City of Milwaukee v. Horvath
| Decision Date | 01 July 1966 |
| Citation | 31 Wis.2d 490,143 N.W.2d 446 |
| Parties | CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Respondent, v. Dorothy HORVATH, Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Dorothry E. Horvath, in pro. per.
John J. Fleming, City Atty., Patrick J. Madden, Asst. City Atty., for respondent.
The single issue presented on this appeal is whether Milwaukee Ordinance, sec. 101--321, 2 which permits imprisonment upon failure to pay a fine, is constitutional.
It is well established that actions for violations of municipal ordinances, such as those in the instant case, are civil proceedings. 3 Appellant contends that the disputed ordinance is repugnant to both sec. 1, art. XIII, (Thirteenth amendment) of the United States Constitution, 4 and sec. 2, art. I, of the Wisconsin Constitution, 5 both of which forbid involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime.
This court ruled in State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege that direct imprisonment for punishment of a municipal ordinance infraction would violate sec. 2, art. I of the Wisconsin Constitution, 6 but that imprisonment to enforce the collection of a fine would not. 7
Appellant argues that the refusal to pay a fine resulting from an ordinance breach is no more a crime than the violation of the ordinance itself; that, if it violates the constitution for a municipality to provide for direct imprisonment for the violation of an ordinance, it also violates the constitution for a municipality to provide for indirect imprisonment for failure to pay a fine levied as a result of that infraction.
In Schmiege this court clearly ruled otherwise by stating:
8
Where imprisonment is for the purpose of aiding in the collection of a fine that has been legally levied, it is not, as appellant urges, imprisonment 'for a crime.' It makes 'effective the imposition of a fine.' The defendant, by paying the fine, avoids any imprisonment. It is analogous to most civil contempt judgments where a jail sentence is imposed as an alternative to performance under the judgment. In such case, the contemptee has the keys to his cell and by doing what the court orders he can escape being jailed. 9
Appellant might argue that she was indigent and unable to pay the fine; that for the poor the fine with the followup imprisonment on failure to pay amounts to imprisonment for an ordinance violation; that thus, the city ends up doing indirectly what it could not do directly--bring about imprisonment for the violation of an ordinance.
To adopt this line of reasoning would be to vitiate all fines of ordinance violators who could be considered 'indigent,' to allow such offenders to violate the city's ordinances with impunity. We reaffirm Schmiege that where a fine is levied and imprisonment provided on failure to pay the fine, such imprisonment does not violate either sec. 2, art. I, of the Wisconsin Constitution, or sec. 1, art. XIII, of the United States Constitution.
Even assuming that the jailing of appellant for nonpayment of her fines amounts to 'punishment for crime' we must reject appellant's contention that this amounts to 'involuntary servitude' within the meaning of either the federal or state constitutions. The immediate object of the Thirteenth amendment was to abolish slavery. 10 The term 'involuntary servitude' contained in the amendment is understood to have a broader meaning than slavery 11 and has been interpreted by the United States supreme court to mean 'a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another' 12 or the 13 More specifically, the evils intended to be eliminated were 'those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which, in practical operation, would tend to produce like undesirable results.' 14
Thus it is clear that the involuntary-servitude proviso of the Thirteenth amendment is not directed to the present facts. Mere imprisonment, without the imposition of labor, is not servitude. 15
This court has not yet been called upon to interpret the meaning of 'involuntary servitude' in sec. 2, art. I, of the Wisconsin Constitution. However, since both the federal and Wisconsin provisions were patterned after the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 16 the decisions of the United States supreme court interpreting the Thirteenth amendment should also apply with equal force and effect to sec. 2, art. I. 17
Judgment affirmed.
1 Sec. 101--321 'In default of payment of any forfeiture and costs of prosecution, the violator shall be imprisoned in the house of correction or the county jail until said forfeiture and costs are paid, but such imprisonment shall not exceed ninety (90) days.'
2 Enacted pursuant to sec. 66.12(1)(c), Stats.
3 Sec. 66.12(1)(a), Stats., provides: 'An action for violation of a city or village ordinance, resolution or bylaw is a civil action. * * *' See also: City of Neenah v. Alsteen (1966), 30 Wis.2d 596, 600, 142 N.W.2d 232; City of Milwaukee v. Antczak (1964), 24 Wis.2d 480, 481, 129 N.W.2d 125; City of Milwaukee v. Bub (1962), 18 Wis.2d 216, 218, 118 N.W.2d 123; State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege (1947), 251 Wis. 79, 86, 28 N.W.2d 345, 174 A.L.R. 1338.
4
5
6 Supra, footnote 3, 251 Wis. at page 85, 28 N.W.2d 345. See also City of Waukesha v. Stathas (1949), 255 Wis. 76, 79, 37 N.W.2d 846, and State ex rel. McStroul v. Lucas (1947), 251 Wis. 285, 291, 29 N.W.2d 73.
7 State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, supra, footnote 3, 261 Wis. at page 85, 28 N.W.2d 345. See also City of Milwaukee v. Johnson (1927), 192 Wis. 585, 592, 213 N.W. 335.
8 Supra, footnote 3, 251 Wis. at page 85, 28 N.W.2d at page 348. This rationale was also followed in the case of City of Milwaukee v. Johnson, supra, footnote 7, 192 Wis. at page 592, 213 N.W. at page 338: ...
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