City of Minneapolis v. Janney
| Decision Date | 02 May 1902 |
| Docket Number | 12,916 - (35) |
| Citation | 90 N.W. 312,86 Minn. 111 |
| Parties | CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS v. THOMAS B. JANNEY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action of ejectment in the district court for Hennepin county. The case was tried before Pond, J., who found in favor of defendant. From an order denying a motion for a new trial plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Deed of Municipal Corporation -- Special Laws.
Under the provisions of the charter of the city of Minneapolis , as amended (Sp. Laws 1887, c. 15, § 3), authority, in form, was conferred upon the city council, by the vote of a majority of all of its members, to authorize the proper city officers to execute and deliver a deed of conveyance to the Minneapolis Industrial Exposition, a corporation, of certain land belonging to the city, upon which the corporation had already erected its exposition building; said deed to contain certain prescribed conditions. By a further amendment (Sp. Laws 1891, c. 131, § 1), the city council was, in form, authorized to release and relieve the exposition company from the conditions previously imposed in the deed of conveyance, and to relinquish by quitclaim deed all of the right, title, claim, and interest of the city in and to the property previously conveyed.
Deed of Municipal Corporation.
By these acts of the legislature, both conveyances were authorized to be executed without the payment of money and without further consideration.
Findings -- Taxation not for Private Purpose.
The finding of fact, in effect, that the exposition, in form a private corporation, was organized largely, if not wholly, for a public purpose, and that, by reason of the industrial expositions which were given by it, the city acquired and secured for itself great and substantial benefits and advantages, held supported by the evidence. Held, further, upon the facts, as a matter of law, that the taxation necessarily, although indirectly, resulting from a donation of the property in question for exposition purposes, was for a public, and not for a private, use, and was not obnoxious to the rule that the power of taxation must not be exercised for private purposes.
Invalid Tax.
To justify a court in declaring a tax invalid on the ground that it was not imposed for the benefit of the public, the absence of a public interest in the purpose for which the money is raised by taxation must be so clear and palpable as to be immediately perceptible to every mind.
Duty of State -- Education.
It is the duty of the state to promote the educational interests of its people, to encourage their industrial pursuits, to advance their material resources, and to foster their commercial interests, by providing all reasonable facilities therefor demanded by a prudent regard for the growth, development, and general prosperity of its people, and taxation for such uses is not to be tied down to any narrow and mere utilitarian policy.
Exhibition a Public Enterprise.
It is beyond question that exhibitions of the nature of those made by the Minneapolis Industrial Exposition are well calculated to advance the material interests, and to promote the general welfare, of the people of the community in which they are made, and that which promotes such an object and facilitates such a result in any community is a public and municipal enterprise, in the truest sense. The proposition that such expositions are so far public in their character and effect as to justify public aid in the form of appropriations is well settled in this country.
Right of Taxation.
The right of taxation depends upon the ultimate use, purpose, and object for which the fund is raised, and not on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it.
Frank Healy and William H. Morse, for appellant.
Hahn, Belden & Hawley, for respondent.
1. Under the original charter provisions of plaintiff city, the common council seems to have been authorized to sell its real property when a majority of the members concluded and considered it for the best interests of the city so to do . But there is no necessity to pass upon the question in this case, because by the charter amendment (Sp. Laws 1885, [p. 48] c. 2, § 16) power was conferred upon the council to sell real estate belonging to the city, by a vote of two-thirds of all of the members thereof. The plain purpose of this amendment was to curtail the already existing power of the council, so that real estate could not be sold by a bare majority vote of its members, as had previously been permissible.
In January, 1886, the city council, by resolution, assured the exposition company, just incorporated, that the property in dispute, belonging to the city absolutely, and not impressed with any special trust, should be conveyed to it in fee, as a site upon which its building might be erected; and thereupon the company proceeded to expend $250,000 in the erection of a suitable structure, in which an exposition was held in the fall of 1886. By an amendment to section 14, supra (Sp. Laws 1887 [p. 447] c. 15, § 3) the legislature authorized the city council, by a majority vote of all of its members, to confer authority upon the proper city officers to execute and deliver deeds of conveyance to the company of the land on which this building had theretofore been erected; this provision being followed by a description of the premises. This act also required that conditions be inserted in the conveyance providing for a reversion of the lands to the city in case of a breach by the grantee company of the conditions prescribed.
It is very clear, from the legislative act of 1887 and the existing circumstances, that it was not intended to restrict the council to a sale of the premises for a money consideration. Such a construction is wholly inconsistent and at variance with the language used, which empowered the council to authorize the execution of proper deeds, and is also opposed to the facts then well known. The authority was to convey, not to sell. The building had already been erected by consent of the council, and upon an assurance that the site would be donated, and a formal conveyance made when legislation could be obtained. Conditions were to be inserted in this conveyance, and, had a sale been intended, there would have been no such conditions imposed; nor would provisions have been required through which reversion would result in case the conditions were not complied with. No doubt can exist as to the intent of the legislature to empower a conveyance as a gratuity and without further consideration.
But if this were not so, we find another amendment to section 14 (Sp. Laws 1891 [p. 764] c. 131, § 1) by which the council was authorized formally to release the exposition company from any of the conditions imposed upon it in the deeds of conveyance previously executed under the authority of the legislative acts before mentioned. It was then enacted that the exposition company could be released from the conditions imposed, and the council was authorized to relinquish, by quitclaim deed, whenever it deemed it for the best interests of the city, all of the right, title, claim, and interest of said city in and to the property previously conveyed, "including all reversionary rights reserved in its deeds of conveyance to said corporation." An affirmative vote of three-fourths of the members of the council was required by this act. In December, 1891, by vote of more than the prescribed number of its members, a resolution was adopted by the council, and thereafter duly approved by the mayor, in which was recited the fact of the previous conveyance; the conditions made a part thereof; that, in case of failure to perform in accordance with its terms, the conveyed property should revert to the city, together with further recitals as to what part of the conditions had been complied with, wherein there had been default; and that the law of 1891 had been passed, authorizing the council to release and absolve the corporation from further compliance with these conditions. This resolution then directed and empowered the mayor and city clerk to execute and deliver to the company a quitclaim deed in conformity with the provisions of the legislative act.
Under the provisions found in these various enactments, we are clearly of the opinion that in so far as legislative permission was required, or authority could be conferred, both deeds were authorized, and were properly executed and delivered. They cannot be questioned upon the ground of absence of legislative authority to execute and deliver them, without ignoring and disregarding the plain language of these various enactments.
2. The court below found that the exposition company, although in form a private corporation, was in fact organized by its members largely, if not wholly, for a public purpose, and also found that, through and solely by reason of eight yearly industrial exhibitions which were given, the plaintiff city had acquired and secured for itself great and substantial benefits and advantages. These findings are assailed by counsel for the city upon the ground that they are not supported by the evidence. We think they are.
Expositions of this character are not inaugurated or carried forward with a view to pecuniary profit, but are promoted in the hope that they may at least be self-sustaining, and not result in pecuniary loss to the promoters. Profit is not anticipated and, experience demonstrates, rarely results. The design and purpose is to promote the welfare of the people by bringing them in touch and to a more intimate relationship with many things which are...
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