City of Portage Des Sioux v. Lambert

• Decision Date: 16 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. ED 84658.,ED 84658.
• Citation: 196 S.W.3d 587
• Parties: CITY OF PORTAGE DES SIOUX, Respondent, v. Klaus LAMBERT and Constance B. Alt, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

196 S.W.3d 587

CITY OF PORTAGE DES SIOUX, Respondent, v. Klaus LAMBERT and Constance B. Alt, Appellants.

No. ED 84658.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.

May 16, 2006.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 10, 2006.

Application for Transfer Denied August 22, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William James O'Herin, Florissant, MO, for appellant.

Stephen A. Martin, St. Charles, MO, for respondent.

NANNETTE A. BAKER, Presiding Judge.

Klaus Lambert ("Lambert") and Constance B. Alt ("Alt") appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a mistrial based on its lack of jurisdiction for municipal violations with penalties of fines and incarcerations. First, Lambert and Alt assert that the trial court erred when it declared a mistrial and remanded the City of Portage Des Sioux ("City")'s petition to the associate circuit court¹ on the grounds that as a circuit court it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the issue. Lambert and Alt argue that circuit courts and associate circuit courts in Missouri have the same jurisdiction. Second, Lambert and Alt argue that the trial court erred when it severed the criminal case and remanded it to the associate circuit court because jeopardy attached and the remand constituted double jeopardy. Third, Lambert and Alt claim that the trial court erred when it found the remaining structures unfit for use or habitation because there was no substantial evidence to support such finding. Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

Procedural Background

The City, a Fourth class city, filed a petition on February 10, 2004, for injunction and fines charging Lambert and Alt with three counts of violating municipal ordinances, concerning their real estate located at 1265 Church Street. The petition claimed that Lambert and Alt, on various dates since 1998, violated multiple ordinances² concerning the condition of their property. These conditions included having more than one boat on the property, overgrown lot causing a fire and driving hazard, commercial use of a residential lot and a building structure so damaged such that it constituted a health and safety hazard. The petition sought injunctive relief as well as fines and incarceration.

On February 18, 2004, before the start of the trial, Lambert and Alt filed a request for a jury trial. City's counsel expressed concern to the court that this was a delay tactic. The court, having a venire panel available, granted the request on the condition that the trial proceed that day. After a jury was seated, the counsel for each party discussed whether to hold a bifurcated or non-bifurcated trial on the issues of liability and punishment. On the advice of their attorney, Lambert and Alt agreed on the record to waive any request for bifurcation.

The trial court then began hearing evidence on the case involving municipal ordinance violations. Sometime after six o'clock P.M. during the February 18 hearing, the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial on the basis that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction for municipal violations with penalties of incarceration and fines, and continued the hearing on injunctive relief until the March 31 hearing.

The Mistrial

In their first point relied on, Lambert and Alt claim that the trial court erred when it declared a mistrial on the grounds that as a circuit court it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over municipal ordinance violations. For their second point relied on, they claim that the trial court erred when it severed the criminal case and remanded it to the associate circuit court because jeopardy attached and the remand constituted double jeopardy.

After the day's testimony, the court asked counsel to approach the bench. Following a discussion that was off the record, the court quoted from Section 479.130:³ "Any person charged with the violation of a municipal ordinance of a city of the third or fourth class shall be entitled to a trial by jury, as in prosecutions for misdemeanors before an associate circuit judge." The court cited City of Webster Groves v. Kurt for the proposition that the circuit court generally lacks jurisdiction over municipal ordinance violation where there is a municipal judge. 797 S.W.2d 494 (Mo.App.E.D.1990). Following a break to determine whether the case remained good law, the parties returned to the record. There was further discussion of whether Webster Groves was binding precedent on the current proceedings. The court noted that since the City has no municipal judge, the situation in Webster Groves was different in that a municipal judge had rendered a judgment on only two of the counts alleged in the petition and transferred the third count, untried, to the circuit court. Id.

The counsel for City disputed the applicability of Webster Groves to the case before the court. Counsel further stated that, "if it's the Court's position that it doesn't have jurisdiction as to either the fines or the incarceration, then I would be willing to drop those claims and proceed on the injunction issue if that's what it takes to complete this trial in some timely fashion." The court replied, "What I think it stands for is that you can't originally file municipal ordinance violations in the circuit court . . . I think they need to be filed in the associate circuit court per Section 479.130." Referring to Section 479.090, the court quoted, "All prosecutions for the violation of municipal ordinances shall be instituted by information and may be based upon a complaint. Proceedings shall be in accordance with the supreme court rules governing practice and procedure in proceedings before municipal judges." Then the court declared a mistrial but retained jurisdiction over the request for injunctive relief. After the jury was dismissed, the court continued the case to March 31, 2004, "for conclusion of testimony and argument and submission of the case for a request for injunctive relief."

A final judgment is a prerequisite to appellate review. In re Marriage of Boden, 136 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Mo.App.E.D.2004). If a trial court order is not a final judgment, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. Id. An appealable judgment disposes of all issues in a case, leaving nothing for future determination. Id. For the judgment to be final and appealable, it must fully determine the rights of the parties. Id. If a judgment does not dispose of all of the issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence, it is not final and appealable. Id.

A mistrial is generally defined as, "a trial that the judge brings to an end, without a determination on the merits, because of a procedural error or serious misconduct occurring during the proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (8th ed.2004). The Southern District considered a similar situation in Helton Const. Co. Inc. v. Thrift, 865 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.App.S.D.1993). Helton concerned an appeal from a mistrial declared when the judge disqualified himself prior to delivering a ruling. Id. at 420. The court stated that "Section 512.020 enumerates the orders, including any final judgment in the case, from which an aggrieved party may appeal. An order of self-disqualification is not an appealable order, and the same is true of an order declaring a mistrial." Id. at 422. The Southern District declined to enter a judgment on the appeal "because the first proceeding did not result in an appealable judgment or order." Id. at 423.

The Western District considered this issue in Duckett v. Troester, 996 S.W.2d 641 (Mo.App.W.D.1999). In Duckett, the trial court granted the respondent's motion for a mistrial one month after the jury had reached a verdict on the case. Id. at 645. Although the Western District ruled that the order granting the motion for a mistrial was a nullity because the trial had already concluded, it entered its order sustaining the respondent's motion to dismiss an earlier appeal from the order granting a mistrial, finding that the trial court's order granting a mistrial was neither final nor otherwise appealable pursuant to Section 512.020.⁴ Id.

In the case before us, it is clear under Missouri law that the trial court's order granting a mistrial on February 18, 2004 is not a final, appealable order. There...