City of Ocean Springs v. Illanne
| Decision Date | 27 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-01100-SCT |
| Parties | CITY OF OCEAN SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI v. MICHAEL ILLANNE, JULIA R. ILLANNE, BEN CHENEY, LYN CHENEY, RANDALL SCOTT EDWARDS, JOYE W. SHANTEAU, JOHN W. GODSEY, M.D., ZACHARY GREENE, M.D., STACEY GREENE AND DINAH PAYNE |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/07/2021
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. ROBERT P. KREBS, TRIAL JUDGE
ATTORNEYS: KAREN ELIZABETH HOWELL, KEVIN M. MELCHI, ROBERT THOMAS SCHWARTZ, DAVID BRUCE KRAUSE, CHRISTIAN JANE'T STRICKLAND, JORDAN REX MATHEWS, LEONARD ADAM BLACKWELL, II WILLIAM LEE GUICE, III, MARIA MARTINEZ, WILL R. NORMAN ROBERT W. WILKINSON, NICOLE WALL SULLIVAN
¶1. A group of residents ("the Neighbors") appealed three separate zoning decisions of the City of Ocean Springs Board of Aldermen to the Jackson County Circuit Court. The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019), consolidated the appeals and reversed the City's zoning decisions in two of the appeals and remanded the first appeal to the City board. The City now appeals whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions when W. Lee Brumfield, who was an applicant before the City, was not included as a party to the Neighbors' appeal. Due to this Court's intervening decision in Longo v. City of Waveland, 353 So.3d 437 (Miss. 2022), and the fact that the circuit court did not address the issue in its ruling, we find that Brumfield's status as a petitioner cannot be determined at this point. The case is remanded to the circuit court for a factual determination as to whether Brumfield is a petitioner under Section 11-51-75.
¶2. On November 7, 2018, Brumfield submitted a subdivision application sketch plat to the City of Ocean Springs' planning commission for a townhouse development to be located on Front Beach Drive in Ocean Springs. The record indicates that the document, accepted by the commission and signed before a Notary Public, lists Brumfield as applicant and The Sands at Front Beach, LLC, as owner of the property to be developed. The application was denied by the planning commission, and The Sands appealed to the board of aldermen. The board of aldermen, after a period of public discussion, overrode the decision of the planning commission and subsequently approved the sketch plat on February 5, 2019. The Neighbors filed a notice of appeal in the Jackson County Circuit Court on February 14, 2019, appealing the approval of the sketch plat.
¶3. Thereafter, on February 25, 2019, the board of aldermen adopted a portion of the Uniform Development Code (UDC) which included the development in question. The Neighbors filed a notice of appeal in the Jackson County Circuit Court on March 6, 2019. Ultimately, the city again adopted the Uniform Development Code on March 26, 2019, and the Neighbors filed a third notice of appeal in the Jackson County Circuit Court on April 4, 2019. The three cases were consolidated by the circuit court on May 9, 2019.
¶4. On July 7, 2021, the circuit court reversed the city's approval of the sketch plat, finding that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and ordering the demolition of two existing structures on the subject property. The Court also set aside both the February 25, 2019 and March 26, 2019 adoptions of the UDC.
¶5. On July 16, 2021, The Sands, as amicus curiae, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Alter, Amend and/or Set Aside Order with Memorandum Incorporated arguing, for the first time, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Neighbors failed to include The Sands as a party to the appeal as required by Section 11-51-75.[1] The City also filed a Combined Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Relief from Final Judgment, or alternatively, a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. The Neighbors filed a combined response in opposition to the motion. The Sands and the City both filed separate rebuttal memorandums. In its rebuttal memorandum, The Sands further argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Neighbors failed to include The Sands, Brumfield Properties, Inc., and Brumfield as parties to the appeal as required by Section 11-51-75.
¶6. The circuit court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the motion. The court altered its ruling on the application of the UDC. The court also set aside its prior order requiring the demolition of the two existing structures on the property and ordered the board of aldermen to conduct a hearing to "consider whether one or both of the structures built on the subject property can be made compliant" under the applicable zoning ordinance. Although the court discussed whether the Neighbors had standing to appeal, there was no discussion, much less a finding, on the issue of whether the Neighbors failed to name the necessary parties to their appeals pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The circuit court's order simply included the blanket statement that "[a]ll other requests for relief are DENIED."
¶7. On appeal, the City argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the City's decision because the Neighbors failed to name and give notice to Brumfield as a necessary party, or petitioner, to the appeal as required under Section 11-51-75.
¶8. A decision of a governing authority of a municipality is subject to a limited review and will only be overturned if it "(1) was beyond its scope or power; (2) violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party; (3) was not supported by substantial evidence; or (4) was arbitrary or capricious." Jones v. City of Canton, 278 So.3d 1129, 1131 (Miss. 2019) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting McAdams v. Perkins, 204 So.3d 1257, 1261 (Miss. 2016)). Jurisdictional issues and matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Longo, 353 So.3d at 440 (citing Fitch v. Wine Express Inc., 297 So.3d 224, 228 (Miss. 2020)); Am. Tower Asset Sub, LLC v. Marshall Cnty., 324 So.3d 300, 302 (Miss. 2021)).
¶9. The dispositive question is whether Brumfield was a petitioner required to be named as an appellee for the purposes of an appeal under Section 11-51-75, which provides:
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019) (emphasis added).
¶10. At the outset, this Court finds that it does not have sufficient information before it to determine whether Brumfield constituted a petitioner who should have been served and named in the notice of appeal in this case under Section 11-51-75. Although this issue was raised before the circuit court, no ruling was included or, if it was ruled upon, it was done in a cursory manner with no discussion whatsoever of the issue. This is understandable, since the issue was first raised in the amicus curiae rebuttal memorandum of The Sands supporting its post-trial motion which had asked the court to reconsider, alter, amend or set aside the forty-nine page Opinion, Ruling and Judgment of the Court previously entered by the circuit court and which had culminated in an Order revising the final judgment. Yes, you read that right. It is also worthy to note that the combined post-trial motion of the City and its subsequent memorandums do not raise the petitioner issue; only the amicus rebuttal raised the issue. Further, and most importantly, at the time of the ruling, this Court had not addressed the amendments to Section 11-51-75 as it relates to the necessity to add a petitioner and the ramifications of the failure to do so.
¶11. Since the appeal was filed in this case, this Court handed down Longo v. City of Waveland, 353 So.3d 437 (Miss. 2022).[2] In Longo, this Court determined that failing to name the prevailing petitioner as a party to the appeal is a procedural defect, as opposed to a jurisdictional one, but that the addition of the petitioner is nevertheless mandatory. Id. at 446. Longo does not, however, answer the question before this Court today: which entity or person(s) is the petitioner(s).
¶12. The term petitioner is not defined by the statute or elsewhere, as it relates to a zoning appeal. While we agree that the cautious play would be to name the person who was listed as applicant on documents before the governing authority as a party to the appeal, that does not, in and of itself, establish that such a person meets the definition of a petitioner. It is...
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