City of Newport v. Masengill Auction

• Decision Date: 30 November 1999
• Docket Number: 99-01342
• Citation: 19 S.W.3d 789
• Parties: CITY OF NEWPORT, TENNESSEE, and THE NEWPORT, TENNESSEE REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MASENGILL AUCTION CO., and WYNDHAM H. GABHART, Defendants/Appellant.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Filed
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

CITY OF NEWPORT, TENNESSEE, and THE NEWPORT, TENNESSEE REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, Plaintiffs/Appellees v MASENGILL AUCTION CO., and WYNDHAM H. GABHART, Defendants/Appellant

No. 03A01-9902-CH-00044

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

Filed November 30, 1999

Appeal As Of Right From COCKE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

TELFORD E. FORGETY, JR., CHANCELLOR

The basis of this appeal is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court by Defendant/Appellant, Wyndham H. Gabhart, Esq. Defendant Gabhart asserts that the jurisdiction of the Cocke County Chancery Court over a suit filed by Plaintiffs City of Newport (hereinafter, "Newport") and the Newport, Tennessee Regional Planning Commission (hereinafter, "Commission") was absent because of a prior, related, suit filed by Gabhart in a United States District Court. Gabhart, after receiving communications from Plaintiffs regarding their position that Gabhart's property was not in compliance with Commission regulations, filed suit in the United States District Court. This federal court action sought an injunction against Newport to prevent it from interfering in an auction of Gabhart's property at issue, and was filed a few days before the Chancery Court suit was filed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged in their Chancery Court complaint that a parcel under the statutory authority of the Commission was advertised for sale by auction as a subdivision, and that the subdivision plan had not been properly submitted and approved under Commission regulations. Gabhart participated by telephone in a hearing on the temporary restraining order, and apparently asserted at that time that his subdivision had been approved by the Cocke County Regional Planning Commission, an entity unrelated to Plaintiff Commission, and that his prior filing in federal court served to prevent jurisdiction in the Cocke County Chancery Court. The Chancellor granted Plaintiffs a temporary restraining order forestalling the auction of the property, and later extended the order by temporary injunction pending trial. Gabhart eventually filed his Answer "Under Protest," alleging status as a resident of Mississippi, and asserting that he did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court "under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12b(2)." [sic] Numerous motions, some highly unusual in caption and character, were filed by both sides, heard by the Chancellor prior to trial, and addressed by Orders of the Trial Court. At trial Defendant Masengill Auction Company was represented by counsel, and Defendant Gabhart appeared pro se. The Chancellor found that the property at issue fell under the territorial authority of Plaintiffs, and issued an order that, while Defendant Gabhart is free to sell his property, subdivision and development of the property must be in compliance with the rules and regulations of Plaintiff Commission. Gabhart does not appear to appeal the findings of the Trial Court, only the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in this matter. Defendant Massengill Auction Company did not join in this appeal. Therefore, the issue raised on appeal by Gabhart is whether or not Gabhart's prior filing of his federal court suit prevented or eliminated jurisdiction of the Cocke County Chancery Court in this suit filed by the Plaintiffs and now before us. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Chancellor's assertion of jurisdiction, affirm the Orders entered, and remand this cause of action to the Trial Court.

For the Appellant:

Wyndham H. Gabhart, Pro Se

For the Appellee:

William O. Shults, Newport

AFFIRMED

Swiney, J.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises out of a property development in Cocke County. Gabhart is an attorney who asserts residency in Mississippi, although he has provided this Court a Tennessee address for matters relating to this appeal. Gabhart purchased a ten-acre lot in the River Chase residential housing development near Newport in 1993. Gabhart then decided to subdivide this parcel into twenty-one smaller residential lots and sell them as part of a development referred to as River Chase II. Between 1994 and 1998, Gabhart built private roads to access the subdivided lots and constructed a boat ramp into the adjoining Holston River, along with certain other improvements. In 1996, a house was built on one of the River Chase II subdivided lots and sold in 1997. In 1998, Gabhart hired Defendant Masengill Auction Company to sell the remaining lots in River Chase II. An auction of the lots was scheduled for July 4, 1998 and advertised in various media.

