State v. Armijo
Decision Date | 13 June 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. S–1–SC–34400,S–1–SC–34400 |
Citation | 2016 NMSC 021,375 P.3d 415 |
Parties | State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Edward Armijo, Defendant–Respondent. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Corinna Laszlo–Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.
{1} Defendant Edward Armijo was convicted in the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court of driving while intoxicated (DWI). His on-record appeals alleging trial error were decided by both the Second Judicial District Court, which affirmed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals, which reversed. State v. Armijo , 2014–NMCA–013, ¶ 1, 316 P.3d 902. We granted certiorari to consider the State's arguments that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over a district court's decision in an on-record appeal from metropolitan court and that a defendant has no right to that secondary record review. Addressing only these two issues and declining to conduct a third appellate review of the underlying merits of this case, we hold that the Legislature has vested the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction over a district court's on-record appellate review of a metropolitan court proceeding and has provided an aggrieved party the right to such an appeal.
{2} The appellate process in New Mexico has evolved in tandem with our court system, and an overview of the historical development of our courts provides helpful background for understanding the issues in this case. The structure of New Mexico's judicial system can be traced back to prestatehood laws. See State v. Ball , 1986–NMSC–030, ¶¶ 17–21, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686 ( ).
{3} Following his 1846 conquest during the Mexican-American war of the area that was to be officially organized in 1850 as the United States Territory of New Mexico, General Stephen W. Kearny promulgated the Kearny Code of Laws, Laws for the Government of the Territory of New Mexico (Kearny Code). The Kearny Code created a provisional government and established a temporary judicial system that combined features of judicial structures in other states with those of the preexisting Spanish and Mexican systems. See Kearny Code of Laws, Letter of General Kearny to the Adjutant General (Sept. 22, 1846); Robert J. Tórrez, Myth of the Hanging Tree 2 (2008).
{4} The judicial structure consisted of one superior court to serve as a supreme court, see Kearny Code, Courts and Judicial Powers, §§ 1, 8, three circuit courts to exercise general criminal and civil jurisdiction, see id. §§ 2, 18(A)–(B), one prefect in each county to handle small probate matters, see id. §§ 19, 21, and as many as four alcaldes in each county to exercise limited jurisdiction in small civil and criminal cases, see id. §§ 23–24. The roles of the prefects and alcaldes were analogous to those of our courts of limited jurisdiction today. See id. § 21 ( ); § 24 ( ); Kearny Code, Crimes and Punishments, art. III, § 11 ( ); see also Jaremillo v. Romero , 1857–NMSC–007, ¶ 13, 1 N.M. 190 ( ).
{5} The general jurisdiction circuit courts had “appellate jurisdiction from the judgments and orders of the prefects and alcaldes in all cases not prohibited by law” and original jurisdiction in all criminal and civil cases that were “not ... cognizable before the prefects and alcaldes.” Kearny Code, Courts and Judicial Powers, § 18(B)–(C). The only exception to the right to appeal to the circuit court was a provision that an appellate judgment of a prefect on review of an alcalde's decision in a civil case where the amount in controversy was less than fifty dollars was “final and conclusive.” Id. § 21. The court of last resort, the superior court, had “appellate jurisdiction in all cases, both civil and criminal, which may be determined in the circuit court.” Id. § 8. It decided those appeals on review of the record. See id. § 14 ( ).
{6} There was no statutory provision or judicial precedent indicating that decisions of circuit courts on appeal from actions of the inferior courts were final or otherwise exempted from superior court review. Cf. id. § 9 (); Kearny Code, Practice of Law in Criminal Cases, § 23 ().
{7} The Organic Act of 1850 that officially established the Territory of New Mexico largely retained the judicial structure of the Kearny Code but renamed the courts, creating a supreme court to replace the superior court, three district courts to replace the circuit courts, justices of the peace to replace the alcaldes, and probate courts to replace the prefects. See Organic Act Establishing the Territory of New Mexico, Act of September 9, 1850, 9 Statutes at Large 446, ch. 49 (Organic Act); id. § 10, 9 Statutes at Large at 449; Arellano v. Chacon , 1859–NMSC–002, ¶¶ 7–8, 1 N.M. 269 ( ). The jurisdiction of the courts was to be set forth by law, with certain limitations applicable to justices of the peace, and appeals were guaranteed from the final decisions of the district courts to the Supreme Court. Organic Act § 10, 9 Statutes at Large at 449–50.
{8} The right to an appeal from the justice of the peace courts was granted first by territorial statute, which “gave the right to appeal to ‘[a]ny person aggrieved by any judgment rendered by any justice.’ ” Ball , 1986–NMSC–030, ¶ 17, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686 (alteration in original) (quoting Law of January 9, 1852, codified at 1856 N.M. Rev. Stat., ch. 12, art. 4, § 101) (citing the Kearny Code). These appeals were to be taken to the district court for trial de novo. Id. ¶¶ 17–18 ( ).
{9} The territorial statutes never limited the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the general jurisdiction courts on appeal from courts of limited jurisdiction. In fact, reported opinions throughout the territorial period reflect that such appeals frequently were entertained and decided by the Supreme Court without any party ever questioning the right to such an appeal. Examples include appeals of district court reviews of civil cases originating in the probate courts, see Chaves v. Perea , 1884–NMSC–006, ¶ 1, 3 N.M. 89, 2 P. 73 ; Spe i gelberg v. Mink , 1859–NMSC–007, ¶ 1, 1 N.M. 308, appeals of district court reviews of civil cases originating in justice of the peace courts, see Rodey v. Travelers' Ins. Co. , 1886–NMSC–006, ¶ 1, 3 N.M. 543, 9 P. 348 ; Ruhe v. Abren , 1857–NMSC–013, ¶ 1, 1 N.M. 247, and appeals of district court reviews of criminal cases originating in justice of the peace courts, see Perkins v. City of Roswell , 1911–NMSC–022, ¶ 1, 16 N.M. 185, 113 P. 609 ; Guyse v. Territory , 1893–NMSC–022, ¶ 1, 7 N.M. 228, 34 P. 295, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Jordi , 1918–NMSC–095, ¶ 4, 24 N.M. 426, 174 P. 204.
{10} When the New Mexico Constitution was adopted in conjunction with our admission to the Union in 1912 as the forty-seventh state, it continued the practice of the territorial court system by providing that “[a]ppeals shall be allowed in all cases from the final judgments and decisions of the probate courts and justices of the peace to the district courts, and in all such appeals trial shall be had de novo unless otherwise provided by law.” N.M. Const. art. VI, § 27 (1911, amended 1966). By that time, “the justice of the peace statutes had been on the books, virtually unaltered, for thirty-five years, and had existed in some form throughout the Territory's history.” Ball , 1986–NMSC–030, ¶ 20, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686. The adoption of the New Mexico Constitution did not change previously existing law providing the right to de novo appeal in the district court. The justice of the peace statutes codified at “NMSA 1897, Sections 3305 [and] 2897, ... reappeared unaltered in NMSA 1915, Sections 3220 [and] 4529 ... respectively” and similarly “appeared in the 1929, 1941, and 1953 compilations.” Ball , 1986-NMSC-030, ¶ 21 & n. 2, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686 ; see NMSA 1953, § 36–18–15 (1876); NMSA 1941, § 38–1815 (1876); NMSA 1929, § 79–516 (1876); see also 1875–76 N.M. Laws, ch. 27, § 117 (...
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