City of Ridgeland, In re

• Decision Date: 03 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 56756,56756
• Citation: 494 So.2d 348
• Parties: In re Inclusion into the CITY OF RIDGELAND, Mississippi. Walter SCHMIDT, et al. v. CITY OF JACKSON.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 348

494 So.2d 348

In re Inclusion into the CITY OF RIDGELAND, Mississippi Walter SCHMIDT, et al. v. CITY OF JACKSON.

No. 56756.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 3, 1986.

Jerry L. Mills, Melton E. Knotts, Jr., Pyle, Harris, Dreher, Mills & Woods, Jackson, Jerry R. Wallace, Montgomery, Smith-Vaniz & McGraw, Canton, for appellants.

James L. Carroll, Douglas J. Gunn, Watkins & Eager, John Hedglin, Jackson, Joe R. Fancher, Jr., Canton, for appellee.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

Today's appeal is that of persons residing in an unincorporated area contiguous to two incorporated municipalities. These persons petitioned to be included in one of the adjoining municipalities which has answered and agreed to the annexation, only to find that the rebuffed municipality vehemently objects.

The principal question presented is whether the complaint in the nature of a petition for inclusion has been joined by two-thirds of the qualified electors of the area tendered for annexation. The Chancellor answered this question in the negative and dismissed the complaint. For the reasons articulated below, we affirm.

II.

On October 1, 1984, ninety-nine persons, Plaintiffs below and Appellants here, invoked the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 21-1-45 (1972) and sought incorporation into the City of Ridgeland, Mississippi, an area largely rectangular in an east-west sense, situated in Madison County and adjoining the city of Ridgeland on that city's western boundary. The southernmost boundary of the area in dispute is contiguous to the northern boundary of the City of Jackson along the Hinds-Madison County line.

The City of Ridgeland answered the complaint and admitted its allegations, apparently agreeing that the area in controversy should be annexed to that city. The City of Jackson, however, vigorously resisted the complaint and sought dismissal on numerous jurisdictional and procedural grounds--short of an adjudication on the merits.

On March 27, 1985, the matter was heard in the Chancery Court on these preliminary issues. Substantial testimony was adduced going to the question whether two-thirds of the qualified electors in the geographical area sought to be made a part of the City of Ridgeland had in fact and in law joined the complaint. On April 23, 1985, the Chancery Court released its opinion finding the complaint inadequate, jurisdictionally and procedurally. On May 24, 1985, the Chancery Court entered its final order dismissing the complaint. This appeal has followed.

III.

The legislature of this state has by statutory enactment prescribed a means by which persons may obtain annexation to municipalities adjacent to the areas in which they live. Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 21-1-45 and -47 (1972). In pertinent part Section 21-1-45 provides for the filing of a complaint

which said petition [complaint] shall be signed by at least two-thirds ( 2/3) of the qualified electors residing in the territory proposed to be included in ... such municipality.

The matter of inclusion of one's home and surroundings into an adjacent municipality is of considerable importance. The municipality into whose corporate limits the petitioners seek to come, as well as other adjacent or nearby municipalities, have important and often conflicting interests at stake. Our responsibility is to see that the mechanism the legislature has afforded be a viable one, fairly administered, not entailed by hypertechnical procedural niceties. See Enlargement of the Boundaries of Yazoo City v. City of Yazoo City, 452 So.2d 837, 843 (Miss.1984); see also Dotson v. City of Indianola, 551 F.Supp. 515, 519 (N.D.Miss.1982).

The City of Jackson is dead wrong when it urges that Section 21-1-45's remedy is available only to persons who are already the inhabitants of an incorporated territory. While we concede that the statute could have been more clearly worded, it may not be read in its entirety without the realization that the legislature has provided that both persons within an incorporated territory at the time of petitioning as well as those without may upon proper showing enjoy the remedy it affords. As indicated above, the area in question at present is an unincorporated area of Madison County. It is a "territory contiguous to and adjoining any existing municipality [to-wit: the City of Ridgeland]" and as such its citizens are entitled to proceed under Sections 21-1-45 and -47.

IV.

Among the various bases for its ruling against Plaintiffs, the Chancery Court held that

the proof established that two-thirds of the qualified electors in the area had not signed the petitions.