Plaintiffs aver that upon learning of the proposed sale through Defendants' marketing promotion efforts shortly before the date set for the auction, Defendants were contacted by the Plaintiffs and informed that the property at issue fell within the statutory authority of the Newport, Tennessee Regional Planning Commission, and that the property had not been properly submitted for subdivision compliance review as required by Commission regulations. A special meeting was held by the Commission, and the City of Newport attorney authorized to take action to prevent the sale of what the Commission determined to be nonconforming property within its regulatory domain. The parties differ on whether Gabhart was afforded a meaningful opportunity to attend this special meeting, and it is unclear whether Defendants could have completed the approval process for River Chase II prior to the auction date, even with special consideration from the Commission.

However, Gabhart chose to make a preemptive strike against Plaintiffs, and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. In this federal court action, Gabhart sought relief, under diversity jurisdiction and other grounds, to enjoin the City of Newport from interfering with the pending auction of his property. After the case was transferred from Knoxville, where Gabhart filed, to Greeneville, the District Court entered an order of dismissal sua sponte, declaring that the issue asserted was not ripe for adjudication. Apparently on the same day that this dismissal occurred, Plaintiffs filed the present cause of action in the Chancery Court for Cocke County, seeking temporary relief to prevent the auction, and permanent injunctive relief to ensure compliance with Commission regulations. At least as of the time of oral argument, the federal suit was still on appeal by Gabhart to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Trial in the Chancery Court of Cocke County was held November 9, 1998, with Plaintiffs represented by counsel, Defendant Masengill Auction Company represented by counsel, and Gabhart appearing pro se. The Chancellor heard testimony and examined the exhibits offered into evidence, along with the prior filings of the parties. By Order filed December 2, 1998, the Trial Court permanently enjoined the Defendants from selling the River Chase II subdivided lots until such sale would comply with the Commission regulations and Tennessee statutes, but specifically allowed Defendants to sell the property "as a whole, as the same is shown on the plat of the original Riverchase." The Chancellor, in the transcript of the Opinion of the Court as delivered from the bench and attached to the Order, made a finding of fact that the property at issue "is within the geographical boundaries of the area granted to the City of Newport Regional Planning Commission and that the . . . Commission has jurisdiction over that geographical area. It also appears clear and without question that the Cocke County Regional Planning Commission therefore does not have jurisdiction over that area." The Chancellor expressed sympathy for Defendant Gabhart concerning the issue of the Cocke County Regional Planning Commission acting ultra vires regarding the subdividing of River Chase II, but noted that relevant statutory authority, along with the Newport, Tennessee Regional Planning Commission rules and regulations, mandated compliance with the requirements of the Plaintiff Commission before the property could be further subdivided and sold. It is from this final judgment of the Trial Court that Gabhart appeals.

DISCUSSION

The only issue on appeal is whether the Chancery Court erred in asserting jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' filing in Chancery Court after Gabhart had previously filed a related complaint against one of the Plaintiffs in federal court. As stated by Gabhart, "[t]he only issue raised for review here is notice of federal jurisdiction and jurisdiction may be raised at any time. [ ]" Gabhart's appeal focuses upon the assertion that once he filed suit in federal court, the courts of Tennessee were stripped of jurisdiction over a related matter between the same parties. Although Gabhart is apparently a member of the Mississippi bar and referred to himself as appearing both pro hac vice and pro se on his filings with this Court, he appears pro se in this appeal, and his filings have been treated appropriately in regard to this status. Edmundson v. Pratt, 945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

The issue of whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction in this case is a question of law. Therefore, the standard of review is de novo upon the record without a presumption of correctness. Grace Thru Faith v. Caldwell, 944 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Gabhart asserts that once the federal district court attained jurisdiction over the parties in that suit and the subject matter, the Tennessee courts were stripped of jurisdiction in a related filing. Although the parties differ in the two causes of action in that only the City of Newport and Gabhart were named in the federal court action, with additional parties named in the Tennessee action, this does not materially affect our analysis and opinion under the specific facts of this case. Gabhart cites more than fifty cases as authorities in this appeal, the vast majority from federal courts, seven from the courts of...