Dot v. Frankenlust Luth Cong
| Decision Date | 31 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 257225.,Docket No. 257206. |
| Citation | 711 N.W.2d 453,269 Mich. App. 570 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANKENLUST LUTHERAN CONGREGATION, Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul Church, Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul Church Trustees, and St. Paul Lutheran Church, Defendants-Appellees. Department Of Transportation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frankenlust Lutheran Congregation, Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul Church, Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul Church Trustees, and St. Paul Lutheran Church, Official Reported Version Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Patrick F. Isom, Assistant Attorney General, and Lawrence P. Schneider, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiff.
Monaghan, LoPrete, McDonald, Yakima, Grenke & McCarthy, P.C. (by Thomas J. McCarthy), Bloomfield Hills, for the defendants.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and NEFF and DAVIS, JJ.
In this action to determine just compensation for property condemned under the provisions of the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51 et seq., we are asked to decide whether, and to what extent, the parties may present evidence of precondemnation and postcondemnation property valuations at the compensation trial. We hold that a condemning authority is not bound by precondemnation statements and offers of just compensation, and thus may obtain and introduce at trial a different valuation, but if the condemning authority relies on a lower valuation of the property at trial, the landowner may introduce evidence of the higher, precondemnation valuation for the purpose of rebutting the authority's lower valuation. We therefore affirm the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part the parties' motions in limine and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this holding.
As part of its plan to widen and improve a section of state highway M-84, plaintiff Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) found it necessary to acquire portions of property owned by defendants in Frankenlust Township. The UCPA, which governs the acquisition of property by public authorities through the power of eminent domain, see MCL 213.75, requires that before initiating negotiations for the purchase of property the authority "shall establish an amount that it believes to be just compensation for the property and promptly shall submit to the owner a good faith written offer to acquire the property for the full amount so established." MCL 213.55(1). Consistent with this statutory requirement, MDOT hired real estate appraiser Walter Frisbie, who, relying in part on a separate fixture appraisal, concluded that the fair market value of the property to be taken in connection with the highway project totaled $589,900, including damages to the remainder and any "costs-to-cure." MDOT thereafter submitted to defendants a written "good faith offer" to purchase the subject property for $592,523—the appraised value of the property to be taken plus applicable permit fees necessary to cure damages to the property arising from the widening and improvement project—which amount MDOT indicated "represents the sum total of just compensation based on market data for the property. . . ."
After defendants rejected the offer, MDOT initiated this suit to condemn the property under the UCPA. As required by MCL 213.55(4), MDOT alleged in its complaint that a partial taking of defendants' property was necessary to the highway project, and incorporated by reference a declaration of taking in which the department estimated that just compensation for the taking was $592,523. Because defendants did not contest the necessity of the taking within the period set forth in MCL 213.56, title to the property vested in MDOT on the date of filing of the complaint, with a concomitant "right to just compensation" for the property vesting in defendants. See MCL 213.57. An order providing for payment to defendants of the estimated just compensation, "for or on account of the just compensation that may be awarded" at a subsequent compensation trial, MCL 213.58, was entered and satisfied. See also MCL 213.63.
Thereafter, in preparation for trial, MDOT sought and received a second appraisal prepared by real estate appraiser Edward Stehouwer, who, differing with Frisbie, concluded that the fair market value of the property taken, including damages to the remainder and all necessary permits, totaled just $409,777.1 Upon discovering that MDOT would rely on Stehouwer's lower valuation at the compensation trial, defendants moved to exclude the Stehouwer appraisal from evidence on the ground that the UCPA did not authorize a condemning authority to lower its determination of just compensation from that contained in both its good faith offer and declaration of taking. However, noting that the UCPA provides that property taken pursuant to its procedures is to be valued as of the date of the filing of the condemnation complaint, see MCL 213.70(3), MDOT responded that the UCPA did not prohibit it from altering its precondemnation determination of just compensation. Arguing further that a condemning authority's precondemnation determination of just compensation is not itself evidence of the value of the property taken, MDOT moved to exclude any reference to the Frisbie appraisal, or its good faith offer and estimate of just compensation based thereon.
Finding that nothing in the UCPA or the "general principles of law" precludes a condemning authority from obtaining a postcondemnation appraisal that is lower than its precondemnation determination of just compensation, the trial court denied defendants' motion to exclude the Stehouwer appraisal. The trial court similarly found no statutory or evidentiary impediment to the admission the Frisbie appraisal, or MDOT's good faith offer and estimate of just compensation based on that appraisal, and, reasoning that excluding such information "would be keeping valuable information from the jury and would result in some sort of synthetic result that would not be fair and just," denied MDOT's motion to exclude that evidence at trial. This Court granted interlocutory leave to appeal the trial court's rulings in these regards.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the UCPA does not prohibit a condemning authority from altering its determination of just compensation from that contained in both its good faith offer and its declaration of taking and, therefore, does not preclude MDOT from presenting evidence of a lower property valuation at trial. We disagree.
Evidentiary rulings are, in general, reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 457 Mich. 593, 614, 580 N.W.2d 817 (1998). However, preliminary issues of law, such as the interpretation of statutes, are reviewed de novo. MDOT v. Haggerty Corridor Partners Ltd. Partnership, 473 Mich. 124, 134, 700 N.W.2d 380 (2005); Attorney General v. Michigan Pub. Service Comm., 249 Mich.App. 424, 434, 642 N.W.2d 691 (2002). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature evinced by the plain language of the statute. Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 468 Mich. 594, 597, 664 N.W.2d 705 (2003).
As previously noted, the UCPA governs the acquisition of property by public agencies through the power of eminent domain, and provides that
[b]efore initiating negotiations for the purchase of property, the agency shall establish an amount that it believes to be just compensation for the property and promptly shall submit to the owner a good faith written offer to acquire the property for the full amount so established. . . . The amount shall not be less than the agency's appraisal of just compensation for the property. . . . The agency shall provide the owner of the property and the owner's attorney with an opportunity to review the written appraisal, if an appraisal has been prepared, or if an appraisal has not been prepared, the agency shall provide the owner or the owner's attorney with a written statement and summary, showing the basis for the amount the agency established as just compensation for the property. If the agency is unable to agree with the owner for the purchase of the property, after making a good faith written offer to purchase the property, the agency may file a complaint for the acquisition of the property in the circuit court in the county in which the property is located. . . . The complaint shall ask that the court ascertain and determine just compensation to be made for the acquisition of the described property. . . . [MCL 213.55(1) (emphasis added).]
Citing the language emphasized above, defendants argue that the UCPA plainly contemplates that the amount determined by a condemning authority to constitute just compensation for purposes of its good faith offer to purchase "establishes" a baseline for compensation from which the authority cannot go lower at a subsequent condemnation trial. We do not agree.
When interpreting a statute "we consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as `its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.'" Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999), quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995); see also Draprop Corp. v. City of Ann Arbor, 247 Mich.App. 410, 415, 636 N.W.2d 787 (2001) (). The ultimate purpose of the statutory scheme at issue here is to ensure the guarantee of just compensation found in Const 1963, art 10, § 2, which provides, "Private property shall not be taken for public use...
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