Plaintiffs assign this conclusion as error. Because it is perhaps the most basic of the deficiencies found in the complaint--the others, at worst, being amendable--we will consider it first.

Plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Chancery Court, a non-confessable jurisdiction which, as we have oft repeated, turns upon the well pleaded allegations of the complaint (in the statute denominated "Petition"). ¹ Lee v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc. 485 So.2d 293, 294 (Miss.1986); American Fire Insurance Co. v. Athens Stove Works, Inc., 481 So.2d 292, 296 (Miss.1985); Luckett v. Mississippi Wood, Inc., 481 So.2d 288, 290 (Miss.1985). The complaint filed October 1, 1984, more than adequately states a claim under Section 21-1-45 upon which relief may be granted. Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Construction Company, Inc., 464 So.2d 499, 504-06 (Miss.1985). Without question, the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to confer upon the Chancery Court authority to proceed further and, indeed, to hold the hearing which has resulted in the order of dismissal, the appeal of which we consider this day. See, Penrod Drilling Co. v. Bounds, 433 So.2d 916, 924-25 (Miss.1983).

The merits of the question presented turn upon the criteria to be employed in determining whether a person residing in the area should be counted in the quest for the two-thirds majority. While the Chancery Court did not give the definition it employed in deciding that the petition fell short, we consider that the positions of the parties at trial and in their briefs on this appeal may be safely regarded as framing the issue.

The City of Jackson takes the position that the calculations are made as of October 1, 1984, the date of the filing of the complaint; that is, identifying all persons residing in the area sought to be included into the City of Ridgeland, determining which on that date were registered to vote in Madison County, Mississippi, and then by reference to the complaint determining whether two-thirds of those so registered had signed the complaint. The City presented testimony to the effect that, when this procedure was employed, the conclusion was that there were 115 qualified electors in the area, 72 of whom had signed the complaint. This computes to 62.6 percent, ² slightly short of the required two-thirds or 66 2/3 percent.

Plaintiffs' view is interestingly different. They accept the October 1, 1984 filing date as the date on which the determination must be made. They argue, however, that the term "qualified elector" in the statute means persons who would be eligible to vote if an election were held on that day, pointing out familiar legal requirements that, in order to be eligible to vote in a given election, persons must have registered the minimum of thirty days in advance of the election, see, e.g., Ferguson v. Williams, 343 F.Supp. 654 (N.D.Miss.1972); Graham v. Waller, 343 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.Miss.1972). Under this test 69.358 percent of qualified electors joined the complaint. ³

The question turns on the definition to be given the term "qualified electors" within Section 21-1-45, the legislature having provided no dispositive definition.

The two-thirds requirement was, no doubt, imposed to assure that, before an area is incorporated into a municipality, it be ascertained that a clear majority of the persons residing there desires annexation. After all, the consequences of such annexation are not insignificant--both in the availability of services and benefits and the exaction of taxes and assessments. Suffice it to say that the question of whether the benefits exceed the costs is one with respect to which reasonable people may and do differ. This notion provides us with a compelling reason to construe the statute as broadly as may reasonably be done, that is, to allow a maximum number of those persons who may be affected by the results of the annexation proceeding to participate (by signing the complaint or refraining to do so).

There is, of course, the competing consideration of assuring that the persons voting are those who have some stake in the community and are not mere transients. For this reason the legislature has required that participation in the annexation process be limited to "qualified electors" rather than that no doubt larger group who are mere "residents". These thoughts would appear to lead to the conclusion that the counting should be done by reference to the names of persons who were qualified electors on the date the complaint is filed without further restrictions. Cf. City of Clinton, Mississippi v. Smith, 493 So.2d 331, 339 (Miss.1986).

The City of Jackson agrees and urges in support the provisions of a statute taken from another chapter of the Code, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 23-5-85 which appears in that context to provide a definition of "qualified elector". ⁴ This statute does provide a definition of "qualified elector" consistent with the City's position but does not stop there. The statute goes on to provide that entitlement to vote is a separate idea to be measured by the now superseded four months pre-election registration requirement. This statute begs the question and plays into the hands of Plaintiffs who argue that the signing of a complaint in the...