City of Montpelier v. Cent. Vermont Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 May 1915
• Citation: 93 A. 1047
• Parties: CITY OF MONTPELIER v. CENTRAL VERMONT RY. CO.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

93 A. 1047

CITY OF MONTPELIER

v. CENTRAL VERMONT RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 10, 1915.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Exceptions from Washington County Court; Frank L. Fish, Judge.

Action by the City of Montpeller agalns; the Central Vermont Railway Company, to recover taxes. There was verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Modified and affirmed.

Argued before POWERS, C. J., and MUNSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and TAYLOR, JJ.

Burton E. Bailey and Fred B. Thomas, both of Montpelier, for plaintiff. Harry B. Amey, of Island Pond, and John W. Gordon, of Barre, for defendant.

HASELTON, J. This is an action under sections 644, 645, 646, of the Public Statutes, as amended by No. 52 of the Acts of 1910. It is brought to collect, in the manner therein provided, taxes assessed in 1911 on three pieces of railroad property separately set in the grand list, and collector's fees. One piece is set in as about three-eighths of an acre of land leased to B. Blair, R. C. Bowers, and E. W. Bailey & Co., another piece is called the Langdon meadow, and is set in the list as 18 acres of land with buildings on Winooski avenue. The third piece is called the Nicholas meadow, and is described in the list as 24 acres of land and storehouse. There are farm buildings on the Langdon meadow, and there is a storehouse on the Nicholas meadow. The Langdon meadow and the Nicholas meadow adjoin each other, and both belonged to the Langdon estate until October, 1910, when they were purchased by the defendant company. The defendant pleaded the general issue with notice of special matter in defense. Trial by jury was had, and verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff for the sum of $358.21, being the amount of the taxes claimed and collector's fees. The defendant brings a bill of exceptions.

The defendant, under an exception taken in the course of the trial, claims that the city of Montpelier could not collect a tax by suit, in the manner here attempted, on the ground that the statute permitting a tax to be collected in such proceeding is applicable only to taxes imposed or assessed under certain chapters of the Public Statutes named in the act authorizing this procedure. Acts of 1910, No. 52, § 1. But the chapters referred to are the ones under which the city of Montpelier and other cities, as well as towns, impose and assess taxes. These chapters contain the general tax law as to quadrennial appraisals and the making up of grand lists and the assessment of taxes thereon, and the city of Montpelier has no other authority under which it can impose and assess taxes. Minor details as to procedure do not affect the fact that the authority to impose and assess taxes is found in the chapters referred to. There is no doubt about the intent of the Legislature as derived from its legislative acts. Cities are not named, because in this matter the word "towns" applies to cities, P. S. 23.

The defendant claimed and claims that the declaration was insufficient. But the statute says what shall be a sufficient declaration, and the declaration meets the statutory requirements. The defendant's claim is that the declaration should show things which the statute says it need not show, and such a claim is without merit. The specifications filed were amended to the satisfaction of the defendant,

Before treating the exceptions to evidence and!, the other numerous exceptions, we point out that, under the statute sued upon, we have no occasion to consider claimed grounds of the invalidity of the whole or any portion of the tax, except in so far as the notice sets forth the "particular grounds" of the claimed invalidity, but that, when such grounds are so set forth in the notice, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff "in so far as the validity of the tax is so put in issue." Acts of 1910, No. 52, § 2.

On trial the plaintiff, under objection and exception, introduced in evidence a certified copy of the warning of the March meeting for 1911. The eleventh article of the warning read:

"To see if the city will vote a tax for the payment of debts and current expenses of the city."

The defendant's objection was that the article was so general that a valid tax could not be assessed by virtue of it. We think this article in the warning was admissible. The city council has rather extensive powers. The charter provides that it shall assess taxes upon the grand list of the city for such purposes as the city at a meeting warned for that purpose may vote; and one of the purposes, named among others, is "the payment of the debts and current expenses of the city." Again the charter provides that the money raised by taxation, fines, and other lawful sources, except the sale of bonds, "shall constitute the entire sum from which appropriations and payments are to be made by the authority of the city council, except that the money raised by bonds shall be appropriated and paid out for the purposes for which the bonds were issued." Acts of 1900, §§ 47, 55.

