Riccioni v. American Cyanamid Co., Calco Chemical Division, A--233

• Decision Date: 13 May 1953
• Docket Number: No. A--233,A--233
• Citation: 26 N.J.Super. 1,96 A.2d 765
• Parties: RICCIONI v. AMERICAN CYANAMID CO., CALCO CHEMICAL DIVISION. . Appellate Division
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 1

26 N.J.Super. 1

96 A.2d 765

RICCIONI v. AMERICAN CYANAMID CO., CALCO CHEMICAL DIVISION.

No. A--233.

Superior Court of New Jersey.

Appellate Division.

Argued April 27, 1953.

Decided May 13, 1953.

Thomas L. Parsonnet, Newark, for appellant (Parsonnet, Weitzman & Oransky, Newark, attorneys).

Frederick W. Hall, Somerville, for respondent (Wharton, Hall, Stewart & Halpern, Somerville, attorneys).

Before Judges EASTWOOD, BIGELOW and JAYNE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JAYNE, J.A.D.

It is represented to us that the present appeal introduces a virgin point in the interpretation and construction of sections 34:15--41 and 34:15--51 of our Workmen's Compensation Law. R.S. 34:15--1, N.J.S.A. The point, on its way to us from the initial determination by the Deputy Director in the Workmen's Compensation Division, received the very intelligent consideration of Judge Arthur B. Smith of the Somerset County Court, whose opinion is reported in 23 N.J.Super. 465, 93 A.2d 60 (Cty.Ct.1952).

It is expedient here to reproduce from that opinion the statement of what we are told are the stipulated and uncontroverted facts:

'* * * The petitioner suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on December 7, 1942. After the accident, the respondent furnished three or four medical treatments to petitioner, the last on December 14, 1942. Petitioner lost no time from his work and continued his employment regularly with the respondent until he had an epileptic seizure, for which he obtained treatment, in the year 1948. He was suspended from his work on June 23, 1948 and did not return to his work until November 21, 1948. During this period of time he applied for and was paid accident and health insurance benefits on the basis of a non-compensable condition. On respondent's application, an order was entered in the Division of Workmen's Compensation on November 19, 1948, pursuant to the provisions of Rev.Stat. 34:15--16 (N.J.S.A.), permitting the respondent to pay the cost of certain medical treatment necessitated by the petitioner's epileptic seizures, which costs had been incurred by the petitioner during the aforementioned absence from work and without any request to respondent to furnish such teatments. This order, as permitted by the statute, reserved the respondent's defenses in connection therewith, and particularly the defense of jurisdictional limitation. The respondent thereupon paid these expenses. Subsequently, in the months of May and June, 1949, respondent, at petitioner's request, and without the benefit of any such order, paid certain bills for additional medical treatments obtained by petitioner, again without any request to respondent to furnish treatment. Petitioner was again suspended from work on July 20, 1949 and has not worked for respondent since. He has been paid private plan disability benefits, plus supplemental coverage, for the period from July 20 1949 through January 25, 1950. Such payments were also made on the basis of a non-compensable condition. Respondent acknowledged that in March, 1950 petitioner was suffering from the effects of a post traumatic epilepsy, as a result of the December, 1942 accident. That he is totally and permanently disabled is not disputed.

'Petitioner's claim petition in this action was not filed until November 23, 1949. In this posture of admitted and determined facts, the Deputy Director found the sole question for determination to be whether petitioner's claim petition, based on the accident of December 7, 1942, had been filed within the time required by the provisions of Rev.Stat. 34:15--41 (N.J.S.A.) and Rev.Stat. 34:15--51 (N.J.S.A.).'

The deputy director found adversely to the petitioner. On appeal the County Court resolved that the deputy director justifiably dismissed the petition. The propriety of the latter judgment is now submitted to us.

It is imperative primarily to recognize the pertinent provisions of the statute. R.S. 34:15--41, N.J.S.A., provides:

'In case of personal injury or death all claims for compensation on account thereof shall be forever barred unless a petition is filed in duplicate with the secretary of the workmen's compensation bureau, as prescribed by section 34:15--51 of this title.'

