City of Paterson v. Smith

• Decision Date: 27 May 1941
• Docket Number: No. 209.,209.
• Citation: 126 N.J.L. 571,20 A.2d 323
• Parties: CITY OF PATERSON v. SMITH.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

20 A.2d 323

126 N.J.L. 571

CITY OF PATERSON

v. SMITH.

No. 209.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

May 27, 1941.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lillian Phillips Smith for compensation for death of her husband, William J. Smith, opposed by the City of Paterson. To review an award of compensation, the City of Paterson brings certiorari.

Writ dismissed.

See, also, 6 A.2d 194, 17 N.J.Misc. 143. Argued May term, 1941, before BODINE, PERSKIE, and PORTER, JJ.

Salvatore D. Viviano and John F. Evans, City Counsel, both of Paterson, for prosecutor.

Joseph T. Lieblich, of Paterson, for defendant.

PORTER, Justice.

This case arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 et seq.

The claim is that William J. Smith was employed in the Fire Department of the City of Paterson as a fireman and that he met with an accident on May 7, 1934, while on duty at a fire in the course of his employment and that he was injured and became infected while being treated for his injuries and as a result of the infection died some three years later.

His condition of health before the accident is in dispute. It seems clearly established, however, that he was suffering from enlargement of the prostate gland and was not in good health by reason thereof. He suffered injuries to his back and groin at the fire. He was confined to hospital by reason of his injuries for about two weeks and returned to his work in about two months. It became necessary while he was in the hospital to catheterize him and the testimony was that by that operation he became infected and that thereby the prostatic gland condition became progressively worse and that surgical treatment was finally necessary, following which he died. We conclude that the testimony established that the death resulted from the condition following the infection of the prostate gland at the hospital following necessary treatment for the injuries he had received.

The prosecutor makes five points in its argument for reversal of the award: First, that the Bureau had no jurisdiction because the petition was not filed within time. Second, that the decedent's death bore no causal connection with his employment. Third, that the clear weight of the evidence does not establish a right of recovery. Fourth, that the affirmance of the award by the Court of Common Pleas was erroneous because based on the findings of fact by the Bureau rather than upon the facts adduced before it as an independent judgment upon a trial de novo. Fifth, that the deceased was not an employee within the meaning of the statute.

As we have said we conclude that the testimony does establish facts which show that his death followed an infection resulting from treatment of his injuries and that there was clearly a causal connection between that condition and his employment. The rule is settled that where a preexisting disease was caused to become acute or flare up and injury resulted therefrom rather than from the specific hurts...