City of Riverside v. Smuda, 941
Decision Date | 31 October 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 941,941 |
Citation | 339 N.W.2d 768 |
Parties | CITY OF RIVERSIDE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Linda Sue SMUDA, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Loren D. Jones, Asst. City Atty., Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee.
Edward J. Murphy, Fargo, for defendant and appellant.
The defendant, Linda S. Smuda, appealed from a sentence imposed by the County Court of Cass County after she was found guilty by a jury of the offense of criminal mischief, a violation of a City of Riverside municipal ordinance. We dismiss the appeal.
Smuda was convicted originally in municipal court. She was fined $75 and ordered to make restitution for damages resulting from the commission of the offense in the amount of $78.12. Smuda thereafter appealed the conviction to the county court as permitted by Section 40-18-19, N.D.C.C., and Rule 37, N.D.R.Crim.P., and received a trial anew in county court. A jury returned a verdict of guilty. She was sentenced by the county court to 30 days in the county jail which sentence was suspended for one year, fined $250, ordered to make restitution in the amount of $78.12, and ordered to pay costs of her prosecution in the amount of $250.
Smuda appealed the sentence to this Court contending it was improper for the county court to impose a harsher sentence than was imposed by the municipal court on the original conviction. She contends that a defendant may be reluctant to appeal and obtain a trial anew and a trial by jury if the possibility exists that a harsher sentence than that imposed by the municipal court may be imposed by the county court. This risk, she contends, places a chill upon the right to trial by jury.
Our first inquiry in this matter must be a determination of whether or not we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. It is the duty of this Court to dismiss an appeal on our own motion if we conclude that the attempted appeal fails for lack of jurisdiction in this Court to hear the appeal. State v. Lawson, 321 N.W.2d 514, 515 (N.D.1982); Trautman v. Keystone Development Corporation, 156 N.W.2d 817, 819 (N.D.1968).
The right of appeal is purely statutory; thus, the Legislature of this state basically determines what is appealable. Fey v. Fey, 337 N.W.2d 159, 160 (N.D.1983); Trehus v. Job Service of North Dakota, 336 N.W.2d 362, 363 (N.D.1983); State v. Jefferson Park Books, Inc., 314 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D.1981). An examination of Section 29-28-06, N.D.C.C., reveals no provision authorizing a defendant to take an appeal from a sentence imposed by a county court. 1
In Jefferson Park Books, Inc., supra, we considered whether or not an appeal was authorized from an order denying the defendant a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35, N.D.R.Crim.P., where the defendant's argument on appeal centered on the validity of its sentence. We concluded that an appeal from an order denying a reduction in sentence was not authorized, based upon certain indications that the Legislature did not intend a sentence to be appealable. Our conclusion was based, in part, on the defeat in the 1979 Legislative Assembly, of a bill which, if enacted, would have authorized an appeal from a sentence only.
There exists no statutory authority in North Dakota for an appeal from a sentence imposed by a county court as a result of a conviction for the violation of a municipal ordinance. Consequently, the appeal of Smuda must be dismissed.
We take this opportunity, however, for the sake of judicial economy, to comment briefly on the question raised by Smuda because the question raised has previously been considered by this Court. See State v. Koehmstedt, 297 N.W.2d 315, 316-18 (N.D.1980).
Section 40-18-19, N.D.C.C., insofar as it is pertinent to the issue, reads:
A defendant is not entitled, under the North Dakota two-tier system, to a trial by jury at the municipal court level. Section 40-18-15, N.D.C.C. The system does, however, afford a defendant in a criminal action a trial by jury in county court. Section 27-07.1-31, N.D.C.C.
Article I, Section 13, of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota provides in part: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate." This constitutional provision "neither enlarges nor restricts ... [the right of trial by jury] but merely preserves it as it existed at the time of the adoption of our constitution." In re R.Y., 189 N.W.2d 644, 651 (N.D.1971). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution also preserves the right to trial by jury. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), the United States Supreme Court concluded "that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and thus held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal trials involving serious crimes.
Smuda does not contend, however, as acknowledged during oral argument, that her right to a trial by jury was infringed because a trial by jury is not available in municipal court. Rather, her argument centers on the effect of the two-tier system; whether it unconstitutionally burdens the exercise of the right to trial by jury, available in the county court, because the possibility or risk of receiving a harsher sentence exists if a trial anew is pursued from a conviction in municipal court pursuant to Section 40-18-19, N.D.C.C.
This Court has previously considered the validity of imposing a sentence in a trial anew, more severe than that imposed by the original court, and held that such a sentence did not violate the defendant's right to trial by jury. State v. Koehmstedt, supra, 297 N.W.2d at 316-18.
The defendant in Koehmstedt, supra, was convicted in county justice court of driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. He appealed the conviction to the district court pursuant to Section 33-12-34, N.D.C.C., 2 and Rule 37, N.D.R.Crim.P., and received a trial anew in the district court. He was found guilty by a jury and received a sentence more severe than that imposed by the county justice court. The issue addressed in Koehmstedt, supra, is the precise issue Smuda raised in her attempted appeal. In Koehmstedt, supra, we relied on Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 96 S.Ct. 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts two-tier system did not violate the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by jury. The two-tier system established by Section 40-18-19, N.D.C.C. is similar to the Massachusetts two-tier system construed in Ludwig. The Massachusetts procedure made no provision for a trial by jury in the first tier, and the second tier consisted of a trial de novo, which is the equivalent of a trial anew in North Dakota, before a jury in a different court.
The appellant's argument in Ludwig, supra, included the issue raised by Smuda; whether or not the two-tier procedure unconstitutionally burdens the exercise of the right to trial by jury "by subjecting an accused to a potentially harsher sentence if he seeks a trial de novo in the second tier." The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative:
[Footnotes omitted.] Ludwig, supra, 427 U.S. at 627, 96 S.Ct. at 2786, 49 L.Ed.2d at 739-40.
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State v. Orr
...1 Because the issue was not raised, the effect of noncompliance with the statutory requirement remains undecided. City of Riverside v. Smuda, 339 N.W.2d 768 (N.D.1983).2 The record is silent because municipal courts are not courts of record. NDCC Sec. 27-01-01. However, NDRCrimP 11(f) requi......
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...this recent statutory direction for an explained sentence remains undecided. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D.1985); City of Riverside v. Smuda, 339 N.W.2d 768 (N.D.1983). Ennis's argument in this case positions our attention on the purpose of this statutory direction for a written stateme......
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...1173, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975). "The right of appeal is purely statutory in this state." Robideaux, at 916 (citing City of Riverside v. Smuda, 339 N.W.2d 768, 769 (N.D.1983)). An appeal may be dismissed for noncompliance with our rules or statutes, such as for failure to file briefs, make time......
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...State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129, 131 (N.D.1982). The right of appeal is governed solely by statute in this state. City of Riverside v. Smuda, 339 N.W.2d 768, 769 (N.D.1983). Without any statutory basis to hear an appeal, this Court must take notice of the lack of jurisdiction and dismiss t......