City of Peoria v. Cent. Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 13 December 1906
• Citation: 79 N.E. 296,224 Ill. 43
• Parties: CITY OF PEORIA v. CENTRAL NAT. BANK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

224 Ill. 43

79 N.E. 296

CITY OF PEORIA

v.CENTRAL NAT. BANK.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 23, 1906.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Peoria County; L. D. Puterbaugh, Judge.

Bill to quiet title by the Central National Bank against the city of Peoria. From a decree in favor of complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed.W. H. Moore, City Atty. (Henry Mansfield of counsel), for appellants.

Jack, Irwin, Jack & Danforth, for appellee.

The appellee, the Central National Bank, filed its bill in the circuit court of Peoria county at the September term, 1902, representing that it was then the owner in fee and in possession of certain premises therein described, in Peoria, fronting on that part of the Illinois river called ‘Peoria Lake,’ under a chain of title running to the United States, as well as by payment of taxes, possession, and improvement for much longer than the statutory period; that the appellant, city of Peoria, claimed said premises as a street or public property, having torn down a fence inclosing them, erected by a prospective purchaser, and announced its intention of tearing down any fence that might be built; that thereby the sale was broken up and title of the appellee clouded and the chances for future sales interfered with. Prayed that the city might be enjoined from claiming title or removing improvements. Appellant answered the bill denying the title in appellee and asserting it in itself. The case was referred to a master in chancery, who reported that there was no equity in the bill and recommended that it be dismissed. Appellee objected to the master's report, and the court sustained the objections and entered a decree in favor of appellee, confirming the title to the premises in question in said appellee and perpetually enjoining the city from interfering with the possession or with the construction of proper buildings or improvements on said land. From that decree the defendant in the trial court appealed, assigning errors substantially covering the major portion of the findings of said decree.

The plat given herewith shows approximately the situation, surroundings, and the premises in question, and is substantially the same as appellant's Exhibit A:

PLAT. 1.

Image 1 (2.54" X 2.55") Available for Offline Print

The line G, A, is the section line between fractional sections 9 and 10. The line A, B, is what is claimed by the appellee to be a part of the section line dividing sections 9 and 10, and by appellant to be an extension of said section line. E, F, is the meander line as run by the government survey; A being the point where the section line and meander line intersect. B, D, represents the present dock line along the river. C, A, represents a line drawn perpendicularly to the thread of the stream from the point where the section line and the meander line intersect. The land in question is the triangle A, B, C.

The city contends that the meander line represents the location of the bank of the river at the time fractional section 10 was platted and marks the southwesterly limit of the land embraced in the patent to Mills; that the land betweenline E, F, and line B, D, or at least that part included in the triangle A, B, C, has been formed by accretion or filling in since that time, and its ownership should be determined according to the law of accretions; that the point A represents the dividing line at the river between the lands of the original proprietors; and that the dividing line between the owners across such added land down to the present river front should not be a continuation or extension of the section line, but should run perpendicular to the thread of the stream from the point A. Appellee contends that the said dividing line should be the section line, which actually extends to the present water front; that the meander line did not represent the margin of the river at the time the land was patented; that the patent to fractional section 10 embraces the land in dispute; that the title to the same rests in appellee under a chain of deeds from the original patentee; that the said appellee also claims said land under long continued adverse possession, payment of taxes, and improvements; that said city is estopped from laying claim to the land in question by certain of its acts. A copy of part of defendant's Exhabit I, showing the government survey of said fractional sections 9 and 10 with their front on the Illinois river and Peoria Lake, is herewith given for better understanding of the discussion of the facts in the case:

PLAT. 2.

Image 2 (2.58" X 2.45") Available for Offline Print

Defendant's Exhibit H, which in the record is called ‘Mills' second addition,’ is herewith given (except certificates), with the notation made by the recorder of deeds in June, 1902, as to the writing in of the word ‘street’ on the records. This is substantially the same as complainant's Exhibit 2:

PLAT. 3.

Image 3 (2.57" X 2.87") Available for Offline Print

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts).