The implicated portion of section 34:15--51 reads:

'Every claimant for compensation under article 2 of this chapter (§ 34:15--7, et seq.) shall, unless a settlement is effected or a petition filed under the provisions of section 34:15--50 of this title, file a petition in duplicate with the secretary of the bureau in his office, at the state house, in Trenton, within two years after the date on which the accident occurred, * * * Or in case a part of the compensation has been paid by the employer, then within two years after the last payment of compensation. Any payment Made in accordance with the provisions of article 2 of this chapter (§ 34:15--7, et seq.) shall constitute an agreement for compensation.' (Emphasis supplied)

Then, too, the premise must be preliminarily acknowledged that the statutory limitations of time are jurisdictional. Valentine v. Walter Kidde & Co., 136 N.J.L. 292, 55 A.2d 664 (Sup.Ct.1947).

Another acceptable premise is that medical treatment furnished to the injured employee and paid for by the employer is ordinarily regarded as in effect a partial payment of compensation within the import of the act. Donoher v. American Steel & Wire Co., 2 N.J.Super. 72, 64 A.2d 622 (App.Div.1949); Sampson v. Thornton, 8 N.J. 415, 86 A.2d 117 (1952); 144 A.L.R. 617. However, the correlation and interconnection between the payment by an employer for medical treatment received by the employee and workmen's compensation are not to be considered conclusive in all cases.

Still another forethought is that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its manifest purpose. Furferi v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 117 N.J.L. 508, 189 A. 126 (E. & A.1937); Granahan v. Celanese Corp. of America, &c., 3 N.J. 187, 69 A.2d 572 (1949); Sampson v. Thornton, supra. But it must be realized that the Compensation Bureau is a creature of the statute and that its special and limited jurisdiction cannot be inflated by consent, waiver, estoppel, or judicial inclination. Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 349, 78 A.2d 709 (1951). Workmen's compensation, however munificently recognized by recent decisions, has not yet been expressly declared to be the identical equivalent of workmen's accident insurance.

It is with a comprehension of the aforementioned basic concepts that the issue debated in the present appeal is considered.

The suggested novelty of this proceeding seems to inhere particularly in the applicability of the third limitation embodied in section 34:15--51 to the admitted factual circumstances. And so an unmitigated treatment of the import of the section in relation to the many diversified situations that can be envisioned is not necessary. The scope of the present appeal, as we perceive it, may appropriately be confined to the narrow question whether this is a case in which 'a part of the compensation has been paid by the employer' where the petition may be filed within two years after the last payment. Was the payment made by the employer in the circumstances of the present case the kind of a payment that tolled the statute or revived the claim?

The interpretative import and applicability of that statutory provision has received previous judicial attention in such relatively recent cases in our jurisdiction as City of Paterson v. Smith, 126 N.J.L. 571, 20 A.2d 323 (Sup.Ct.1941); Betsy Ross Ice Cream Co. v. Grief, 127 N.J.L. 323, 22 A.2d 571 (Sup.Ct.1941); Fischbein v. Real Estate Management, Inc., 131 N.J.L. 495, 37 A.2d 199 (Sup.Ct.1944), affirmed 132 N.J.L. 418, 40 A.2d 649 (E. & A.1945); Donoher v. American Steel & Wire Co., supra; Jensen v. Wilhelms Construction Co., 18 N.J.Super. 372, 87 A.2d 365 (App.Div.1952); vide, also Oldfield v. New Jersey Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63, 61 A.2d 767 (1948); Harper v. New Jersey Mfrs. Casualty Ins. Co., 1 N.J. 93, 62 A.2d 135 (1948); Allord v. Henry Muhs Co., 163 A. 97, 10 N.J.Misc. 1230 (Sup.Ct.1932), affirmed, 111 N.J.L. 237, 168 A. 298 (E. & A.1933).

Workmen's Compensation Acts uniformly contain a provision which in substance declares that where there has been a payment of compensation to an injured employee by the employer or his insurance carrier, a claim for compensation may be made within a specified time after the last payment, and the many reported decisions relating to the...