City of Oldsmar v. State, SC00-2695.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. SC00-2695.,SC00-2695. |
| Citation | 790 So.2d 1042 |
| Parties | The CITY OF OLDSMAR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida and The Florida Department of Transportation, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
George L. Spofford, IV and Trenton H. Cotney of Glenn Rasmussen Fogarty & Hooker, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Appellant.
Bernie McCabe, State Attorney, and C. Marie King, Assistant State Attorney, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, FL, on behalf of the State of Florida; and Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel, and Marianne A. Trussell, Deputy General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, for Appellees.
The City of Oldsmar ("City") appeals a final order of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Pinellas County dismissing the City's complaint brought pursuant to chapter 75, Florida Statutes (2000), as a bond validation proceeding. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the City may not utilize chapter 75 to seek to invalidate its own prior written agreement and, accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order of dismissal.
In 1995, the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") began negotiations with various parties regarding a roadway improvement project in Pinellas County. As part of the roadway expansion, water and sewer utility lines owned by the City had to be relocated. The City entered into a written Joint Project Agreement ("JPA") with DOT in which the City agreed to pay DOT for the work performed to relocate the City's utilities that were located on DOT's right-of-way.
The JPA provided that DOT would ensure that the necessary adjustments and the relocation of the City's utilities would be performed by the contractor DOT hired to complete the project. The JPA also provided that the City would pay DOT $1,094,817.79, which was the estimated cost of relocating the utility lines, in advance of the construction project and that DOT would utilize this money to pay the contractor to perform the work on the City's utilities. In addition to the City agreeing to pay the initial amount, at the end of the 715-day project, the JPA also required the City to reimburse DOT for all amounts advanced by DOT, plus interest. Pursuant to the JPA, the City also was required to indemnify DOT for any additional construction expenses, damages, and attorneys' fees incurred as a result of DOT's involvement with the City's utility work.
After the completion of the project, the contractor sued DOT in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court for Hillsborough County ("Hillsborough lawsuit") for damages due to delays in completing the project. In the complaint, dated March 19, 1999, the contractor alleged that it had incurred delays and additional costs as a result of erroneous plans that the City submitted to DOT. The contractor sought an additional $6,000,000 from DOT. DOT in turn filed a third-party complaint against the City alleging that any damages resulting from the erroneous plans were the liability of the City.1
In addition to filing an answer, which contained affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim against DOT seeking relief under the provisions of the JPA, the City also moved for summary judgment. The City claimed that the JPA violated article VII, section 12 of the Florida Constitution,2 because the JPA constitutes a "long term pledge of the City's ad valorem taxes and, as such, is void ab initio." The Hillsborough County Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed. The Hillsborough lawsuit still is pending, as are the City's affirmative defenses.
After the Hillsborough Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, in August 2000, the City filed the complaint that is the subject of this appeal pursuant to chapter 75, Florida Statutes, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit for Pinellas County ("Pinellas lawsuit"), alleging, as it did in the Hillsborough County lawsuit, that the JPA violated article VII, section 12, Florida Constitution, and is therefore void. The only named defendant in this suit was the State of Florida. The trial court issued an order to show cause, mandating that the Office of the State Attorney appear and represent the State in this matter.3
In its response to the order to show cause, the State, through the State Attorney, sought dismissal of the complaint, asserting that the City was without authority pursuant to chapter 75 to attempt to invalidate its prior written contract with DOT because the City's action was not a bond validation proceeding. The State also argued that the City's complaint improperly failed to name DOT as an indispensable party and that the State Attorney's office did not have the authority to represent the interests of DOT. The State argued that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was appropriate under the circumstances.
DOT learned of the Pinellas lawsuit after being notified by the State Attorney for the Sixth Circuit. DOT then filed a motion to intervene, dismiss, or abate the City's lawsuit in Pinellas County. At a hearing on those motions, DOT argued that the Pinellas lawsuit involved a duplication of the facts, issues, and legal positions presented in the Hillsborough lawsuit. In addition, DOT argued that the Pinellas lawsuit was an improper attempt by the City to use chapter 75 to avoid its contractual obligation. DOT requested that it be allowed to intervene and, alternatively, should the trial court deny its motion to dismiss, that the Pinellas lawsuit be abated pending the outcome of the Hillsborough lawsuit.
In response, the City asserted that DOT was not an indispensable party to the Pinellas lawsuit and the City did not have a duty to advise DOT of the Pinellas lawsuit or name DOT as a defendant. Nevertheless, the City stated that it did not oppose DOT's intervention as long as the intervention did not delay these proceedings. The City conceded that the purpose of the complaint was to invalidate the JPA and further conceded that the validity of the JPA currently was being litigated in the pending Hillsborough lawsuit, where the City raised this issue as an affirmative defense. The City also admitted that the Hillsborough County Circuit Court's denial of the City's motion for summary judgment motivated the filing of the Pinellas lawsuit, and the City conceded that the Pinellas lawsuit was in fact an attempt to avoid potential liability in the Hillsborough lawsuit.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Pinellas County Circuit Court granted DOT's motion to intervene and motion to dismiss, stating in pertinent part that it did not have jurisdiction to proceed, that it did not view the complaint as a proper chapter 75 proceeding, and the contract matter was being litigated in Hillsborough County.4 The City appealed the circuit court's order directly to this Court, invoking our mandatory jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(2).
The Florida Constitution vests this Court with mandatory jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments in bond validation proceedings. Specifically, article V, section 3(b)(2) of the Florida Constitute states that, when provided by general law, this Court "shall hear appeals from final judgments entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness." The general law that provides this Court with jurisdiction to hear bond validation appeals is section 75.08, Florida Statutes (2000), entitled "Appeal and review." Section 75.08 provides: "Any party to the [bond validation] action whether plaintiff, defendant, intervenor or otherwise, dissatisfied with the final judgment, may appeal to the Supreme Court within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure."
The narrow issue in this case is whether the City's complaint seeking to invalidate an executed and fully performed contractual obligation was properly brought pursuant to the bond validation provisions of chapter 75. Unlike a traditional bond validation proceeding where the governmental entity seeks to have the circuit court validate a proposed bond or certificate of indebtedness, in this case the City is attempting to utilize the unique features of chapter 75 to invalidate its own agreement with DOT and to avoid paying its incurred debt. Furthermore, the City has invoked this Court's mandatory jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(2) in an attempt to obtain direct and immediate review of the circuit court's order of dismissal, despite the fact that the legality of the JPA currently is being litigated in the Hillsborough lawsuit.
As we explained in State v. City of Miami, 103 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla.1958): Chapter 75 is entitled "Bond Validation." We thus first turn to the specific provisions of this chapter to determine whether the Legislature intended its provisions to be invoked by a governmental entity that seeks to invalidate a fully performed contractual agreement, as in this case.
Section 75.01, Florida Statutes (2000), sets forth that "[c]ircuit courts have jurisdiction to determine the validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness and all matters connected therewith." Section 75.02, Florida Statutes (2000), entitled "Plaintiff," lists who may bring the cause of action and provides in pertinent part:
Any county [or] municipality ... authorized by law to issue bonds, may determine its authority to incur bonded debt or issue certificates of debt and the legality of proceedings in connection therewith, including assessment of taxes levied or to be levied....
(Emphasis supplied.)
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