City of Prattville v. Joyner

• Citation: 698 So.2d 122
• Parties: CITY OF PRATTVILLE v. Leon Harold JOYNER, et al. 1951263.
• Decision Date: 13 June 1997
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 122

698 So.2d 122

CITY OF PRATTVILLE v. Leon Harold JOYNER, et al.

1951263.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 13, 1997.

Donald J. Stewart, Roy J. Crawford, and Richard E. Davis of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Mobile and Birmingham; and George H. Howell of Howell, Sarto & Howell, Prattville, for Appellant.

Alfred Q. Booth, Prattville; and Donald G. Madison, Montgomery, for Appellees.

Bill Pryor, Atty. Gen., and Carol Jean Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., as Amici Curiae.

Alabama League of Municipalities, Amici Curiae, in support of appellant, represented by Kenneth Smith, league counsel.

MADDOX, Justice.

This is the second time this case has been before this Court. It presents this time, as it did the first time, the issue whether a municipality, here the City of Prattville, can terminate fire protection services to residents and businesses located within its police jurisdiction. See, City of Prattville v. Joyner, 661 So.2d 1158 (Ala.1995) (hereinafter referred to as Joyner I ).

Most of the basic facts are stated in Joyner I, but we state a few of those facts again for a better understanding of the legal issue presented.

On October 19, 1993, the Prattville City Council passed an ordinance that purported to withdraw fire protection from Prattville's police jurisdiction, the initial ordinance providing for an effective date of January 1, 1994; the date was later extended to May 1, 1994. On April 29, 1994, just before the ordinance was to become effective, Leon Joyner, the owner of a business located within the Prattville police jurisdiction, filed a class action in which he sought declaratory relief and an order restraining the City from terminating the fire protection in the police jurisdiction on the ground that the City's action was "arbitrary and capricious, null and void, and unconstitutional." On April 30, 1994, the trial judge temporarily restrained Prattville from terminating fire protection, and on May 15, 1994, after a hearing on a request to enter preliminary relief, he entered a preliminary injunction enjoining "the City of Prattville, its Mayor and members of its Council, agents and employees" from "withdrawing, eliminating and/or terminating police and fire protection from the business and individual residents who are located and/or residing within the three mile radius of the city known as and statutorily defined as the police jurisdiction " (emphasis in original). The City appealed; this Court affirmed.

In affirming, this Court cited Alford v. City of Gadsden, 349 So.2d 1132 (Ala.1977), stating that

" '[t]he doctrine of estoppel is rarely applied against a municipal corporation, but it may be applied in a proper case.' Id. at 1135, citing City of Montgomery v. Weldon, 280 Ala. 463, 195 So.2d 110 (1967); Powell v. City of Birmingham, 258 Ala. 159, 61 So.2d 11 (1952); Brown v. Tuskegee Light & Power Co., 232 Ala. 361, 168 So. 159 (1936). In City of Guntersville v. Alred, 495 So.2d 566, 568 (Ala.1986), this Court stated that '[t]he doctrine of estoppel may apply against a municipal corporation when justice and fair play demand it.' See also Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 470 So.2d 1234 (Ala. [Civ.App.] 1985)."

661 So.2d at 1161-62. Nevertheless, this Court held that the doctrine could be applied in that case, saying, among other things, the following:

"We agree with the trial court that Joyner's reliance on continuing city fire protection was reasonable under the facts of this case. After 22 years of providing fire protection and collecting revenues for that protection, Prattville may not arbitrarily terminate this service. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, we conclude that Prattville's relationship with the businesses and residents in the police jurisdiction extended beyond the collection of revenue. If Prattville stops providing fire protection to the police jurisdiction now, there will be a drastic effect on businesses and residents of that area. Prattville must continue to provide fire protection to the police jurisdiction, because Prattville chose to collect revenue from the businesses and residents of the police jurisdiction in order to finance those services, and because Prattville created and maintained an ongoing relationship with the police jurisdiction in regard to those services. More importantly, the businesses and residents of the police jurisdiction reasonably relied on the continuation of that relationship.

661 So.2d at 1163 (emphasis original).

In Joyner I, the Court also found that "[o]ther jurisdictions [had] also considered reasonable reliance as an appropriate basis for enforcing a duty on the part of the municipality," citing cases. 661 So.2d at 1162.

