City of North Yakima v. Superior Court of King County

• Decision Date: 03 August 1892
• Citation: 4 Wash. 655,30 P. 1053
• Parties: CITY OF NORTH YAKIMA EX REL. WHITSON v. SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY ET AL.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

30 P. 1053

4 Wash. 655

CITY OF NORTH YAKIMA EX REL. WHITSON v. SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 3, 1892

Application by the city of North Yakima, on the relation of Edward Whitson, for a writ of prohibition against the superior court of King county and I. J. Lichtenberg, Judge. Granted.

J B. Reavis and Edward Whitson, for relator.

HOYT, J.

By this proceeding petitioner seeks to prohibit the superior court of King county from proceeding in a certain action therein pending against the city of North Yakima, on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction. Some questions are raised as to the regularity of the issuance and service of the alternative writ, but, in our opinion, the questions thus presented are not of sufficient importance to require special consideration at our hands, or to prevent a hearing upon the merits. The jurisdiction of the court below to proceed in the cause therein pending is attacked upon two grounds: (1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action; and (2) that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The object sought by such suit is to prevent the defendant from applying a certain fund belonging to it and on deposit in the First National Bank of North Yakima, to any other purpose than that for which it is alleged to have been created, until the claims of the plaintiff growing out of his connection with the construction of a system of sewerage for said city have been adjusted and paid. In his complaint he alleges that it is his intention to bring an action at law against said city growing out of such matters and he seeks to enjoin said city from using said fund until he can prosecute such action to final determination. Is a suit of this nature transitory or local? Section 158 of the Code of Procedure provides, among other things, that all questions involving the right to the possession or title to any specific article of personal property is local. It is contended on the part of the petitioner that this provision covers said action; that the object of said suit is to determine the status of a specific fund, which is within the meaning of said statute, a specific article of personal property. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that the action in no manner seeks to determine the title or right to the possession of such fund. He says that he concedes the title of the fund to be in the city of North Yakima, and only seeks to have it preserved intact until it can be ascertained whether or not it is necessary that it should be applied to his use under his said contract. We think the position of the petitioner is correct. We see no reason why a specific fund does not come within the spirit and meaning of the provisions of section 158, above quoted, and we are unable to agree with the respondent that the object of said suit is not to substantially determine the status of said fund. It is true the complaint states that such fund is subject to the order of the treasurer of the city, but it alleges, and seeks to have the court hold, that he can only rightfully pay out such fund in accordance with the terms of the contract above referred to. If the allegations of his complaint are established, the result will be to invest the plaintiff with the beneficial title to such fund, so far, at least, as it is necessary to the payment of any amount which may be due to him under his contract. This, if controverted on the part of the city, would raise a direct issue as to the beneficial title to this fund. The technical legal title may have been conceded to be in the city by such complaint, but the beneficial title was certainly claimed therein for the plaintiff. We think the complaint fully shows that the object thereof was, within the meaning of the provisions above quoted, to determine the title and right to the possession of such special fund; from which it follows that the action was local, and that the superior court of King county had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter thereof.

The second question presented, as above stated, is one of great importance, and, in the brief time in which we have thought it was proper for us to hold an action of this kind under advisement, we have been unable to examine it as fully as we could have wished. If the contention of the respondent is to be sustained by the courts, and municipal corporations be held subject to suit in the superior court of any county of the state, it will lead to such inconvenience and injury to such corporations as to seriously embarrass the conduct of their affairs. And we would only be justified in so holding when we are satisfied that such was the law of the case beyond any question. From the examination that we have been able to give the matter, we are not thus satisfied. On the contrary, it seems reasonably clear that such corporations are only subject to be sued in the county in which they are situated. Counsel for respondent urges that by virtue of the provisions of section 672, Code Proc., such corporations are made subject to suit the same as natural persons. This is doubtless true so far as the question of any party...