City of Montgomery v. Zgouvas
Decision Date | 29 September 2006 |
Docket Number | CR-05-0039. |
Citation | 953 So.2d 434 |
Parties | CITY OF MONTGOMERY v. Thyno ZGOUVAS. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Stephanie Smithee, Montgomery, for appellant.
William R. Blanchard, Montgomery, for appellee.
David Gespass and Thomas B. Diasio, Birmingham, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama and American Civil Liberties Union, in support of the appellee.
Thyno Zgouvas was charged in Montgomery Municipal Court with violating Ordinance No. 1-9 of the City of Montgomery, which makes the commitment of a misdemeanor as defined by the laws of the State of Alabama within the city limits an offense against the City. Specifically, Zgouvas was accused of making harassing communications in violation of § 13A-11-8(b), Ala.Code 1975, which states:
Zgouvas was convicted in Montgomery Municipal Court and appealed his conviction to the Montgomery Circuit Court pursuant to § 12-14-70, Ala.Code 1975. Zgouvas filed a motion to dismiss the charge, alleging that § 13A-11-8(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975, is vague and overbroad. The trial court granted Zgouvas's motion, and the City of Montgomery now appeals the trial court's order granting Zgouvas's motion.
Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the standard of review when determining whether a statute is constitutional:
McInnish v. Riley, 925 So.2d 174, 178 (Ala.2005).
Before making any determination whether § 13A-11-8(b)(1)a is constitutional, a court must first determine whether Zgouvas has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
J.L.N. v. State, 894 So.2d 751, 753 (Ala. 2004).
An exception to the aforementioned rule exists for questions of overbreadth in First Amendment speech-or-expression cases. As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
Thus, Zgouvas may challenge the constitutionality of the statute in question based on the overbreadth doctrine. However, because the vagueness doctrine is a separate and distinct concept, we must consider whether Zgouvas has standing to challenge the statute based on vagueness. A review of Zgouvas's motion to dismiss, the transcript of the hearing before the trial judge regarding Zgouvas's motion, and Zgouvas's brief to this Court indicates that Zgouvas is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute as it applies to him, but instead is basing his challenge on hypothetical situations involving "a person who uses the telephone to warn another of a fire, flood, storm or other apparent imminent hazard." (Appellee's brief, p. 12).1 In fact, Zgouvas challenges this statute as being vague based on its use of the term "alarm."
However, upon reviewing the written deposition given by the complainant, we conclude that this is obviously a situation where Zgouvas "communicate[d] . . . in a manner likely to harass . . . ." § 13A-11-8(b)(1)a. The complainant alleged that she assisted Zgouvas while he was making a purchase for his girlfriend in the store where she was employed. The item apparently had to be ordered. The next day Zgouvas telephoned the store, and the complainant informed him the item had not arrived. Zgouvas then told her that he was coming by the store later to give her something. When he arrived, Zgouvas presented a bouquet of flowers and a letter for the complainant. Two days later Zgouvas telephoned the store repeatedly, and the complainant's coworkers took messages for her. That evening Zgouvas appeared at the store inquiring of the complainant about the status of the item ordered. In the conversation that ensued, the complainant told that Zgouvas that things needed to remain professional between the two as she had a boyfriend and Zgouvas apparently had a girlfriend. The next day the complainant telephoned Zgouvas and informed him that the item he had ordered had arrived. When Zgouvas arrived at the store to collect the item, he presented the complainant with a bottle of vodka, a bottle of cranberry juice, and another letter. The complainant later telephoned Zgouvas and told him not to call her or send her gifts again and that if he shopped in the store again someone else would have to assist him. Zgouvas then told the complainant to tell her boyfriend that "if he ever hurt [her] there was a Greek man following [her] around Montgomery trying to date [her]." (C. 10.) The complainant alleges that the following week Zgouvas followed her as she was leaving the shopping center where she is employed. A week later Zgouvas sent the complainant a large, expensive bouquet of flowers and a DVD of the movie Serendipity. The complainant also alleges that on numerous occasions Zgouvas would telephone her place of business and would hang up when...
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...Brook, 688 So. 2d 292,296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (specifically adopting the reasoning in Yates); see also City of Montgomery v. Zgouvas, 953 So. 2d 434, 443 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (same). As such, the Court adopts the reasoning in Yates as to the First Amendment issues as well and declines ......
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