City of Moultrie v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 01 December 1899
• Citation: 34 S.E. 600,109 Ga. 370
• Parties: MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF MOULTRIE v. PATTERSON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

34 S.E. 600

109 Ga. 370

MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF MOULTRIE v. PATTERSON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 1, 1899

Syllabus by the Court.

A court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain the execution of a municipal ordinance of a criminal nature, on the ground of the invalidity of such ordinance, nor on the further ground that the plaintiff is exempt from the operation of the same. The person affected has a full and adequate remedy at law to test the validity of the ordinance as well as the question of his exemption from its operation.

Error from superior court, Colquitt county; A. H. Hansell, Judge.

Suit by A. D. Patterson against the mayor and aldermen of the city of Moultrie. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

McKenzie & McKenzie and J. A. Wilkes, for plaintiff in error.

N. M Reynolds and Covington & Smithwick, for defendant in error.

LITTLE J.

Patterson presented his petition to the judge of the superior court alleging that in June, 1899, the mayor and aldermen of the city of Moultrie passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of beef, mutton, pork, and fish within the limits of the city of Moultrie, except in the city market, and a violation of the terms of said ordinance was punishable by a fine, in the discretion of the mayor. Petitioner alleges that he is a disabled, indigent Confederate soldier, and was possessed of the necessary certificate which allowed him to peddle and do business in this state without a license; that in August, 1899, he was arrested by the marshal of the city of Moultrie for a violation of the terms of said ordinance, and was tried, convicted, and fined. He further alleges that the ordinance is invalid, and, if it is not, that the certificate issued to him empowered him to sell meats in the incorporation of the city of Moultrie, and to be immune from arrest and interruption in his business. He further alleges that, if he continues to ply his said business, he will be constantly arrested and fined. He prays for an injunction restraining the mayor and aldermen of the city of Moultrie from in any way interfering with his business, and from arresting him, from arraigning him in the police court, or from fining or imprisoning him, and from the collection of such fines as have already been imposed. Defendant demurred to the petition,--among other grounds, that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of a criminal ordinance by injunction, and that a court of equity has no right to prevent prosecutions for any criminal offense in the violation of municipal ordinances by injunction. These are the only questions which we find it necessary to consider.

The doctrine is laid down in 2 High, Inj. § 1244, that "a court of equity will not, therefore, interfere by injunction to restrain municipal officers from prosecuting suits against complainants, or from interfering with their business, because of their violation of municipal ordinances which are alleged to be illegal, since the question of the validity of such ordinances does not properly pertain to a court of equity, when complainants have a perfect remedy at law, if the ordinances are invalid, by an action to recover damages for the injury sustained,"--citing West v. Mayor, etc., 10 Paige, 539; Cohen v. Commissioners, 77 N.C. 2. And in 2 Beach, Inj. § 1289, it is declared that "an injunction will not be granted to prevent the enforcement of a municipal ordinance on the ground of its alleged illegality; for, if a criminal prosecution should ensue upon its violation, its validity would then come directly before the courts,"--citing Wardens St. Peter's Episcopal Church v. Town of Washington, 109 N.C. 21, 13 S.E. 700. In the case of Phillips v. Mayor,...