State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon)

• Decision Date: 20 March 1981
• Docket Number: S.F. 23981
• Citation: 625 P.2d 239,172 Cal.Rptr. 696,29 Cal.3d 210
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 625 P.2d 239, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,476 The STATE of California et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE COUNTY, Respondent; Raymond R. LYON et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 696

172 Cal.Rptr. 696

29 Cal.3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,476

The STATE of California et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE COUNTY, Respondent Raymond R. LYON et al., Real Parties in Interest.

S.F. 23981.

Supreme Court of California.

March 20, 1981.

Rehearing Denied April 29, 1981

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., N. Gregory Taylor and Jan Stevens, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denis Smaage, Stephen H. Mills and Richard M. Frank, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioners.

R. Frederic Fisher, Laurens H. Silver, James B. Frankel, F. Bruce Dodge, Palmer Brown Madden, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, and P. A. Towner, Russell R. Kletzing, John Kramer, Katherine A. Striemer, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.

Charles D. Haughton, County Counsel, Robert L. Bridges, Deputy County Counsel, Lakeport, Edgar B. Washburn, Barbara L. Gately and Washburn, Kemp & Wagenseil, San Francisco, for real parties in interest.

Harry D. Miller, Karl E. Geier, Miller, Starr & Regalia, Oakland, Green, Green & Rigby and Denslow Green, Madera, as amici curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.

MOSK, Justice.

In City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362, we reaffirmed the ancient doctrine that tidelands lands between the lines of mean high tide and mean low tide are owned by the public, that the state holds these lands in trust for the people for their use for commerce, navigation, fishing and other purposes, and that this trust interest is retained even if the title to tidelands has been conveyed to private persons, unless the conveyance has been made to promote the purposes of the trust.

The present case also concerns lands along the shoreline, but the issue here is the boundary between state and private ownership in nontidal, navigable lakes and streams between high and low water, i. e., lands alternately covered and uncovered by water as the level of the lake rises and falls with the seasons. The Attorney General, representing the People, claims that these lands are owned by the state, which acquired title thereto by virtue of its sovereignty upon admission to the Union, that they have not been conveyed to the owners of the lands along the shoreline, and that even if such conveyances have been made, the lands in dispute are subject to the trust described in City of Berkeley.

Raymond R. Lyon and Margaret L. Lyon, real parties in interest (hereafter called Lyon) own 800 acres along the shore of Clear Lake in Lake County, a navigable body of water with an area of about 64 square miles. The portion of the property involved in the present dispute consists of more than 500 acres of marshland at the southern end of the lake, known as the Anderson Marsh, most of which is covered by water at certain times of the year. Lyon's predecessors in interest purchased the property from the state under patents issued between 1850 and 1906. These grants did not specify the waterward boundary of the land conveyed. Lyon sought to develop the property and applied for a permit to repair a levee for the purpose of reclaiming a portion of the marsh. The Fish and Game Commission notified him that it could not process his application for a permit because the State of California claimed ownership of the portion of the marsh which extends below the high water mark.

Lyon filed an action against the state and various of its agencies, ¹ seeking to quiet title to the marsh, and for declaratory relief. He relied, inter alia, upon section 830 of the Civil Code. ² The section, which was adopted in 1872, provides "Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on tide-water, takes to ordinary high-water mark; when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, where there is no tide, the owner takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at low-water mark; when it borders upon any other water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake or stream."

The People filed a cross-complaint to quiet title in the state to the portion of the Anderson Marsh between high and low water and for declaratory relief. The County of Lake intervened in the action in its capacity as grantee in trust of the state's interest in the lands underlying the lake. (Stats.1973, ch. 639, § 1, p. 1165.) The county supported Lyon's claim that he owns the property to the line of low water.

Lyon, the county, and the People, all moved for partial summary judgment based on their respective claims. The trial court ruled in favor of Lyon and the county (hereafter sometimes collectively referred to as Lyon); it determined that no portion of the Anderson Marsh lying landward of the ordinary low water mark of Clear Lake is sovereign property of the state or subject to a common law public trust, but that the waters of the lake are impressed with a public servitude so that when the water rises above the low water mark, the public has the right to navigate between that line and the ordinary high water mark. The People seek a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order, and to grant the People's motion for partial summary judgment.