The city meeting does not have to vote separate and respective sums for the maintenance of the police, the support of the poor, the current expenses of the fire department, those of the water department, and so on; but appropriations for these various departments and purposes are to be made by the city council out of the tax raised to meet the current expenses of the city.

The plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of the records of the city meeting, so far as it related to certain articles of the warning.

Article 9 reads:

"To see if the city will make some provision for the payment of its bonded indebtedness."

Article 10 was of the following tenor: "To see if the city will vote a tax sufficient to raise the amount of money estimated by the board of school commissioners as necessary for school purposes."

Article 11 is that which has been quoted earlier in the opinion.

When articles 9 and 10 were reached, it was voted to pass them over.

The record as to article 11, relating to a tax for the payment of the debts and current expenses of the city, is as follows:

"Voted on motion of George L. Blanchard that a tax of $1.60 on the grand list be voted to include the furnishing of the city hall, and ten cents of the same to be applied on the indebtedness of the city. This motion to cover articles nine, ten, and eleven."

The defendant objected to the record of the city meeting on the following grounds: Because the action taken under article 11 was unintelligible in that it jumbled together three different things; because, before the vote was taken under article 11, articles 9 and 10 had been passed over; and because the record does not show what the vote taken may have covered, and that the record does not declare the result of the vote, if there was one. The objection was overruled, and in this there was no error. By passing over articles 9 and 10, the voters were able to see, by the vote taken on article 11, more distinctly the aggregate tax which they were voting, while at the same time they could see what amount they were voting on the indebtedness of the city, to which article 9 related, and that the tax voted included the amount estimated by the school commissioners as necessary for school purposes, which under the charter became, upon the action of the school commissioners, a fixed sum which the city council was bound to raise by assessment Acts of 1900, No. 162, § 47.

The policy of the Legislature, as expressed in the charter of the city of Montpelier, is to commit to a board of school commissioners, having in charge the one matter of the management and control of the schools, the sole right to determine, within certain limits, the sum which shall be raised for the support of schools. Acts of 1900, No. 162, §§ 89, 93, 94, and 47. These charter provisions are not in their essential character peculiar to the city of Montpelier, but are expressed in other city charters. Here the school commissioners had made and submitted their estimates, as sufficiently appears, had kept within the limit of the discretion intrusted to them, and the vote to raise a tax which was to cover the school estimates, and the current expenses, and the amount to be applied on the debt, was certain as to the amount to be raised to meet current expenses, since it was capable of being made certain by a very simple computation. No objection was made on the ground that the furnishing of the city hall was not one of the current expenses of the city.

The fact that the record states the scope of the motion after stating the vote on it seems to be one ground of the objection; but the meaning is clear enough, and the result of the vote is stated in unmistakable terms.

At a city meeting held July 25, 1911, on adjournment from a previous date, a 15 cent tax was voted. The record of this meeting was put in evidence by the plaintiff under objection and exception. The objection was that the record did not show a valid tax to be assessed against the defendant, but the only ground of claimed invalidity pointed out was that the vote did not show upon what list the tax was to be assessed. The warning explicitly referred to the grand list of 1911, and the action was taken thereunder, and the tax voted was to be payable on a date named in the autumn of 1911. The tax must be understood to have been voted on the list of 1911 pursuant to the warning.

The plaintiff, under objection and exception, introduced in evidence a book showing the preliminary or qualifying oath taken March 29, 1910, by each of the persons chosen as listers in that year. The defendant objected because the oath failed to show that the persons taking it swore to do anything as listers, or to describe them as listers. However, the oath is exactly that prescribed by statute (P. S. 577), and is sufficient. The defendant also objected because the jurat does not designate or describe them as listers. But the taking of this oath was necessary to make...