After this Court rendered its decision, the parties made several additional filings, in which Joyner asked that the injunction be made permanent and the City asked that the cause be dismissed because of Joyner's failure to serve a copy of the pleadings on the attorney general. On August 11, 1995, Joyner served a notice of the pendency of the proceeding on the attorney general, attaching copies of the complaint and amendments to it. Joyner then filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of the preliminary injunction order and Joyner I. The original trial judge recused and the case was assigned to another judge. ¹

The newly assigned trial judge, without holding a hearing, granted Joyner's request for a permanent injunction and denied each of the requests by the City to dismiss for the court's failure to require the joinder of the Cities of Montgomery and Millbrook, whose police jurisdictions overlap, in part, with Prattville's.

The City also raises the issue whether the trial court erred in certifying this action as a class action; the City contends that the requirements of Ala.R.Civ.P. 23(a) have not been satisfied. The City of Prattville also raises the issue whether the trial court erred in failing to require the joinder of the City of Millbrook and the City of Montgomery under Ala.R.Civ.P. 19(a).

I.

We first consider the City's argument that Joyner I conflicts with the preexisting fundamental principles of Alabama municipal law. The City cites in support of its argument the case of City of Leeds v. Town of Moody, 294 Ala. 496, 501, 319 So.2d 242, 246 (1975), where this Court stated, "Municipalities are mere instrumentalities of the state possessing only such powers as may have been delegated to them by the legislature." The City contends that in City of Leeds this Court, in referring to a municipality's power with respect to its police jurisdiction, held that such power is "legislative power[ ] delegated [to it] by the legislature," which the municipality cannot "by any provision or terms in a contract delegate or barter away." Id. The City also cites as authority for its position Karagan v. City of Mobile, 420 So.2d 57 (Ala.1982), in which this Court held that in the absence of fraud, a municipality's decision of a discretionary nature is presumed legal and correct; and that, unless it is constitutionally proscribed, or otherwise prohibited by law, such a decision, being a legislative act, is judicially reviewable only on grounds of arbitrariness and capriciousness, to be tested by the "fairly debatable" standard. The City further argues that in Williams v. City of Tuscumbia, 426 So.2d 824 (Ala.1983), and Ziegler v. City of Millbrook, 514 So.2d 1275 (Ala.1987), this Court held that "there is no legislative duty imposed upon a municipality to maintain a fire department." 426 So.2d at 825. Last, the City says that forcing it to provide fire protection to the police jurisdiction will place a substantial financial burden on the City. ²

The City also argues that the principles announced in Joyner I create ambiguities in the law and that it will be difficult to implement those principles. The City mentions such things as annexation of additional territory, or revising the City limits by deannexation, and says that this Court did not define "how and when this 'duty' arises and whether the 'duty' can be terminated."

On this appeal, we have been favored with amicus briefs from the attorney general and the Alabama League of Municipalities. The attorney general argues that "[a] governmental entity cannot be precluded from making prospective changes in its policy of providing governmental services based on a single claim of reliance on the preexisting policy for providing such services." The attorney general concludes his brief with these propositions:

"1. If expenditures for police jurisdiction services equal or exceed business license revenues received from the police jurisdiction, as required by Ala.Code [1975,] § 11-51-91, the determination of what services, if any, are to be provided from time to time in its police jurisdiction by a municipality is a matter within the legislative discretion of the governing body of the municipality. The exercise of that discretion is entitled to judicial deference absent a clear abuse of that discretion.

"2. Residents and property owners in a municipal police jurisdiction acquire no vested entitlement to the general provision of any municipal services or the general provision of any level of municipal services by reliance, estoppel, or otherwise.

"3. Municipal services being provided in a municipal police jurisdiction may be prospectively altered in scope or terminated, after appropriate prior public notice.

The Alabama League of Municipalities argues that "[t]he Code of Alabama places no duty on a municipality to provide service to the police jurisdiction and the theories of reasonable reliance or equitable estoppel should [not] prohibit a municipality from withdrawing service from the police jurisdiction."

It is apparent that this Court decided Joyner I on the principles of equitable estoppel and that it did not foresee some of the questions that could arise from the application of that doctrine....