City of Miami v. Steckloff

• Decision Date: 29 April 1959
• Citation: 111 So.2d 446
• Parties: CITY OF MIAMI, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. Micheal STECKLOFF, Individually and as Trustee, and Diane Steckloff, his wife, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 446

111 So.2d 446

CITY OF MIAMI, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. Micheal STECKLOFF, Individually and as Trustee, and Diane Steckloff, his wife, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 29, 1959.

William L. Pallot and Jack R. Rice, Jr., Miami, for appellant.

Brigham, Wright, Dressler & Rearick, Miami, for appellees.

THORNAL, Justice.

Appellant, City of Miami, which was defendant below in a declaratory judgment proceeding, seeks reversal of a final decree involving the validity of a statute.

Several points for reversal are cited but we are bound to note a jurisdictional defect which precludes our consideration of the matter.

Appellees Steckloff filed a complaint for declaratory decree alleging, among other things, the unconstitutionality of Chapter 30688, Laws of Florida 1955. The Chancellor agreed with the appellees and by his final decree declared the cited statute to be unconstitutional. The City of Miami, which was defendant below, appealed assigning numerous errors.

Our jurisdiction has been invoked under Article V, Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., apparently on the ground that the final decree was one directly 'passing upon the validity of a state statute * * *.'

If the appellant had by its briefs and points raised in this court asserted its right to a review of that aspect of the decree which passed on the validity of a statute, we would undoubtedly have jurisdiction. This, however, the appellant has failed to do. By its brief on appeal the appellant city makes no contention whatsoever that the trial judge committed error in declaring the statute invalid. The only points raised and argued by appellant are that the trial judge was 'without jurisdiction' to determine the constitutionality of the statute and that the plaintiffs were estopped to raise the question. The sum of the points argued and submitted for our consideration, therefore, are merely that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the doctrine of estoppel should be applied against the appellees, who were the plaintiffs below.

Obviously the appellant has presented no matter for our consideration which is comprehended within our jurisdictional limits delineated by the Constitution. It is an established rule that points covered by a decree of the trial court will not be considered by an appellate court unless they are properly raised and discussed in the briefs. An assigned error will be deemed to have been abandoned when it is completely omitted from the briefs.

We have several times noted that the constitutional provisions defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Missouri are similar to those which define our own jurisdiction. In Bankers Mortgage Co. v. Lessley, Mo., 31 S.W.2d 1055, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that even though a constitutional question is timely raised in the trial court, it will be deemed abandoned if not briefed and urged in the Supreme Court. It was further held that when jurisdiction depends solely upon the involvement of such a constitutional question which is abandoned, the case will not be retained for consideration even though at the outset it would properly appear to have been within the orbit of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction because of the trial court ruling. State ex rel. Town of Olivetta v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Mo., 273 S.W.2d 268; Mo.App., 280 S.W.2d 134; City of St. Louis v. Butler, 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372; Mo.App., 223 S.W.2d 831; Stribling v. Jolley, 362 Mo. 995, 245 S.W.2d 885; 241 Mo.App. 1123, 253 S.W.2d 519; McGuire v. Hutchison, 256 Mo. 203, 201 S.W.2d 322; 240...