March 18, 1837, the United States government gave a patent to fractional section 10, northwest of the Illinois river and now in the city of Peoria, to Benjamin Mills, as assignee of John L. Bogardus. In 1834 the fractional northeast quarter of section 9 was patented to the county commissioners of Peoria county, upon which quarter section the town of Peoria was laid out and platted. The government survey of fractional sections 9 and 10 was made in 1817. The chief controversy in this record concerns the location of the point which marks the southerly end of the section line between said fractional section 9 and 10; counsel for appellant contending that the section line ends at the meander line running along the bank of the Illinois river, while counsel for appellee insist that it continues to the center thread of the Illinois river, or at least to the water line.

The rule is settled that meander lines are not intended as boundaries, but that the body of water will be regarded as the true boundary. Farnham on Water & Water Rights, § 418. According to the decisions in most of the states in which lands were surveyed under United States laws, the lines run by the surveyors along the river banks are not lines of boundary, the owners of the adjacent lands taking at least to the water's edge, thus giving them the benefit of river frontage, with the right of access to the river and the incidents of riparian proprietorship as to the use of the water. Gould on Waters (3d Ed.) § 76. The meander line, which is run for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of land in a fractional section, cannot be regarded as a boundary line. Houck v. Yates, 82 Ill. 179. Where a stream was meandered in the original survey and conveyance made and price paid for the quantity within the meandered lines, the grant conveyed to the thread of the stream and the boundaries of the lands were not determined by the meander line. Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462, 44 N. E. 286,33 L. R. A. 146, 52 Am. St. Rep. 380. It has also been held in this state that the riparian proprietor in a grant bounded on the margin of a river or stream, whether navigable or not, took to the center thread of the stream. Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. 510,38 Am. Dec. 112; Trustees v. Haven, 5 Gilm. 548; Fuller v. Shedd, supra; Albany Railroad Bridge Co. v. People, 197 Ill. 199, 64 N. E. 350. ‘Meander lines are run in surveying fractional portions of public lands bordering upon navigable rivers, not as boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of defining the sinuosities of the banks of a stream and as the means of ascertaining the quantity of the land in the fraction subject to sale, and which is to be paid for by the purchaser. In preparing the official plat from the field notes the meander line is represented as the border line of the stream, and shows to a demonstration that the water course, and not the meander line as actually run on the land, is the boundary.’ Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 272, 19 L. Ed. 74. From a copy of the official plat, which is shown as defendant's Exhibit I (see plat 2) in this case, it also appears here, ‘to a demonstration, that the water course, and not the meander line as actually run on the land, is the boundary.’

Counsel for appellant admit this to be the correct rule in this state, but insist that the meander line should be taken as the starting point or shore line from which to draw lines to the center thread of the river to show the water rights between the various property owners fronting on the river and for the purpose of dividing accretions, if any, among the property owners. No decision has been called to the attention of the court where such ruling has been made. In Menasha Wooden Ware Co. v. Lawson, 70 Wis. 600, 36 N. W. 412, and in Clark v. Campau, 19 Mich. 325, the opposite was held. This court, in Kehr v. Snyder, 114 Ill. 313, 2 N. E. 68,55 Am. Rep. 866, said (page 316 of 114 Ill., and page 69 of 2 N. E. ): ‘The rule as stated in appellant's third proposition * * * we regard as substantially correct; that is to say, ‘measure the entire river front of survey 759 as it existed in 1860, when the third subdivision of Cahokia commons was first laid out,’ and note the aggregate number of feet frontage, as well as that of each parcel or lot; then measure a line drawn as near as may be with the middle thread of so much of the stream as lies opposite the shore line so measured. Having done this, divide the thread line thus measured into as many equal parts as there are lineal feet in the shore line, giving to each proprietor as many of these parts as his property measures feet on the shore line; then complete the division by drawing lines between the points, designating the lot or parcel belonging to each proprietor both upon the shore and river line.' This rule was approved by the Appellate Court of this state in Griffin v. Kirk, 47 Ill. App. 258, and Nauman v. Burch, 91...