City of Raytown v. Danforth

• Decision Date: 19 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59734,59734
• Citation: 560 S.W.2d 846
• Parties: CITY OF RAYTOWN, Missouri, Respondent, v. John C. DANFORTH, Attorney General, Missouri Department of Social Services, Kansas City Ambulance Association, Inc., Ralph L. Martin, Prosecuting Attorney, Mid-America Regional Council, Emergency Rescue, Inc., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 846

560 S.W.2d 846

CITY OF RAYTOWN, Missouri, Respondent, v. John C. DANFORTH, Attorney General, Missouri Department of

Social Services, Kansas City Ambulance Association, Inc.,

Ralph L. Martin, Prosecuting Attorney, Mid-America Regional

Council, Emergency Rescue, Inc., Appellants.

No. 59734.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Dec. 19, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1978.

Harvey M. Tettlebaum, John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Billy S. Sparks, Kansas City, for appellants.

Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., Kansas City, for respondent.

RENDLEN, Judge.

Appeal from the trial court's judgment declaring that provisions of Missouri's ambulance licensing law, §§ 190.100 to 190.195, RSMo Supp.1975, ¹ do not require that plaintiff City secure a license from the Missouri Division of Health prior to operation of an ambulance service. The judgment also enjoined the threatened enforcement of the licensing law as to plaintiff. ² The cause was transferred from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City district prior to opinion, pursuant to civil rule 83.06.

During 1975 Raytown, a city of the fourth class, negotiated unsuccessfully with defendant Kansas City Ambulance Association, Inc., to obtain ambulance service for its residents. Resolving to provide its own community ambulance, Raytown in January of 1976 applied to the Missouri Division of Health for an ambulance license under the recently enacted Licensing Law. Because the City had not previously operated such a service and did not qualify under the "grandfather" provision implicit in the Act, ³ its application was processed in the same manner as others entering the field following the effective date of the Act. A hearing required by § 190.125.2(1) was conducted in which it was determined the public convenience and necessity did not "require the proposed ambulance service" and accordingly Raytown's license application was denied. Apparently unwilling to avail itself of the appeal afforded by § 190.170.7, the City purchased a vehicle and commenced operating an ambulance service in 1976, sans the required state license.

Not long thereafter Raytown was notified by the Attorney General and then by the Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County that it was in violation of the Licensing Law. These notices prompted plaintiff's action in the circuit court, culminating in the judgment declaring the City was authorized to continue under the provisions of § 67.300, RSMo 1969, free from constraints of the Licensing Law and restraining defendants from their threatened enforcement actions.

Defendants allege the trial court erred: (1) in declaring plaintiff City had authority to operate an unlicensed ambulance service, and (2) by enjoining the threatened enforcement of the penalty provisions of the Act. We reverse.

Urging affirmance, plaintiff contends that because § 67.300, RSMo 1969, ⁴ authorizes municipal ambulance services, the Licensing Law should not be construed as a limitation of that authority. Section 67.300 is an enabling Act granting authority for activities not previously permitted cities of the fourth class, namely, operation of ambulance services; however the authority conferred may not be extended beyond the legislative intendment. "A municipal corporation such as (plaintiff) is a creature of the legislature, possessing only those powers expressly granted, or those necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental to express grants, or those essential to the declared objects of the municipality. Any reasonable doubt as to whether a power has been delegated to a municipality is resolved in favor of nondelegation." Anderson v. City of Olivette, 518 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo.1975).

Measuring the powers granted municipalities under § 67.300 against the terms of the Licensing Law, we have concluded the legislature did not intend that cities operating ambulance services may do so without regard to the hearing requirements of §§ 190.100 to 190.195. This is not to say that § 67.300 and the Licensing Law are in conflict, instead the latter provides regulations relative to the general grant of the former and the general authority under § 67.300 is qualified by the subsequent special legislation on the subject. Statutes relating to the same subject must be read together and if possible in harmony, and provisions of one having special application to a particular subject will be deemed a qualification to another statute general in its terms. Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corporation, 432 S.W.2d 245 (Mo.1968); Eagleton v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 949, 156 S.W.2d 683 (1941); State ex rel. McKittrick v. Carolene Products Co., 346 Mo. 1049, 144 S.W.2d 153 (banc 1940). Section 67.300 deals with the general grant of power to cities for the operation of ambulance services and subsection 2 permits formulation of rules for the use of equipment and the fixing of fees. However, the statute makes no provision for licensing, minimum equipment requirements, personnel qualifications, training requirements or related operational standards found in §§ 190.100 to 190.195. Moreover, as §§ 190.100 to 190.195 were enacted almost seven years after § 67.300, the later statute prevails if inconsistencies appear between them, thus the chronology of the legislation reinforces defendant's contention that the City's authority to provide ambulance service has been made subject to the requirements of the Licensing Law. State ex rel. McNary v. Stussie, 518 S.W.2d 630, 635(2) (Mo.banc 1974); City of Kirkwood v. Allen, 399 S.W.2d 30, 34(1) (Mo.banc 1966).

Plaintiff, vigorously maintaining the Licensing Law has no application to municipal ambulance services and that the legislative policy allowing local control over ambulance services by municipalities was not undercut by the Act, points to 190.105.4 which states: "The issuance of a license under the provisions of sections 190.100 to 190.195 shall not be construed so as to authorize any person, firm, corporation, or association to provide ambulance services or to operate any ambulances without a franchise in any county, municipality or political subdivision which has enacted an ordinance making it unlawful to do so." (Emphasis added.) This, plaintiff argues, authorizes municipal prohibition of ambulance operations "within their limits by the entities referred to" and because cities have the power to withhold such a franchise it must perforce be exempt from the licensing requirement of the Act. We do not agree. More properly it should be said that the legislature intended a state ambulance license is required for all ambulances operating in the state, but the political subdivision in which the service is rendered may also require a local franchise for such operations. We see an analogy in the state motor vehicle license requirements vis-a-vis that of a city license for resident owners' automobiles. Though the city in the ambulance license field may require a franchise for those operating in its bounds, this does not authorize a municipality to franchise its own operation and thereby circumvent the state licensing requirement. Such would run contrary to the provisions of § 190.105.1 that no person shall be engaged in the ambulance business "unless he holds a currently valid license" from the Division of Health, and would constitute municipal legislative action in conflict with the Act of the sort proscribed by § 190.105.5. ⁵

Numerous provisions of the Act demonstrate a legislative intent that municipal ambulance operations are among those within the purview of the statute. The following are examples: Section 190.105 mandates that "no person" shall operate an ambulance service upon any public way of the State of Missouri, unless holding an ambulance license under the Act. Person is defined by § 190.100(10) as "any . . . organization of any kind, including any government agency other than the United States or the State of Missouri." (Emphasis added.) In this context the term "governmental agency" appears intended to broadly include all governmental entities, for the legislature concluded the section by removing or excepting the United States and the State of Missouri from its terms. Neither cities, towns nor villages are so excepted and therefore are deemed within its purview.

Subsection 190.100(1), defines an ambulance as "any privately or publicly owned motor vehicle" (Emphasis added.) designed and equipped to be used for the transportation of patients "including dual purpose police patrol cars." The inclusion of "publicly owned" vehicles among those defined as ambulances, refers to those owned by any political subdivision of the state, demonstrating a legislative intent that any city owned and operated ambulance must be licensed under the Act. Similarly, "dual purpose police patrol cars" typically owned by cities or counties are numbered...