City of Port Townsend v. Eisenbeis

• Decision Date: 06 May 1902
• Citation: 28 Wash. 533,68 P. 1045
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF PORT TOWNSEND v. EISENBEIS et ux.

68 P. 1045

28 Wash. 533

CITY OF PORT TOWNSEND v. EISENBEIS et ux.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 6, 1902

Appeal from superior court, Jefferson county; Geo. C. Hatch, Judge.

Action by the city of Port Townsend against Charles Eisenbeis and wife. Judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

A. W. Buddress, for appellant.

A. R Coleman, for respondents.

ANDERS J.

The city of Port Townsend seeks by this action to foreclose alleged statutory liens on the real estate of the defendants (respondents here), described in the complaint, for taxes for the years 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1894, levied by said city, and which have never been paid. The complaint, in substance, alleges that during all the times mentioned therein the plaintiff was, and still is, a city in Jefferson county, state of Washington; that it was duly incorporated and organized under and by virtue of an act of the legislature of the territory of Washington approved November 29, 1881, entitled, 'An act to incorporate the city of Port Townsend' (Laws 1881, p. 115), and the act amendatory thereof, approved November 28, 1883, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the city of Port Townsend,' approved on the 29th day of November 1881' (Laws 1883, p. 130); that on the 18th day of August, 1896, said city duly reincorporated under the general laws of the state of Washington as a city of the third class and that ever since said 18th day of August, 1896, the plaintiff has been, and still is, a duly incorporated, organized, and existing city of the third class; that the defendants during all the times in the complaint mentioned were, and still are, husband and wife, and the owners in fee simple and in the possession of certain real property, which is particularly described, and that said premises are situated in the said city of Port Townsend; that said premises were assessed for taxation at the time and in the manner provided by law and the ordinances of said city for the respective years mentioned and set forth; that the assessments were duly equalized and levied; that payment of the taxes so assessed and levied was demanded after the same became due and payable, but that no part of said taxes, penalty, or interest has been paid. The complaint prays for judgment for the amount of taxes, penalty, and interest due plaintiff, and that the amount found due be adjudged a valid and paramount lien on said premises, and that said described premises be sold to satisfy said lien, together with costs. The complaint refers in detail to the various ordinances of the city by virtue of which the several assessments and levies of the taxes therein mentioned were made, and which are not specifically mentioned in the foregoing statement of the contents of the complaint, but we think a fair understanding of the complaint can readily be gathered from said brief statement. The defendants interposed a demurrer to the complaint upon the grounds (1) that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue, and no right or power in law to maintain this action; (2) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants, or either of them; and (3) that this action had not been commenced within the time limited by law, and that the same was barred by the statute of limitations. The demurrer was sustained, and judgment was entered for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.

It does not appear to be claimed in this court that the demurrer is sustainable upon either the first or second ground stated. At all events, we are perfectly satisfied that the appellant city is legally empowered to maintain this action under and by virtue of an express provision of our statutes. 1 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 945. And we are also satisfied that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the respondents.

The remaining question for our determination is whether any provision of the general statute of limitations is applicable to this case. This question is the important one, and was elaborately argued by counsel for both the appellant and the respondents, and many authorities are cited in support of their respective contentions. The laws limiting the time within which actions may be commenced were no part of the common law, and are essentially the creation of statutes. Formerly such laws were unfavorably regarded by the courts, for the reason that they were deemed violative of personal rights, and therefore unjust in principle. At the present time, however, it is generally conceded that statutes of limitations are founded upon sound public policy, and, as they tend to the peace and welfare of society, they are considered as being among the most beneficial of our statutory laws. Although these statutes are remedial in their nature, and are always interpreted so as to carry out the intention of the legislature, 'yet,' says a learned author, 'as they are acts which take away existing rights, they should always be construed with reasonable strictness, and in favor of the rights sought to be defeated thereby, so far as is consistent with their letter and spirit.' Wood, Lim. (3d Ed.) § 4. Our statute of limitations is couched in general terms, and was evidently intended by the legislature to apply to all civil actions except those cases in which some other limitation is prescribed by law, or where it fairly appears in a particular case that no limitation was intended by the legislature. It is clearly within the province of the legislature to change a general statute of limitations whenever it may see fit to do so, and that may be done by the passage of an act inconsistent with the general statute. Our statute of limitations was first enacted in the year 1854 by the legislature of the territory of Washington, and but few changes have been made in its provisions since that time. Laws 1854, p. 362. The first section of that act, and which is still in force, provides that 'actions can only be commenced within the periods herein prescribed, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statMute. * * *' See 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4796 (2 Hill's Code, § 111). At the time this act was passed, and for many years thereafter, the payment of taxes not voluntarily paid was enforced by a seizure and sale of the property assessed, by a designated officer, in the manner provided by law. To such proceedings the general statute of limitations is plainly not applicable. And it was provided in the original charter of the city of Port Townsend (Laws 1881, p. 115) that delinquent city taxes should be collected in the manner above indicated; and no other or different method was provided until the reincorporation of the city on August 18, 1896, under and by virtue of the general statute providing for the organization, classification, etc., of municipal corporations, approved March 27, 1890, and the amendments thereof. The limitations prescribed by our statute apply to actions brought in the name of the state, or any county or other public corporation therein, or for its benefit, in the same manner as to actions by private parties. 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4807 (2 Hill's Code, § 122). After prescribing the time within which certain actions may be commenced in this state, the statute further provides that 'an action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued.' 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4805 (2 Hill's Code, § 120). The general statute specifically provides that actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of possession thereof, shall be commenced within 10 years after the cause of action shall have accrued; that an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States, shall be commenced within six years, and that an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument, must be commenced within three years after such cause of action shall have accrued.

It is claimed by the learned counsel for the respondents that this action is barred both by the two-year statute and by the six-year statute of limitations above quoted, and that the demurrer to the complaint was therefore properly sustained. On the other hand, it is earnestly contended on behalf of the appellant (1) that the action is not affected at all by any provision of the statute of limitations; and (2) that, if it is, either the six or the ten years' limitation is alone applicable, and that the action is not barred under either of those provisions. In order to determine whether the general statute of limitations is applicable to the case at bar, it is necessary to examine carefully all other statutes relating to the subject, for in no other manner can the real intention of the legislature be ascertained.

Section 82 of the original charter of the city of Port Townsend provides that, 'whenever any general or special tax has been levied as provided and authorized in chapter two of this act, the same shall have the offect of a judgment against the person, and every lien created by this act has the force and effect of an execution duly levied against all property of the person assessed; the judgment is not satisfied, nor the lien removed until the taxes are paid, and every tax due upon real property is a lien against the property assessed, and every tax due upon improvements upon real estate assessed to other than the owner of the real estate is a lien upon the land and improvements, and every part thereof shall bear...