs pointed out that previously, under the original ordinance, they had been required to pay only an annual license of $100 as distributors, and contended that the requirement that they pay, in addition, a license tax on each machine was arbitrary and unreasonable. The plaintiffs contended further that the license fees were excessive and that there was no real basis for classifying them differently from those engaged in laundry and dry cleaning business, or from an owner or user of a single machine.

On final hearing the trial court sustained those contentions of the plaintiffs, held that subsections 17 and 54 as amended in 1964 were invalid, and enjoined the city from collecting license taxes thereunder. That ruling operated to leave in effect the provisions of subsections 17 and 54 as they stood in 1950, under which the distributors of such machines paid an annual license tax of $100 and appeared to have been subject to the $4 license tax on each machine provided for in subsection 54, but which, according to the record, had not been charged to the distributors by the city, having been charged against individuals having and using such a machine on their premises. That final decree was entered on September 20, 1966.

On October 5, 1966, the city council enacted ordinance No. 1609, again amending subsection 17. By the new amendment there was imposed on distributors 'where machines are not used in connection with licensed laundry' an annual occupational license tax of $100 (representing a $10 reduction) plus a license tax on each machine of $2.20, where the earlier amendment had provided for $4.40. Included in the new amendment to subsection 17 was a provision for an annual license tax of $2.20 on coin operated laundry washing machines 'not otherwise licensed, upon persons maintaining the same, or the proprietor thereof.' This amendment also contained a new provision imposing an annual license tax of $6 on coin operated clothes Driers. However, this tax on driers contained the language: 'not otherwise licensed,' and 'where machines are not used in connection with licensed laundry.'

Summarizing the foregoing, the situation disclosed is that the annual occupational license tax in the amount of $100 remains the same but the last amendment serves to impose on distributors an additional tax of $2.20 for each such machine. Under that ordinance as amended the distributor pays an annual license tax of $2.20 for each machine distributed for use by customers. The distributee or person using the distributor's machine would not be required to pay the additional tax of $2.20...

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5 cases
  • Boardman v. Esteva
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1975
    ...to perform their duties in a proper and lawful manner in the absence of a sufficient showing to the contrary, City of Miami Beach v. Kaiser, 213 So.2d 449, 453 (Fla.App.3d, 1958), and also that there is a presumption that returns certified by election officials are presumed to be correct. B......
  • ORMOND BEACH v. Daytona Beach, 5D00-2179.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 20, 2001
    ...an injunction prohibiting a legislative act by another branch of government, absent illegality or fraud. See City of Miami Beach v. Kaiser, 213 So.2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). This is so because of the separation of powers doctrine; a court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that......
  • City of Mountain Home v. Drake, 83-228
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 6, 1984
    ...upheld. See State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed. 1248 (1931); City of Miami Beach v. Kaiser, 213 So.2d 449 (1968). In Dicks v. Naff, Mayor, 255 Ark. 357, 500 S.W.2d 350 (1973) this court approved a levy of 1% on the gross receipts of m......
  • Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1972
    ...See Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So.2d 280, 284 (Fla.1953); Brewer v. Gray, 86 So.2d 799, 803 (Fla.1956). Accord: City of Miami Beach v. Kaiser, 213 So.2d 449, 453 (3 DCA Fla.1968), in which the Court summarized the separation-of-powers rule as 'The courts have power to invalidate legislative enact......
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