The case involves issues which are of vast importance to the general public as well as to the owners of land bordering upon navigable lakes and streams. The significance of these issues has generated extensive briefs by amici curiae, ³ and their analyses and arguments have been of considerable assistance to the court. No less than 4,000 miles of shoreline along 34 navigable lakes and 31 navigable rivers in the state are involved. Substantial areas of land will be affected by our decision; at Clear Lake alone, there is a difference of 5,000 acres in the surface area of the lake between high and low water, and the Anderson Marsh constitutes one-half of the remaining fresh water marsh at Clear Lake. Lands of the type involved in this proceeding constitute a resource which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state.

Lyon's claim to the fee ownership of Anderson Marsh to the low water line is based on the following reasoning: California never acquired title to the beds underlying navigable nontidal waters above low tide. The United States Supreme Court has made it plain that the ownership of such lands is a matter of state rather than federal law. (Hardin v. Jordan (1891) 140 U.S. 371, 382, 11 S.Ct. 808, 812, 35 L.Ed. 428; Barney v. Keokuk (1876) 94 U.S. 324, 338, 24 L.Ed. 224.) The states exercised their options with regard to ownership of such land by adopting different rules; some states claim only to low water, some to high water, and others make no sovereign claim to the beds of nontidal bodies. Indeed, only a minority of states claim sovereign ownership to high water. ⁴ When California entered the Union, it determined to exercise no sovereign claim to the beds of nontidal navigable waters. This choice was made when, upon admission to statehood, the Legislature adopted a statute which provided that unless inconsistent with applicable federal or state law, the "Common Law of England shall be the rule of decision in all the Courts of this State." (Stats.1850, ch. 95, p. 219.) Under English common law, the sovereign made no claim to ownership of lands underlying nontidal waters. Therefore, by the adoption of the English common law, California made no claim to ownership of the beds of such waters. Subsequently, by the enactment of section 830 in 1872, the state determined to claim title only to low water.

The People contend, on the other hand, that California acquired title to the lands in question to the high water mark in its sovereign capacity upon statehood, citing, inter alia, Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. (1977) 429 U.S. 363, 370-371, 97 S.Ct. 582, 586-587, 50 L.Ed.2d 550; Barney v. Keokuk, supra, 94 U.S. 324, 338. Moreover, argue the People, section 830 did not grant such lands to private persons because that provision only sets forth a rule for the construction of deeds and does not constitute a grant of sovereign land.

We consider, first, whether California acquired sovereign ownership, in the lands between low and high water in nontidal, navigable lakes and rivers upon admission to the Union. If this question is answered in the negative, the People's claim to fee ownership of these lands cannot prevail. If, on the other hand, the state owned the property in question at the time of admission to the Union, it will be necessary to decide whether, by the enactment of section 830 in 1872, it granted an interest therein to riparian landowners and, if so, the extent of the interest conveyed.

We begin with the proposition that, even accepting Lyon's assertion that the state did not automatically succeed to title to the beds of navigable nontidal lakes and streams to high water upon statehood but only had the option to make such a claim, absent an indication that the new state declined to exercise sovereign ownership of such lands, we would be compelled to decide the issue in favor of the state's title. The only basis for a claim that California abdicated its rights to claim to high water in 1850 was the adoption of the common law of England as the rule of decision in this state. ⁵

In England, there were different rules concerning the ownership by private persons of the beds of tidal waters and nontidal waters. Nontidal rivers and lakes were privately owned; a riparian holder took to the middle of the lake or the thread of the stream, much like the landowner along a public street. At the same time, the beds of all navigable waters were said to belong to the crown, and the King held such property in trust for the public and could not dispose of it free of that trust. Only waters where the tide ebbed and flowed were considered to be navigable in England. The reason for the difference in...