City of Miami v. Horne
| Citation | 198 So.2d 10 |
| Decision Date | 05 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 35820,35820 |
| Parties | CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation, Petitioner, v. Elzie C. HORNE, Sr., Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Frates, Fay, Floyd & Pearson, Miami, for petitioner.
Nichols, Gaither, Beckham, Colson, Spence & Hicks and Robert Orseck, Miami, for respondent.
Allen Clements, Jr., Miami Beach, as amicus curiae.
This cause is here on petition for certiorari, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, having certified that its decision 'passes upon a question of great public interest' because it determines that 'police officials of a municipality are legally responsible for damages caused by persons attempting to escape lawful authority.'
The District Court, in its opinion, 1 noted the facts to be:
'Anderson was fleeing in his automobile at a high rate of speed, estimated as high as ninety-five miles per hour, through the streets of Miami and a police car was in pursuit at approximately the same speed when Anderson ran a red traffic light at the intersection of Northwest Seventh Avenue and Twenty-ninth street and collided with the car being driven by plaintiff's wife who had entered the intersection.'
The record discloses that shortly before 5:00 A.M., Sergeant Weaver, of the City Patrol, stopped a motorist, Anderson, for violation of a thirty mile per hour speed zone. Sergeant Weaver directed Anderson to bring his driver's license back to the police car. When Anderson was unable to produce his license, Weaver proceeded to write two tickets, one for speeding and the other for driving without a license. Before Weaver could complete the writing of the tickets Anderson left the police car, rushed to his own automobile and left the scene at a high rate of speed. Weaver had not received a reply to an earlier radio request for information on Anderson. By leaving the scene and not accepting the tickets, Anderson committed an offense for which the officer was required to take him in custody.
Sergeant Weaver pursued Anderson, using his red light and his siren, in an attempt to stop him. Anderson raced through the Northwest section of Miami with Weaver following from a distance of a block or more, Weaver slowing down for stop lights while Anderson went through in total disregard.
In response to a call for assistance, Officer Kilgore aided in the pursuit, using his red light and siren. Anderson, driving at speeds estimated as high as ninety-five miles per hour, drove through several stop signs and red lights, with the officers in pursuit, until he reached the intersection where his automobile collided with the car driven by Mrs. Horne, causing her instant death. Officer Kilgore was approximately one block behind Anderson and Sergeant Weaver was just behind Kilgore. The automobiles had not reached the point where a third officer, Maltz, had set up a road block.
The plaintiff sued the defendant City for the wrongful death of his wife. Several defenses were filed, including the defense that if there was negligence it was that of a third party not under the control of the defendant. After extensive discovery the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding: 'The negligence, if any, of the defendant's employees was not the proximate cause of the damages claimed by the plaintiff.' The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court holding the movant had failed to carry its burden of showing there was no genuine issue of fact. Judge Barkdull, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that, if this were a question of first impression in this state, he would be inclined to affirm the summary judgment under review, but, inasmuch as the Mount Dora 2 and St. Petersburg 3 cases appeared to have recognized that a municipality could be liable in such situations, he would concur.
The question of whether, in Florida, municipalities are liable for the negligent acts of its police officers committed within the proper scope of employment has long been settled. 4 The Mount Dora and St. Petersburg decisions, supra, merely restated the general proposition. In addition, the Mount Dora case held the issue of negligence is not properly determinable on motion for summary judgment where the record suggests factual conflict or presents a situation on which a jury might properly draw conflicting inferences. The St. Petersburg case held the facts there involved, together with the inferences to which they are susceptible, should have been presented to the jury. The question here is whether the instant case should have gone to the jury or was properly disposed of by summary judgment.
The complaint charged that the police pursued the vehicle 'operated by Robert Anderson at speeds in excess of ninety miles per hour * * * in a negligent, careless and reckless disregard for the lives and property of others.'; that the area of pursuit is well populated, that the police officers knew the fleeing vehicle had run several red lights and knew or should have known that 'to continue the chase at speeds in excess of ninety miles per hour in the above-described area would create an unreasonable risk * * * and that the foreseeable risk of great bodily harm to members of the public, such as Audrey Horne, outweighed their duty to arrest a mere traffic offender; that the officers nevertheless continued the chase and the aforementioned accident was the result of such carelessness and reckless conduct.'
It seems reasonably clear that the complaint charged that the pursuit itself constituted reckless and wanton conduct rather than that, although pursuit per se was lawful, the manner of pursuit, the conduct of the officers in otherwise discharging a necessary duty, was reckless and wanton. It is not made to appear on which theory the trial court ruled there was no liability. The District Court did not draw the distinction nor did it decide whether vel non a municipality is responsible for damages caused by persons attempting to escape arrest. 5
In this cause it was the police officer's duty when, in his presence, the offender refused to accept the tickets and escaped at excessive speed, ignoring stop signs and red lights, to halt the violations and apprehend the offender. If, by his complaint, the plaintiff charges the officer with reckless conduct simply because he pursued the offender, on the theory that mere pursuit creates a highway danger, we must disagree. Neither would we agree that while the officers should pursue offenders he must do so at lawful rates of speed or, in this case, at thirty miles per hour while the offender moved off at ninety miles per hour. We think the rule is that the officer should take such steps as may be necessary to apprehend to offender but, in doing so, not exceed proper and rational bounds nor act in a negligent, careless or wanton manner.
In determining whether an officer, in pursuit, has acted negligently or recklessly it is to be borne in mind that he is charged with the duty of arresting the offender and must often exceed the precautions normally imposed upon individuals. The Albro case held the standard of care exercised by him must be judged liberally and that the city, exercising its police power for the protection of the public, should not be liable in damages for every mistake of judgment by its officers; that, although under Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 6 the city is liable for the negligent acts of its officers, the required care is not the same as that of an individual. 7
This Court in City of Miami v. Simpson 8 (opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Thornal, author of the Hargrove decision) noted with approval the...
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