City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Presbyterian Church, 70819
| Decision Date | 14 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 70819,70819 |
| Citation | 764 S.W.2d 647 |
| Parties | CITY OF RICHMOND HEIGHTS, Respondent, v. RICHMOND HEIGHTS PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
David G. Dempsey, Richard H. Ulrich, St. Louis, Lee G. Kline, Clayton, for appellant.
Kenneth Heinz, Steven W. Garrett, St. Louis, for respondent.
William T. Smith, III, Kansas City, Lee Boothby, Julie B. Kaplan, Berrien Springs, Mich., amicus curiae, Americans United for Separation of Church and State.
Bernard C. Huger, Anne D. Crane, St. Louis, amicus curiae, Roman Catholic Archdiocese.
Leonard J. Frankel, Edward M. Roth, Irl B. Baris, St. Louis, amicus curiae, American Jewish Congress.
The Circuit Court of St. Louis County enjoined the Richmond Heights Presbyterian Church from operating a day care center for children located on the church's property. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed on First Amendment grounds and this Court granted transfer. The Court concludes that under the facts of this case the day care center meets the requirements of an "accessory use" as defined and permitted in the City of Richmond Heights' (City) zoning ordinance. Reversed.
The church is located in an area of the city zoned single family residential only. The day care is operated in an educational building constructed in 1960. The city adopted a zoning ordinance in 1981. In 1984, the church began operating its day care. The church's use of the property as a church is not challenged. It has been stipulated that the day care complies with all applicable health and safety regulations and that the only issue before this Court is whether or not the city's zoning ordinance prohibits the church from operating its day care program in this neighborhood.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether or not the operation of the day care center is an "accessory use" under the city zoning ordinances. In order to determine whether a particular use is a permitted accessory use, the wording of the applicable ordinance is controlling. Suburbia Gardens Nursery, Inc. v. County of St. Louis, 377 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Mo. banc 1964); Coots v. J.A. Tobin Construction Co., 634 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Mo.App.1982); Schaefer v. Neumann, 561 S.W.2d 416, 424 (Mo.App.1977). Because of the unique nature of this ordinance applied to these facts, the holding herein is expressly confined to the facts of this case.
Under the applicable city zoning ordinance, No. 3707, art. 2, an "accessory use" is defined to be:
... a structure or use which meets all the following criteria: (1) It is subordinate to and serves a principal building or a principal use; (2) It is subordinate in area, extent or purpose to the principal building or principal use served; (3) It contributes to the comfort, convenience or necessity of occupants, business or industry in the principal building or...
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Shim v. Washington Tp. Planning Bd.
...focused exclusively on zoning grounds rather than on constitutional principles. For example, in City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Presbyterian Church, 764 S.W.2d 647 (Mo.1989), the city's ordinance included a definition of "accessory use" virtually identical to the definition fou......
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...within the ambit of the religious activity of the church. Noah's Ark and the Trustee cite, as well, City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Presbyterian Church, 764 S.W.2d 647 (Mo.1989) (holding that a church-run day care center was an accessory use), and Harvest Christian Center v. Ki......
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