City of Rio Rancho v. Sais
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38727 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Parties | CITY OF RIO RANCHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUDE N. SAIS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY George P Eichwald, District Judge
City of Rio Rancho Gina R. Manfredi, Assistant City Attorney Rio Rancho, NM for Appellant
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant Jude N. Sais was convicted in Rio Rancho Municipal Court of one count of assault upon peace officers and one count of interference with officers, in violation of Rio Rancho (City) ordinances. Defendant appealed his convictions to the district court for a trial de novo. In the district court, the City refused to comply with the district court's pretrial order requiring the City to produce its witnesses for interviews by the defense thirty days prior to trial. Defendant moved to suppress the witnesses's testimony. The district court granted the motion, suppressing the testimony of the City's only two witnesses and dismissing the charges for lack of evidence.
{¶2} On appeal to this Court, the City contends that de novo proceedings in the district court are limited by Article VI Section 27 of the New Mexico Constitution and the statutes and court rules implementing that section to a "trial de novo." We understand the City to contend that the district court lacks jurisdiction to order the City to produce a witness if that witness was previously interviewed in the municipal court proceedings by the defense. We do not agree.
{¶3} Anticipating our conclusion that the district court is authorized to enter a pretrial scheduling order requiring the City to produce its witnesses for defense interviews, including witnesses who were previously interviewed during the municipal court proceedings, and to enforce compliance with its pretrial order by imposing sanctions on the City, the City next contends reversal is nevertheless required because the district court failed to explain on the record the reasons for its imposition of such a severe sanction. We agree that the district court was required by our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, 150 N.M. 745, 266 P.3d 25, State v. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 20, 394 P.3d 959, and the Court's decision in State v. Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019, 413 P.3d 484, to explain on the record the manner in which it considered culpability, prejudice, and lesser sanctions, the three Harper factors. Absent an on-the-record explanation, we are required to reverse and remand to allow the district court to reconsider the sanctions imposed, and to explain its reasoning on the record for its choice of sanctions. We emphasize that we express no opinion on the appropriateness of the sanctions chosen by the district court. We simply hold that the record is insufficient to allow us to determine whether the sanctions imposed were a proper exercise of the district court's discretion.
{¶4} Defendant was charged in Rio Rancho Municipal Court with one count of assault upon peace officers and one count of interference with officers, contrary to City ordinances, arising from an incident that occurred during a traffic stop on April 29, 2017.
{¶5} The City called the two police officers who performed the traffic stop as its only witnesses at Defendant's municipal court trial in May 2018. In preparation for trial in municipal court, the City produced the officers for pretrial interviews by the defense in September 2017 and in January 2018. Defendant was convicted of both counts in a municipal court trial not of record. He timely appealed to the district court.
{¶6} In the district court, the City, as required by Rule 5-501(A)(5) NMRA, designated the two police officers as its witnesses for Defendant's trial de novo. The district court conducted a pretrial hearing and entered a pretrial order, pursuant Rule 5-603 NMRA, requiring that pretrial interviews of witnesses be completed no later than thirty days before trial. The City did not object at the pretrial hearing to the terms of the pretrial order, nor did the City ever file an objection to the order.
{¶7} In accordance with the schedule set by the pretrial order, defense counsel made a timely request to the City attorney's office to schedule pretrial interviews of the two officers. The City attorney's office replied with a formal form letter stating that it was the office's policy to refuse to schedule a pretrial interview when defense counsel had interviewed the witness previously in the municipal court proceedings. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the officers' testimony, citing the City's violation of the district court's pretrial order and arguing that reinterviewing the witnesses prior to the trial de novo was essential to the defense's trial preparation. The City admitted in its response to the motion to suppress that it refused to make its witnesses available for pretrial interviews as a matter of City policy. The City argued that it was not required to produce witnesses for defense interviews who had been interviewed during the municipal court proceedings because "[a]ppeals de novo specifically mean that the trial is held anew; not all proceedings are held anew" (emphasis added), and that, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a pretrial order requiring pretrial interviews or other pretrial proceedings de novo.
{¶8} At a hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress held just prior to the start of the trial de novo, the City prosecutor contended, as she had in her written response to Defendant's motion that: (1) a defendant, in an appeal by trial de novo, is entitled by the New Mexico Constitution, and by statute, only to a new "trial," and not to new "pretrial proceedings"; (2) to the extent the rules of criminal procedure for the district court allow pretrial proceedings, they cannot be relied on to extend the district court's jurisdiction; and (3) the delay and expense to the City of requiring new interviews, given that defense counsel had both interviewed the City's witnesses before trial in the municipal court and cross-examined them at trial, is "unjustifiable." Counsel for the City admitted that she had deliberately violated the district court's pretrial order, that it is the practice of her office to deny pretrial interviews in appeals de novo when a witness had already been interviewed during the municipal court proceedings, and suggested that the court could find her in contempt of court, were it inclined to impose a sanction, instead of granting Defendant's suppression motion. The district court, however, entered an order suppressing the testimony of the two officers and dismissing the charges for lack of evidence. Other than finding that the City had violated the district court's pretrial order, the court did not explain its reasoning for imposing sanctions resulting in dismissal.
I. The District Court Has Authority in a De Novo Appeal From Municipal Court to Conduct Pretrial Proceedings De Novo Including Ordering the Prosecution to Produce Its Witnesses for a Second Interview by the Defense
{¶9} On appeal, the City argues that there is no constitutional or statutory authority, and no precedent, requiring de novo pretrial proceedings in an appeal from a municipal court conviction. The City relies primarily upon the plain language of the constitutional and statutory provisions, which use the term "trial de novo" or require the case to be "tried anew," and do not specifically state that the district court shall or may conduct "all proceedings de novo." The City argues that, had the Legislature intended to require the district court to conduct pretrial proceedings de novo, the Legislature could easily have said "all proceedings de novo," or "all pretrial proceedings de novo." We are not persuaded.
{¶10} "The right to appeal is a matter of substantive law created by constitutional or statutory provision." State v. Cruz, 2021-NMSC-015, ¶ 31, 486 P.3d 1 (emphasis, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We review de novo the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. State v. Armijo, 2016-NMSC-021, ¶ 19, 375 P.3d 415. In interpreting the Constitution, the rules of statutory construction "apply equally to constitutional construction." State ex rel. Richardson v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating Comm'n, 2007-NMSC-023, ¶ 17, 141 N.M. 657, 160 P.3d 566. "The most important consideration for us is that we interpret the constitution in a way that reflects the drafters' intent." State v. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶ 24, 134 N.M. 139, 74 P.3d 73. "Our interpretation of the Constitution must not be too literal, for it is our duty to give effect to the spirit and intent of the Constitution's framers." State v. Ball, 1986-NMSC-030, ¶ 16, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686.
{¶11} Article VI, Section 27 of the New Mexico Constitution (1966)[1], the provision in effect at the time this case was filed, granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction on appeal from judgments of the inferior courts including from convictions of criminal offenses in both municipal and magistrate courts. Article VI, Section 27 of the New Mexico Constitution provided, in relevant part, that "in all such appeals, trial shall be had de novo unless otherwise provided by law." NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-1 (1955) provides: "All appeals from inferior tribunals to ...
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