City of Richland v. Wakefield

Decision Date22 September 2016
Docket NumberNo. 92594–1,92594–1
Citation186 Wash.2d 596,380 P.3d 459
Parties City of Richland, Respondent, v. Briana Wakefield, Petitioner. City of Kennewick, Respondent, v. Briana Wakefield, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Karla Elizabeth Mary Carlisle, Jefferson Hampton Coulter II, The Northwest Justice Project, 1310 N. 5th Ave., Ste. B, Pasco, WA, 99301–4172, for Petitioner.

Jessica Marie Foltz Kennewick, City Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 6108, 210 W. 6th Ave., Kennewick, WA, 99336–0108, James Floyd Bell, Bell Brown & Rio PLLC, 410 N. Neel St., Ste. A, Kennewick, WA, 99336–2865, for Respondent.

Gary Manca, Manca Law, PLLC, 108 S. Washington St., Ste. 308, Seattle, WA, 98104–3406, Mathew Lane Harrington, Theresa Hsin–Yi Wang, Stokes Lawrence, PS, 1420 5th Ave., Ste. 3000, Seattle, WA, 98101–2393, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Nami–Washington.

Julie Johnson Schaffer, Gonzaga University School of Law, 721 N. Cincinnati St., Spokane, WA, 99202–2021, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Center for Justice.

Colleen M. Melody, Office of the Attorney General, 800 5th Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Attorney General.

Melissa R. Lee, Nicholas Brian Allen, Columbia Legal Services, Institutions Pr., 101 Yesler Way, Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98104–2528, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Columbia Legal Services.

Toby James Marshall, Elizabeth Anne Adams, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, 936 N. 34th St., Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98103–8869, Sarah A. Dunne, U.S. Department of Education, 915 2nd Ave., Ste. 3310, Seattle, WA, 98174–1000, Jaime Michelle Hawk, Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington, 901 5th Ave., Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164–2086, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

OWENS

, J.

¶1 Benton Comity District Court ordered petitioner Briana Wakefield to pay $15 each month toward her outstanding legal financial obligations (LFOs). Wakefield is homeless, disabled, and indigent. Her only income is $710 in social security disability payments each month, and as a result, she struggles to meet her own basic needs. Wakefield and amici ask this court to reverse the district court's order and hold that the current practice of strict LFO enforcement against homeless, disabled, and indigent people in Benton County violates state and federal statutes. Because the district court's order was contrary to both the law and the evidence in the record, we reverse. Under state law, LFOs should be imposed only if an individual has a present or future ability to pay, and LFOs may be remitted when paying them would impose a manifest hardship on the person. In this case, Wakefield has no present or future ability to pay LFOs. She already struggles to obtain basic needs such as secure housing, food, and medical care. Both parties agree that ordering Wakefield to pay would impose a manifest hardship on her and that her LFOs should be remitted. However, both parties also request that we issue an opinion on the merits to provide guidance to parties in the future. Pursuant to our analysis below, we order that her LFOs be remitted.

FACTS

¶2 Wakefield had a difficult childhood. Her parents were both addicts, and her father was abusive. She entered the foster care system at the age of 14. At the age of 18, she began receiving social security income because she is unable to work due to her permanent disabilities, which include bipolar disorder

, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Her monthly social security disability payment has been her only income, although she also receives about $170 in food stamps assistance from the State. At this time, she is 27 years old.

¶3 She has four children who are in foster care, and she is currently involved in a dependency action. She testified that she is actively working to comply with the dependency court's order, which includes seeing a mental health counselor once every other week, seeing a drug counselor every week, attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings two to three times a week, visiting her children three times a week for three-hour visits, and taking parenting classes. She is also attempting to find stable housing.

¶4 Wakefield has three low level misdemeanor convictions: theft (2009), disorderly conduct (2010), and harassment (2012). Wakefield is specifically challenging the discretionary costs imposed as a result of the latter two convictions. She is not challenging fines or nondiscretionary LFOs.1 Wakefield acknowledges that she did not appeal the costs imposed as part of her judgment and sentence, and thus she is not challenging the original decision imposing those costs.

