City Of Newark v. American Realty & Inv. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1948
• Citation: 58 A.2d 856
• Parties: CITY OF NEWARK v. AMERICAN REALTY & INVESTMENT CO.
• Court: New Jersey Tax Court

58 A.2d 856

CITY OF NEWARK

v.AMERICAN REALTY & INVESTMENT CO.

New Jersey Department of Taxation and Finance, Division of Tax Appeals.

April 27, 1948.

Appeal from Essex County Board of Taxation.

Proceeding in the matter of the appeal of the City of Newark from judgment of Essex County Board of Taxation which fixed the assessment for the year 1946 on land of American Realty & Investment Company.

Appeal dismissed.

Vincent Casale, of Newark, for petitioner.

Joseph L. Lippman, of Newark, for respondent.

WAESCHE, Commissioner.

The City of Newark brought this appeal to the Division of Tax Appeals from the judgment of the Essex County Board of Taxation which fixed the assessment for the year 1946 on the land of the American Realty & Investment Co., known on the tax duplicate of said City as Block 164, lots 20 and 23. The original assessment on the land for 1946, as fixed by the City's assessor, was $136,900. The taxpayer appealed from this assessment to the Essex County Board of Taxation, which Board reduced the assessment to $109,500. The City appealed to the Division of Tax Appeals to increase the assessment to the true value of the land.

The attorneys for the City of Newark and for the taxpayer agree that the judgment of the Essex County Board of Taxation was entered and published on October 8, 1946. The city's petition of appeal was filed with this Division on November 9, 1946, more than one month after the publication of the County Board's judgment. The taxpayer, therefore, now moves to dismiss the City's appeal, because the petition of appeal was not filed with this Division within one month from the date the Essex County Board of Taxation published the entry of its judgment (N.J.S.A. 54:2-39). The City contends that the statute does not limit the time within which it must file this appeal.

The first appeal which the statute allows to an aggrieved taxpayer or to a taxing district for discrimination is an appeal to the county board of taxation under section 54:3-21 of the Revised Statutes as amended, N.J.S.A. The petition of appeal must be filed with the county board on or before August 15 following the assessment. The time limit for filing an appeal to the county board is the same, under the statute, for both the taxpayer and the taxing district.

Section 54:2-39 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, P.L.1946, ch. 161, p. 726, sec. 8, N.J.S.A. 54:2-39, permits an ‘appellant who is dissatisfied with the judgment of the county board of taxation upon his appeal’ to appeal from that judgment to the Division of Tax Appeals of filing a petition of appeal with the Division ‘within one month’ from the date on which the county board of taxation published the entry of its judgment. Under this section of the statute, only the appellant before the county board of taxation is given the right of appeal to the Division of Tax Appeals. Since the City was not the appellant before the County Board, the appeal sub judice was not brought under this section of the statute.

Section 54:2-35 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, P.L.1946, ch. 161, p. 726, sec. 7, N.J.S.A. 54:2-35, provides that any action or determination of a county board of taxation may be appealed for review to the Division of Tax Appeals. Under this section of the statute, any taxpayer or a taxing district may appeal from the county board judgment to the Division of Tax Appeals. The appeal sub judice was brought under this section of the statute.

The purpose of the three sections of the statute mentioned above is to provide within a reasonable time, a fair and impartial review and final determination of the original assessment. The policy of the State is to insure the taxation of all property at its true value (R.S. 54:3-13, N.J.S.A.), and to settle all tax controversies within a reasonable time (Montclair v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 127 N.J.L. 382, 22 A.2d 525; affirmed 128 N.J.L. 319, 24 A.2d 849. These three sections of the statute are in pari materia. They must be construed as a related whole, and a uniform and consistent legislative intent must be given to all parts thereof ‘so as to consistently effectuate the general legislative policy.’ Passaic Nat. Bank, etc., Co. v. Eelman, 116 N.J.L. 279, 287, 183 A. 677, 681; West Shore R. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 92 N.J.L. 332, 335, 104 A. 335; Jamouneau v. Murphy, 130 N.J.L. 498, 502, 33 A.2d 834; affirmed 131 N.J.L. 39, 34 A.2d 417). In the case of Crater v. County of Somerset, 123 N.J.L. 407, 410, 412, 8 A.2d 691, 694 (Court of Errors and Appeals) the Court said:

‘It is an elementary canon of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every clause and sentence of a statute. It is to be presumed that every provision has significance in the delineation of the legislative purpose. * * *

‘These enactments were in pari materia, and, on well-settled principles of interpretation, are to be construed together as a homogeneous and consistent whole, giving effect to all their provisions and leaving no clause inoperative.’

In the recent opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of Edgewater, Borough of v. Corn Products Refining Company, 136 N.J.L. 664, 668, 57 A.2d 39, 42, the Court said:

‘The statute is not to be given an arbitrary construction, according to the strict letter, but one that will advance the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context. It is to be reasonably construed with reference to the central purpose of the entire enactment. The general intent is to be kept in view in ascertaining the scope and meaning of any part. The obvious definite purpose of the law giver is an implied limitation on the sense of general terms, and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms. The plain intention always prevails over the literal sense of the terms; and the reason of the enactment will prevail over the strict letter. * * * It is not ‘the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law.’ * * * If the sense and reason of the enactment find expression in the instrument as a whole, it is to...