City of Nashville v. Smith
| Decision Date | 17 December 1887 |
| Citation | 6 S.W. 273 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
| Parties | MAYOR & COUNCIL OF NASHVILLE <I>v.</I> SMITH, County Clerk. |
Lytton Taylor, for plaintiffs. Edward M. Woodall, for defendant.
The revenue act of 1887 provides that water companies in cities, taxing-districts, or towns of 40,000 inhabitants or over, shall pay to the state annually a privilege tax of $600. This case presents the question of liability or non-liability of the city of Nashville, under that act, for a tax upon the privilege of using and operating its water-works. William T. Smith, clerk of the county court of Davidson county, being of the opinion that such liability existed, and the city failing to take out license, issued a distress warrant, in July, 1887, against the city, for $1,050, the aggregate tax for the state and county upon that privilege, for the current year, — $600 for the state, and $450 for the county, as appeared by an indorsement upon the back of the warrant. The city, denying its liability, took the matter before the circuit court upon petition for certiorari and supersedeas. The petition was dismissed on motion, and the city has appealed in error to this court.
The present government of the city was organized, and its functions are now exercised, under chapter 114, Acts 1883. In the seventeenth section, the powers of the mayor and city council are enumerated in 36 subsections; the eighth of which is in these words: "To provide the city with water by waterworks, within or beyond the boundaries of the city, and to provide for the prevention and extinguishment of fires, and organize and establish fire companies." The petition alleges the construction and maintenance of water-works by the city in its corporate capacity for the public good, and not as a private enterprise for pecuniary gain or profit. Upon these grounds, the city denies its liability, and seeks to restrain the collection of the tax.
Though the right to own and use water-works is confined by the language we have quoted from the act of 1883, there is in that act no express exemption of the city from taxation for the exercise of that right, or for the ownership of the property itself. Another act, passed at the same session, however, provides "that the property herein enumerated shall be exempt from taxation, and none other: (1) All property belonging to the United States, to the state of Tennessee, to any county in the state, or any incorporated city or town in the state, that is used exclusively for public or corporation purposes," etc. Acts 1883, c. 105, § 2. The terms there used seem naturally to comprehend an exemption from the burden of an ad valorem tax only, and not from that of a privilege tax. A later act so limits the exemption in express terms. It is as follows: That the property herein enumerated, and none other, shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation: "(1) All property belonging to the United States, to the state of Tennessee, to any county in the state, or any incorporated city or town in the state, that is used exclusively for public or municipal...
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