City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner

Decision Date21 July 1977
Citation53 Ohio App.2d 63,371 N.E.2d 579,7 O.O.3d 44
Parties, 95 A.L.R.3d 364, 7 O.O.3d 44 CITY OF PEPPER PIKE, Appellee, v. LANDSKRONER, Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. A presumption of validity attaches to all ordinances including zoning ordinances. It is not a conclusive presumption but a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by competent and relevant evidence. A legislative enactment will not be disturbed, unless it is shown that the action taken by the municipality in denying a property owner the unrestricted use of his property is arbitrary, capricious, and bears no reasonable relationship to the health, safety or general welfare of the community. A person wishing to attack an ordinance as unconstitutional has the burden of proof and may not rely on mere allegations or conclusions of law that the ordinance is not based on health, safety or general welfare, but must introduce competent and relevant evidence to support his position. If he meets his burden and introduces sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and constitutionality, the municipality may not merely counter with its own legal conclusions but must also present evidence to support the validity of the ordinance on the basis of health, safety or general welfare or risk that its ordinance will be declared unconstitutional.

2. A municipal corporation may constitutionally enact an ordinance the primary purpose of which is the health, safety, or general welfare of the community with aesthetic considerations as its secondary purpose. It may not enact an ordinance the primary purpose of which is one of aesthetic considerations. A municipality may enact an ordinance prohibiting the outside storage of trailers and house trailers in single-family neighborhoods under its police power for the general welfare of the community where such outside storage could become a nuisance or interfere with the character and integrity of the single-family residential neighborhood even though the secondary effect of the ordinance is aesthetic.

3. The terms "trailer" and "house trailer," without further definition, contained in a municipal zoning ordinance prohibiting outside storage of these vehicles on single-family residential premises do not automatically include all recreational vehicles such as self-propelled motor homes. In order for a penal ordinance prohibiting outside storage of trailers and house trailers to include other vehicles, the terms "trailer" and "house trailer" must have a generally accepted meaning as including all recreational vehicles or the ordinance must either specify all proscribed vehicles, define which vehicles are included in the definition of trailers and house trailers, or incorporate by reference the definition contained in another ordinance or statute, such as R.C. 4501.01.

Thomas H. Baughman, Cleveland, for appellee.

Lawrence Landskroner, pro se.

KRENZLER, Judge.

On May 15, 1975, Patrolman Raymond Walters of the Pepper Pike Police Department filed a sworn complaint in the Municipal Court of Shaker Heights against the defendant-appellant, Lawrence Landskroner, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, in which he alleged that on or about May 1, 1975, at 2460 Snowberry Lane in the City of Pepper Pike, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the appellant did store a house trailer in the open and on a premise where a single-family dwelling existed in violation of Section 1143.02 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Pepper Pike. 1

The appellant filed a motion to quash the complaint on the basis that ordinance 1143.02 does not apply to him because it prohibits house trailers from being stored in the open on single-family premises and that his vehicle is a self-propelled motor home and not a house trailer. The appellee argues that R.C. 4501.01(J), 2 which at the time this action was brought, defined house trailers as including both nonself-propelled and self -propelled vehicles, is applicable to ordinance 1143.02.

The trial court overruled the motion to quash and held that as a matter of law the definition of house trailer contained in R.C. 4501.01(J) was applicable to the Pepper Pike ordinance.

The case was tried to the court on October 16 and November 3, 1975, which on December 1, 1975, found the appellant guilty and fined him $250 and costs, with $175 of the fine suspended and placed him on inactive probation for one year. 3

In its decision, the trial court found that the appellant was charged with a violation of Section 1143.02 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Pepper Pike, which prohibits the storing of a commercial vehicle or trailer, including house trailers, in the open on any premises where a single-family dwelling has been erected.

The court further found that the appellant's house trailer, also described as a recreational vehicle, was for some period of time and up to the time of trial observed by the city officials standing in the open on the premises of the appellant which premises contain a single-family dwelling.

The trial court stated that the appellant's primary argument was that the ordinance was unenforceable and invalid on the basis that its purpose was based on aesthetic considerations, and not related to health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. The court found that there was no evidence adduced to substantiate that express motive or intent.