¶5 The parties agree that Wakefield has not been making monthly payments on these outstanding costs (although she has intermittently made a couple of small payments over the years), and the district court scheduled a fine review hearing, which is essentially a contempt proceeding. Wakefield moved to remit the costs pursuant to RCW 10.01.160(4)

because she did not have the ability to pay, and because being forced to pay would create a manifest hardship for her and her family. The cities were not contacted about the fine review hearing and did not appear. The only attendees were Wakefield, her attorney, and her expert witness.

¶6 At the fine review hearing, Wakefield testified with regard to her current situation. She explained that she is homeless and that she does not have enough money to pay her LFOs, despite minimizing her expenses as much as possible. She recounted her expenses for the past few months and explained how she spends her monthly $710 on her basic needs (or at least attempting to meet her basic needs).

¶7 Wakefield also presented testimony from expert witness Dr. Diana Pierce, a professor at the University of Washington School of Social Work. Dr. Pierce testified regarding her research calculating “self-sufficiency standards,” which are measurements of “the minimum amount of money you need to adequately meet your basic needs.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 78. These standards include the resources needed to meet only “the core necessities of life, such as clothing, food, shelter and medical care at a decent level.” Id . at 188. Dr. Pierce explained, “To be below this minimum means the inability to secure even the basic necessities with one's own resources, and be forced to sacrifice one need for another, e.g., not eat in order to pay for heat, or be forced to rely on luck, on the uncertainty of the kindness of others.” Id . It does not include “recreation, entertainment, savings, debt repayment, or any other needs beyond the inescapable daily needs of basic human existence.” Id . at 189. Dr. Pierce testified that the self-sufficiency standard in 2011 for a one person household in Kennewick or Richland is $1,492 per month. Dr. Pierce testified that Wakefield's monthly income falls well below that self-sufficiency standard and that she can't even meet her basic needs at a bare bones level.” Id . at 85. Based on her experience and the facts of this case, Dr. Pierce stated that ordering Wakefield to pay court costs would be ordering Wakefield to “put her basic survival needs aside.” Id . at 192.

¶8 Since the cities were not present at the hearing, the district court judge actively questioned all witnesses. She summarized her understanding of the law in her ruling, stating that “the caselaw doesn't say just because she's indigent or just because she has trouble meeting basic needs that she's excused from the penalty.” Id at 107. The judge then ordered Wakefield to participate in work crew and to pay $15 each month. At no point did the court make an explicit finding that Wakefield was able to make the payments. Nor did the court mention or apply the manifest hardship standard for remitting costs for indigent defendants.

¶9 Wakefield appealed to Benton County Superior Court. The superior court remanded to the district court for entry of “findings setting forth the reasons and facts which led the [court] to enter these orders.” Id . at 237. The district court entered 16 findings of fact and 5 conclusions of law.

¶10 Wakefield challenges many of those findings of fact because they are not supported by substantial evidence. The key findings of fact at issue in this case are:

3. Ms. Wakefield currently receives SSI [ (social security income) ] and other state funded benefits.
4. There was no evidence presented that Ms. Wakefield has a permanent disability that prevents her from working.
....14. Her continuing criminal activity, failure to do court ordered treatment and continued drug use are life style choices she made that negatively impacted the amount of money that Ms. Wakefield had available to pay her fines and demonstrate willfulness on her part.
....
16. The defendant stated that her income would prohibit her from paying fines but did not testify to any bona fide efforts she has made to be current in her fine payments.

Id . at 240–41.

¶11 The superior court reviewed the district court decision for (1) errors of law and (2) whether the factual findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record. The superior court upheld most of the district court's ruling, with the exception of the work crew requirement. The superior court reversed the imposition of work crew because there had been no finding that Wakefield willfully failed to make payments. Thus, the work crew requirement is not in front of us.

¶12 Wakefield sought discretionary review from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the case to us, and the commissioner accepted certification. Amicus briefs in support of Wakefield were filed by the attorney general, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Washington, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness—Washington.

¶13 After the briefs were filed, respondents city of Richland and city of Kennewick filed a motion to strike oral argument, and to remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order...

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