City of Novi v. Woodson
| Decision Date | 11 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 224291. |
| Citation | 251 Mich. App. 614,651 N.W.2d 448 |
| Parties | CITY OF NOVI, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. John L. WOODSON and Karen J. Woodson, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Hampton, Truex & Morley by Gerald A. Fisher, Thomas R. Schultz, and David C. Wiegel, Farmington Hills, for plaintiff.
Jackier, Gould, Bean, Upfal & Eizelman, Bloomfield Hills, for defendants.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and BANDSTRA and SMOLENSKI, JJ.
In this condemnation case, plaintiff, city of Novi, appeals as of right from the trial court's order of final judgment following a jury verdict in favor of defendants, John and Karen Woodson. Novi's issues on appeal also concern the trial court's order denying its motion in limine. The Woodsons filed a cross appeal and argue that the trial court erred in failing to award mediation sanctions and abused its discretion by ordering Novi to pay only a portion of the Woodsons' expert witness fees. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In 1981, Louis and Mildred Gavar sold the Woodsons a lot measuring approximately one-half acre (0.55586 acre), contiguous to West Road in the city of Novi. Mrs. Woodson testified at trial that they bought the vacant lot to store wood and heavy equipment used in their tree removal business. Before she bought the lot, Mrs. Woodson went to the offices of the city of Novi to confirm that outdoor storage was permitted. Mrs. Woodson testified that a Novi employee, "Mr. Bailey," told her that no site plan was necessary because their intended use was the same as the prior owners' use of the lot. Accordingly, the Woodsons closed on the lot purchase on December 31, 1981, without submitting a site plan to the planning board and without obtaining a certificate of occupancy.
Between 1981 and 1996, the Woodsons' tree removal business grew and aerial photographs of the property show that, over the years, their use of the property expanded significantly. Mrs. Woodson testified that, in 1985, she learned that the zoning for the lot had changed to light industrial, but that the change did not affect their use of the land because their use was a legal, nonconforming use that continued from the prior owners.1
During the winter of 1996-97, a representative from JCK and Associates (JCK) called Karen Woodson to negotiate the purchase of her property on behalf of Novi. Novi determined that it was necessary to extend Taft Road, north of Twelve Mile, for the use and benefit of the public. The city engineers at JCK found it necessary to build the extension across the Woodsons' property and, accordingly, offered the Woodsons $20,000 for the lot. The Woodsons refused to sell and, on May 19, 1997, Novi submitted a good-faith offer to purchase the lot for $38,000. The Woodsons rejected the good-faith offer and, on June 2,1997, Novi passed a resolution regarding the road extension and issued a declaration of taking on June 12, 1997.
Novi filed a complaint on July 30, 1997, and requested that the court enter an order vesting title in the property in Novi if the Woodsons failed to file a motion to review the necessity of the taking under M.C.L. § 213.56(1). Novi also requested a jury trial to determine the amount of just compensation for the lot if the Woodsons continued to contest the amount of its good-faith offer. On August 25, 1997, the Woodsons' attorney sent a letter to Novi's attorney that stated that, under M.C.L. § 213.55(3), the Woodsons "reserve the right to claim just compensation for [among other claims,] ... business interruption damages and/or going concern damages...." The Woodsons did not contest the necessity of the taking, and, therefore, the trial court entered a stipulated order vesting title in and granting possession of the lot to Novi, effective October 14, 1997. The order further ordered Novi to pay the Woodsons the amount of the good-faith offer, $38,000, and preserved the Woodsons' right to pursue additional compensation in court.
