City of Muskogee v. Martin

• Decision Date: 17 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 62692,62692
• Parties: 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3265, 1990 OK 70 CITY OF MUSKOGEE, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Henry Sharp, Chief of Police of the City of Muskogee, Plaintiff/Intervenor, v. Mr. John MARTIN, Chairman of the Merit System Board of the City of Muskogee; Mr. D.C. Hilton, Member of the Merit System Board of the City of Muskogee; and Mr. Jack Farr, Member of the Merit System Board of the City of Muskogee, Defendants, and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 2465, Co-defendant/Intervenor, and Warren D. Haworth, Intervenor below (co-defendant in trial court), Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 337

796 P.2d 337

134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3265, 1990 OK 70

CITY OF MUSKOGEE, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee and Henry Sharp, Chief of Police of the City of Muskogee Plaintiff/Intervenor, v. Mr. John MARTIN, Chairman of the Merit System Board of the City of Muskogee; Mr. D.C. Hilton, Member of the Merit System Board of the City of Muskogee; and Mr. Jack Farr Member of the Merit System Board of the City of Muskogee, Defendants and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 2465, Co-defendant/Intervenor, and Warren D. Haworth, Intervenor below (co-defendant in trial court), Appellant.

No. 62692.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 17, 1990.

On Appeal from the District Court, Muskogee County; James E. Edmondson, Judge.

Demoted police officer appeals from a declaratory judgment of the district court that ordered the case remanded to the City of Muskogee's Merit System Board for review of the officer's demotion.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Gregory Meier, Lloyd Payton, Muskogee, for appellant.

Steve Cousparis, City Atty., Muskogee, for appellee.

OPALA, Vice Chief Justice.

Four issues are presented for our determination: Whether the district court was the proper authority to interpret the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement when the parties had contractually agreed to submit to arbitration all disputes concerning the contract's interpretation or a term or condition of employment. Whether the district court was the proper authority to declare what grievance procedure was due a demoted police officer whose employment was covered by the agreement. Whether the district court gave its declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable controversy and without possessing subject matter jurisdiction of the claim? and Whether the district court deprived police officer Haworth of due process by granting the declaratory judgment without hearing any evidence the day the court issued its order? We answer the first two questions in the affirmative only insofar as we hold that the district court had the authority to determine if the dispute was arbitrable. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, it was within the authority of the arbitration panel, not the district court, to resolve all disputes concerning the meaning and interpretation of that agreement. We answer the third and fourth questions in the negative.

FACTS

Appellee, City of Muskogee [city], and the Fraternal Order of Police [FOP], Lodge No. 95, entered into a collective bargaining agreement ¹ effective July 1, 1982 through June 30, 1984. On March 23, 1984, the city's police chief demoted Appellant, police officer Warren Haworth [Haworth]. Haworth, invoking Article XVII § 14 ² of the agreement, requested a hearing before the city's merit system board [merit board]. The merit board subsequently scheduled a hearing.

Prior to the hearing, the city filed suit against the Merit Board in the District Court, Muskogee County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the hearing; Haworth intervened as a party defendant. ³ The city alleged a dispute between itself and Haworth concerning whether the merit board could conduct a "hearing" or a "review" of Haworth's demotion under the Merit System Rules [merit rules]. The city claimed the merit rules, as a provision of the collective bargaining agreement, constituted a term and condition of employment. As such, under Article XVII § 2 ⁴ the city and the FOP agreed to submit to arbitration all disputes concerning the interpretation of any provision of the agreement or a term and condition of employment. The district court's temporary order restrained the merit board hearing.

Haworth challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court and he contended the merit board, not the district court or an arbitration panel, was the proper forum to resolve the dispute. Haworth also contended the merit rules entitled him to a full evidentiary hearing, not merely a merit board review. After hearing the matter, the district court granted the declaratory judgment and ordered the case remanded to the merit board for a "review" rather than a "hearing".

