City of Overland Park v. Fricke
| Decision Date | 27 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 50563,50563 |
| Parties | CITY OF OVERLAND PARK, Kansas, Appellant, v. Ronald A. FRICKE, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402, which provides a statutory right to a speedy trial to persons charged with crime in district court, is applicable to criminal cases which have been appealed to the district courts from municipal court convictions.
2. In district court cases involving appeals from municipal courts, the time limitations provided in K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 shall commence to run from the date the appeal is docketed in district court or at the expiration of the time the appeal should have been docketed under the time schedule set forth in K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3609(3), whichever occurs first.
Michael D. Mance, Overland Park, argued the cause, and Bradley J. Richardson, Asst. City Atty., was with him on the brief for appellant.
Ronald A. Fricke, pro se.
This is an appeal by the city of Overland Park from the dismissal of a complaint by the district court, following an appeal to district court by the defendant after a municipal court conviction. The district court dismissed the case for denial of a speedy trial because the case was not tried within the 180-day limit prescribed by K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402. For purpose of this appeal, the facts are undisputed and are as follows: The defendant-appellee, Donald A. Fricke, was arrested on November 1, 1977, for a violation of an Overland Park city ordinance. Defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel in the municipal court. He was found guilty and received a jail sentence and a fine. He appealed to the district court on February 7, 1978, the same day he was convicted. Defendant's appeal was docketed in the district court. On February 22, 1978, the defendant appeared at a docket call and announced that he was maintaining his not guilty plea and wanted a trial. The trial date was to be determined later. On October 3, 1978, the complaint was dismissed by the district judge for failure of the city to bring the defendant to trial within the 180-day limit required by K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402. The city's motion to vacate the dismissal was denied on October 13, 1978. The city of Overland Park then appealed to this court.
On the appeal, the city does not seek to justify the delay in bringing the defendant to trial. Suffice it to say, the defendant Fricke was caught up in the dispute between Johnson County and various cities in that county as to who was responsible to pay the fees of attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants in district court on appeals from municipal court convictions. This dispute was recently settled in City of Overland Park v. Estell & McDiffett, 225 Kan. 599, 592 P.2d 909 (1979). The city's argument that the dismissal of the complaint by the district court was in error rests solely on the proposition that K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 is inapplicable to municipal court appeals in the district court. K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 provides in pertinent part as follows:
In support of its position, the city concedes the defendant was charged with a crime, was held to answer on an appearance bond, and was not brought to trial within 180 days from his first appearance in district court. However, the city points out the statute refers to 180 days after defendant's Arraignment on the charge. The city argues that it is the word Arraignment which governs the application of the statute. The city urges that the appearance by the defendant in district court at the time the municipal appeal docket was called was not an arraignment within the meaning of the statute. It directs our attention to City of Ogden v. Allen, 208 Kan. 573, 493 P.2d 277 (1972), where this court held that there is no statutory requirement that a defendant must be rearraigned in district court on a municipal court complaint, since he has already been arraigned in municipal court. Hence, the city argues that the provisions of K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 could apply only to the arraignment of the defendant in municipal court. In addition, the city contends that K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 has no application to this case because the case involves an Appeal and, even though the matter is tried de novo at the district court level, it is still an appeal by the defendant from the municipal court. The city then cites Kansas cases holding that a district court may dismiss a municipal court appeal for failure of the defendant to prosecute such appeal with due diligence, and reasons that the Supreme Court by these decisions is acknowledging that cases from the municipal court to the district court are really appellate cases and, therefore, it would be illogical to hold that K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 should be applied in such cases. See, City of Wichita v. Houchens, 184 Kan. 297, 335 P.2d 1117 (1959), and City of Wichita v. Catino, 175 Kan. 657, 265 P.2d 849 (1954).
The city cites an Oregon case, State v. Dodson, 226 Or. 458, 360 P.2d 782 (1961), which distinguishes between cases originally filed in an Oregon Circuit Court and those originally filed in courts of limited jurisdiction which are appealed to a circuit court. As to the latter cases, the Oregon Supreme Court held that where the defendant has been afforded a speedy trial and convicted in a justice court and thereafter appeals to a circuit court, the burden is upon the Defendant to prosecute his appeal with reasonable diligence and the Oregon speedy trial statute, providing for dismissal of an indictment for failure to bring a defendant to trial within a reasonable time, does not apply to such appeals. The court reasoned that the Oregon statute clearly placed the burden in such cases upon the defendant to prosecute his appeal with reasonable diligence and he should not be discharged because of the state's inaction.
The issue must, of course, be determined from the Kansas statutes and case law. We should first consider the pertinent Kansas Statutes. K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3402 is a part of the comprehensive Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure. K.S.A. 22-2102 declares the scope of the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure as follows:
K.S.A. 22-3610 governs trials when a case is appealed to district court from a court of limited jurisdiction. It provides:
K.S.A.1977 Supp. 22-3609 establishes a right to appeal to the district court from a municipal court and sets forth the procedural steps required to perfect an appeal:
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