Discovery proceeded and, on August 26, 1998, Novi filed a motion in limine to prohibit the Woodsons from submitting evidence at trial regarding any damages other than for the fair market value of the property. Specifically, Novi argued that the Woodsons' business interruption damages claim was barred under subsection 5(3) of the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), M.C.L. § 213.55(3), which states that claims for such damages must be filed within ninety days of the date the good-faith written offer was made or within sixty days of the date the complaint was filed, whichever is later. M.C.L. § 213.55(3). Novi further asserted that the Woodsons' letter of August 25, 1997, did not constitute a written claim for those damages and that the limitation period expired on September 29, 1997, sixty days after Novi filed its complaint.2
The trial court ultimately denied Novi's motion in limine. A jury trial began on September 13, 1999, and witnesses testified for both sides regarding the value of the property and the Woodsons' business interruption damages claim. Following deliberations, the jury awarded the Woodsons $160,000 for the taking and $90,000 for business interruption damages. Thereafter, on December 2, 1999, the trial court entered a final judgment. The trial court ordered that, in addition to the amount paid pursuant to the good-faith offer of $38,000, Novi must pay $249,035, plus interest. The trial court also ordered Novi to pay the Woodsons $80,000 in attorney fees, $9,531.25 in expert witness fees for their real estate appraiser, and $18,000 in expert witness fees for their financial consultant.
Novi contends that the jury's award for business interruption damages should be vacated because the trial court erred in denying its motion in limine to exclude evidence of those damages pursuant to M.C.L. § 213.55(3). We agree.
While Novi's specific appeal addresses the trial court's admission of evidence, the basis for its motion in limine is Novi's legal position that the Woodsons' claim is barred by the limitation period set forth in M.C.L. § 213.55(3). Absent a disputed issue of fact, this Court decides de novo, as a question of law, whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations. Colbert v. Conybeare Law Office, 239 Mich.App. 608, 613-614, 609 N.W.2d 208 (2000). Further, "[t]he interpretation of statutes is also a question of law that we consider de novo." Id. at 614, 609 N.W.2d 208. This Court has also held that it reviews de novo issues arising under the UCPA. Silver Creek Drain Dist. v. Extrusions Div., Inc., 245 Mich.App. 556, 562, 630 N.W.2d 347 (2001).
The application of the time limit for filing a claim for additional items of compensable property or damage following a city's good-faith offer is an issue of first impression in this state. M.C.L. § 213.55(3). The UCPA was amended by 1996 PA 474 to add, among other provisions, subsection 5(3), which provides:
If an owner believes that the good faith written offer made under subsection (1) did not include or fully include 1 or more items of compensable property or damage for which the owner intends to claim a right to just compensation, the owner shall, for each item, file a written claim with the agency. The owner's written claim shall provide sufficient information and detail to enable the agency to evaluate the validity of the claim and to determine its value. The owner shall file all such claims within 90 days after the good faith written offer is made pursuant to section 5(1) or 60 days after the complaint is filed, whichever is later. Within 60 days after the date the owner files a written claim with the agency, the agency may ask the court to compel the owner to provide additional information to enable the agency to evaluate the validity of the claim and to determine its value. For good cause shown, the court shall, upon motion filed by the owner, extend the time in which claims may be made, if the rights of the agency are not prejudiced by the delay. Only 1 such extension may be granted. After receiving a written claim from an owner, the agency may provide written notice that it contests the compensability of the claim, establish an amount that it believes to be just compensation for the item of property or damage, or reject the claim. If the agency establishes an amount it believes to be just compensation for the item of property or damage, the agency shall submit a good faith written offer for the item of property or damage. The sum of the good faith written offer for all such items of property or damage plus the original good faith written offer constitutes the good faith written offer for purposes of determining the maximum reimbursable attorney fees under section 16. If an owner fails to file a timely written claim under this subsection, the claim is barred. If the owner files a claim that is frivolous or in bad faith, the agency is entitled to recover from the owner its actual and reasonable expenses incurred to evaluate the validity and to determine the value of the claim. [Emphasis added.]
Neither party contends that the language of M.C.L. § 213.55(3) is ambiguous. Our Supreme Court recently reiterated that "[t]he primary goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Crowe v. Detroit, 465 Mich. 1, 6, 631 N.W.2d 293 (2001). The Court further observed:
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