I. THE ARBITRATION ISSUE

Arbitration is the prime vehicle for resolving a dispute concerning the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement formed under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act. ⁵ The legislative proclamation in 11 O.S.1981 § 51-111 ⁶ ensures arbitration's use by requiring an arbitration clause in all collective bargaining agreements entered into under the Act. ⁷ The statute commands that any controversies over the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements are to have an "immediate and speedy resolution by required mediation." ⁸

The main purpose of arbitration is to prevent court intrusion "into the merits of disputes" when there is an agreement to arbitrate disputes concerning contract interpretation. ⁹ For quick resolution of these disputes, the role of the district court is limited to determining whether the dispute is one that is covered by the contract. ¹⁰ In the presence of any dispute regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the first remedy lies with the contractually-agreed-upon arbitration, and the district court has no authority to disturb the function of arbitration. ¹¹

In the Steelworkers Trilogy, ¹² the United States Supreme Court also expressed a federal court policy preferring arbitration. When contracting parties agree to arbitrate questions concerning the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the court's function is narrowly restricted to determine whether the party requesting arbitration asserts a "claim which on its face" is covered by the agreement. ¹³ The arbitrator decides if the party is "right or wrong". ¹⁴ Therefore, in the presence of an agreed-upon arbitration procedure, the arbitration forum, not the courts, is responsible for interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. ¹⁵

It is, of course, within the authority of the courts to determine if a dispute is arbitrable under a collective bargaining agreement. ¹⁶ Arbitration should be allowed unless the court can say with "positive assurance" the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause. ¹⁷ "Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." ¹⁸

Specifically, in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., ¹⁹ an employer-union dispute arose regarding a collective bargaining agreement provision. The provision stated in part, "matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be subject to arbitration under this section." ²⁰ The agreement also contained an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of the meaning and application of the agreement. ²¹ The employer refused to arbitrate its action of contracting out maintenance work because it was "strictly a function of management" and not arbitrable under the agreement. The union contended that contracting out violated the agreement. The Warrior Court held where the collective bargaining agreement required disputes over the agreement's meaning to be resolved by arbitration and the agreement did not contain an express provision excluding contracting out from arbitration, the question of whether contracting out violated the agreement was for the arbiter rather than the courts. ²² Without an express provision in the agreement removing a certain grievance from arbitration, "only the most forceful evidence" of the parties' intent not to arbitrate a claim prevails. ²³ This proves especially true in the presence of a vague exclusion clause and a broad arbitration provision. ²⁴

The dispute in the present case can be simply stated--is Haworth entitled to a merit board review or a full evidentiary merit board hearing with respect to the collective bargaining agreement, Article XVII § 14, and the merit rules? ²⁵ Also, does Article XVII § 2's arbitration panel or the merit board have the authority to resolve this dispute?

The city and the FOP agreed to submit any controversy between the parties "concerning the interpretation, enforcement, or application of any provision of the agreement, concerning any of the terms or conditions of employment contained in this agreement" to a procedure concluding with arbitration. ²⁶ In the presence of such an arbitration clause, the role of the district court was narrowly limited to determining whether the dispute over the meaning of the merit rules was covered by the agreement or whether the merit rules constituted a term and condition of employment.

The crucial inquiry is whether Article XVII, § 14 operates to include the merit rules within the collective bargaining agreement; ²⁷ we find it does. Under § 14, the parties agreed that grievances concerning promotion, demotion, suspension, dismissal, or other disciplinary action are subject to merit board review and must be governed by the merit rules. Section 14 is a provision intentionally placed in the agreement to assure the merit rules, rather than the general grievance procedures of Article XVII, are followed in the specifically enumerated grievances. Haworth acknowledges in his brief that the FOP and city "specifically contracted" to use the merit rules in cases of demotion. ²⁸ Also, both the city and Haworth contend the merit rules are terms and conditions of employment. In addition, Article V of the agreement incorporates all rules of the Muskogee Police Department into the agreement. ²⁹ It is hence clear that by specific reference in the collective bargaining agreement, the merit rules were incorporated into the agreement and became a provision of the agreement.

It may be argued that since certain grievances are subject to merit board review, the merit rules are excluded from arbitration. However, nowhere does § 14 expressly state that if a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of § 14 or the merit rules that the parties...