The court further held that there was a lack of evidence to overcome the presumption of the validity of the ordinance. The trial court found that Section 1143.02 of the Codified Ordinances of the city of Pepper Pike is a valid exercise of the powers of the city council and that it bears a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the community.

The appellant has taken this appeal and has three assignments of error:

"I. The trial court erred in not finding Section 1143.02 of the Pepper Pike Planning & Zoning Code to be both on its face and as applied an unconstitutional denial of property without due process of law.

"II. The trial court erred in not finding Section 1143.02 of the city of Pepper Pike Planning and Zoning Code unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to adequately define the meaning of the term 'house trailer.'

"III. The trial court erred in not finding Section 1143.02 of the city of Pepper Pike Planning and Zoning Code unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to adequately define the meaning of the term 'store.' "

We have before us only the original papers, exhibits and docket of the journal entries. The appellant did not file a verbatim or narrative transcript of testimony nor did he file an agreed statement of evidence as provided for in App.R. 9(B), (C) and (D).

In his three assignments of error, the appellant raises three issues regarding the validity of ordinance 1143.02. The first is that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the appellant because it is not based on the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community but that its primary purpose is one of aesthetic considerations. The second is that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to him because it only pertains to trailers and house trailers and that the vehicle observed upon his premises is a self-propelled motor home which is not a proscribed vehicle. His third reason is that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it does not properly define the term "store" and is unconstitutional as applied to the appellant because his vehicle was not stored on his premises.

In this case, we are dealing with a municipal ordinance that prohibits outside storage of trailers on single-family premises. Many municipalities have enacted similar ordinances which prohibit outside parking or storage of trailers and other types of recreational vehicles in residential neighborhoods. These ordinances variously pertain to different types of vehicles and equipment such as trailers, house trailers, travel trailers, campers, vans, motor homes, truck campers and others which we shall refer to collectively as recreational vehicles. Some municipalities, such as Pepper Pike, permit the storage of these vehicles in a residential neighborhood if the vehicle is enclosed or screened.

These ordinances are generally enacted as a part of the zoning regulations of the municipalities. The authority for a municipal corporation to enact zoning regulations is contained in Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.

Zoning ordinances which in their enactment and application are rationally based on the objective of promoting the health, safety, morals or general welfare of a community are constitutionally within the police power of a municipal government. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 23, 309 N.E.2d 900; Pritz v. Messer (1925), 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30. That a particular zoning act is based upon these legitimate purposes is usually specifically stated in the enabling legislation. Section 1131.01 of the Pepper Pike ordinances provides that city council finds that the public health, safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity and general welfare will be promoted by the regulations and restrictions enacted in the zoning code.

An ordinance may be attacked as unconstitutional upon its face or as applied to the person attacking the ordinance. Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629. The principal argument generally voiced against ordinances such as the one presently before us is that the ordinance is not based on the health, safety, morals...

To continue reading

Request your trial
63 cases
  • Vlcek v. Chodkowski
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • May 15, 2015
    ...with the character and integrity of the single-family residential neighborhood * * *.’ ” Id., quoting Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 53 Ohio App.2d 63, 371 N.E.2d 579 (1977).{¶ 115} “Under common law, the State of Ohio has the authority to abate public nuisances. This authority is extended to ......
  • Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • January 25, 1984
    ...court of appeals. 1 This trend has also been evidenced in several appellate court decisions. See, e.g., Pepper Pike v. Landskroner (1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 63, 72-73, 371 N.E.2d 579 ; Euclid v. Fitzthum (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 297, 300, 357 N.E.2d 402 ; P & S Investment Co. v. Brown (1974), 40......
  • DeRosa v. Parker
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • November 16, 2011
    ...No. 479, 130 Ohio Laws 1031, 1032, 1034. The history of this particular statutory definition was examined in Pepper Pike v. Landskroner (1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 63, 371 N.E.2d 579: {¶ 15} “The definition of house trailer as contained in R.C. 4501.01 has changed at least three times to reflect......
  • Brown v. City of Cleveland
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • April 29, 1981
    ...favor of the property owner. In re University Circle, Inc. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 180, 184, 383 N.E.2d 139; Pepper Pike v. Landskroner (1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 63, 76, 371 N.E.2d 579; 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d Ed.) 4, Section 16.02. Zoning ordinances which impose restrictions upon......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT