City of Niagara Falls v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York for Second Dist

• Decision Date: 07 July 1920
• Parties: CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF NEW YORK FOR SECOND DIST. et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

229 N.Y. 333

128 N.E. 247

CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS

v.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF NEW YORK FOR SECOND DIST. et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 7, 1920.

Application by the City of Niagara Falls for a writ of prohibition against the Public Service Commission of the State of New York for the Second District and the International Railway Company. An order of the Special Term (108 Misc. Rep. 567,177 N. Y. Supp. 861) denying relator's demand was reversed by the Appellate Division (178 N. Y. Supp. 882) as a matter of law, and defendant railway company appeals by permission.

Affirmed.

McLaughlin, Chase, and Collin, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third department.

Morris Cohn, Jr., of Niagara Falls, for appellant.

Robert J. Moore, of Niagara Falls, for spondent.

HOGAN, J.

The appellant, International Railway Company, succeeded to the rights of several railroad companies operating railroads in and through the village of Niagara Falls, the village of Suspension Bridge, and the town of Niagara between the two villages, a large portion of which was included in the city of Niagara Falls which was created in March, 1892.

On August 22, 1905, the International Railway Company, desirous of extending its lines in said city, applied to the common council of the city of Niagara Falls for its consent to construct, maintain, operate, and use single or double-track extensions of its railroad to be operated by electricity upon and along a number of streets constituting quite extended territory within the city of Niagara Falls, together with the right to construct, maintain, and operate turnouts, crossovers, etc., in connection with its existing tracks.

After due proceedings had, the common council granted consent to such extensions upon certain terms, the important one to be considered here being:

‘Said company shall not charge more than one fare of five cents for each passenger for any continuous ride or passage over its railroad and extensions within the present limits of the city of Niagara Falls.’

The consent was not to be operative unless the company filed its acceptance in writing of the consent and all conditions therein contained in the office of the clerk of the city of Nigara Falls. The same was accepted and a portion of the extension made.

Upwards of thirteen years thereafter the railway company applied to the Public Service Commission for an order permitting it to increase from five cents to seven cents the rate of fare to be charged passengers upon its road within the city of Niagara Falls. The city of Niagara Falls applied for a writ of prohibition restraining the Public Service Commission from assuming and exercising jurisdiction of the application. The Special Term denied the motion, but the order made thereon was reversed by the Appellate Division and the writ granted on the authority of Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Comm., 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433, 3 A. L. R. 685.

Our decision in Matter of Quinby is controlling here. That case was argued at length March 25, 1918, by counsel representing the parties directly interested. In addition, by permission of the court, counsel representing the Public Service Commission, First District, the New York State Railways Company, and a committee of corporation counsels of the municipalities of the state filed briefs. After a due consideration of the questions presented to this court, a decision was handed down April 5, 1918, determining that an absolute writ of prohibition should be awarded restraining the Public Service Commission from acting upon the application made to it to increase the rates of fare. We distinctly held in that case, without determining the limits of legislative power, that the provisions of the Railroad Law (Consol. Laws, c. 49) did not disclose a legislative intent to deal with the matter of rates fixed by agreement between local authorities and the railroad corporation, consequently the Public Service Commission was unauthorized to nullify conditions attached to such consents by increasing rates without the consent of the local authorities.

Eighteen months later a motion was made in this court for the reargument of the appeal, and it was alleged that our decisions in People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. Public Service Commission, 225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777, and Matter of International Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission, 226 N. Y. 474, 124 N. E. 123, had in substance overruled our decision in the Quinby Case. We held to the contrary and not only denied the motion for the reargument (227 N. Y. 601, 124 N. E. 790) but reiterated the views expressed in the original opinion.

In the instant case we are again asked to overrule our decision in the Quinby Case. Here, as in that case, the question of the power of the Legislature to confer upon the Public Service Commission authority to abrogate conditions embodied in the agreement between local authorities and a railroad company is not presented, for the Legislature has not undertaken to confer such power but has consistently for three successive sessions since the declsion in the Quinby Case declined so to do. We are now urged to hold that the Legislature intended to delegate power to the Public Service Commission to modify the rates prescribed in the contract between the local authorities and the railroad company, against the protest of the municipality, notwithstanding the refusal of three successive legislative bodies to accede to such demand for delegation of power. This we are not prepared to accede to.

The order should be affirmed, with costs.

CARDOZO, J. (concurring).

I think this case is controlled by our decision in Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Commission, 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433, 3 A. L. R. 685;Id., 227 N. Y. 601, 124 N. E. 790.

I do not say that it is beyond the power of the Legislature, either directly or through a commission, to abrogate or modify the conditions of a franchise. If such a question were here, I might agree in that respect with Judge McLAUGHLIN. Because it is not here, I conceive that we are not at liberty to express an opinion on the subject. The courts of this state do not act as the advisers of the Legislature to define its powers in advance. Matter of State Industrial Commission, 224 N. Y. 13, 119 N. E. 1027. When a statute has been passed, and the Legislature has thus construed its powers for itself, we pay much heed to the construction, and nullify the statute only if a case is presented in which ‘there can be no rational doubt.’ People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 484,31 N. E. 921, 923 (16 L. R. A. 836);Oswego & Syracuse R. R. Co. v. State, 226 N. Y. 351, 362,124 N. E. 8. It is however, ‘unnecessary, and therefore improper’ (Matter of Quinby, 223 N. Y. at page 263, 119 N. E. at page 437, 3 A. L. R. 685), to determine the limits of a power which there has been no attempt to exercise. ‘We deal with the particular instance; and we wait till it arises.’ Matter of State Industrial Commission, supra.

We held in the Quinby Case that the instance had not arisen yet. Our ruling was that the Legislature had not yet attempted to delegate to the Public Service Commission the power to abrogate conditions in respect of fares, contained in franchise agreements between municipalities and railroads, when the agreements were already in existence at the adoption of the statute. The judges now dissenting attempt to limit the application of that ruling to the city of Rochester, where the controversy arose. No such limitation was suggested as the basis of the decision either when the case was first decided (223 N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433, 3 A. L. R. 685) or upon the motion for reargument (227 N. Y. 601, 124 N. E. 790), or in other opinions in which its meaning has been restated (People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. P. S. Comm., 225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777; Matter of Int. Ry. Co. v. P. S. Comm., 226 N. Y. 474, 124 N. E. 123). No such limitation, if suggested, would have been reasonable. Section 173 of the Railroad Law has no bearing upon the powers of the commission in respect of rates; it defines the terms upon which franchises are to be granted in the future. The act of 1915 (L. 1915, c. 359, § 7) has no bearing; it withdrew from the commission no power that would otherwise have been there; indeed, our decision was that, in so far as rates were fixed by that act rather than by agreement with the city, the Public Service Commission had power to increase them (227 N. Y. 601, 602, 124 N. E. 790). I find myself unable to assent to the conclusion that by the true construction of the Quinby Case, the city of Rochester has been singled out as the sole spot within the length and breadth of the state in which the process of the commission will not run, and in which its mandate must be halted. Such a reading of the opinion underrates the capacity of the members of the court to give expression to their meaning. Untenable, too, is the suggestion that the Quinby Case has been overruled by the later cases which have limited it. People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. P. S. Comm. (Jan. 1919); Matter of Int. Ry. Co. v. P. S. Comm. (July, 1919) supra. With those cases decided, and sharply pressed upon our notice, we denied, less than nine months ago, a motion for reargument (Matter of Quinby, 227 N. Y. 601, 124 N. E. 790 [Oct. 21, 1919]), and restated our earlier ruling.

The Quinby Case cannot be distinguished. It has not been overruled. The only question remaining is whether we shall overrule it now. The single point decided was one of statutory construction. Since that decision was announced, three successive Legislatures have been asked to confer upon the Public Service Commissions the power which in our view of the existing statute had been theretofore withheld. In each year the bills embodying the proposed enlargement of jurisdiction failed. The Public Service Commission for the First District has...