City of Rochester v. People's Co-op. Power Ass'n, Inc., s. C2-90-2141
| Decision Date | 24 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | C5-90-2148 and C5-90-2151,Nos. C2-90-2141,s. C2-90-2141 |
| Citation | 483 N.W.2d 477 |
| Parties | Util. L. Rep. P 26,190 CITY OF ROCHESTER, Appellant, v. PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC., etc., et al., Respondents, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and Minnesota Department of Public Service, Intervenors, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Parallel acquisition procedures embodied in Minn.Stat. Secs. 216B.44 and 216B.47 preserve to the municipality in the instance of its expansion through annexation, the election of whether to proceed through the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission or by eminent domain in the acquisition of service area rights and facilities.
2. The trial court erred in relying upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to deprive the municipality of its right to elect to extend its service area pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.44.
Richard V. Ehrick, Joseph F. Chase, O'Brien, Ehrick, Wolf, Deaner & Maus, Rochester, for appellant.
Kenneth R. Moen, Dunlap, Finseth, Berndt & Sandberg, Rochester, for People's Co-op. Power Ass'n.
Margaret Hendrickson, St. Paul, for MN Public Utilities Comn.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
At issue are the alternative procedures afforded by operation of either Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.44 or Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.47 to the City of Rochester in its efforts to acquire the facilities and service area rights of People's Cooperative Power Association, Inc. in territory newly annexed by the City. The City has sought review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's reliance upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to compel the City to proceed within the framework of section 216B.44. 466 N.W.2d 753. We reverse and remand.
On December 18, 1989 the City of Rochester adopted an ordinance annexing certain areas, most of which were uninhabited at the time of annexation. Several weeks later, the city council adopted the first of four condemnation resolutions affecting the annexed territory and, in accordance therewith, the City filed, on January 31, 1990, the first of three petitions for condemnation and notices of intent to take possession pursuant to the "quick take" condemnation proceeding authorized by Minn.Stat. Sec. 117.042.
The annexed territory was part of the exclusive service area that had been assigned by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to the Cooperative. The condemnation proceedings were not directed to the acquisition of the annexed land--those areas newly located within the City's corporate limits--but rather to the acquisition of the Cooperative's facilities and the service area rights 1 located within the newly annexed territory. Asserting that the City was required to proceed in compliance with Minn.Stat. Secs. 216B.41 and 216B.44, the Cooperative and the MPUC together secured a temporary restraining order preventing the City from extending its electric service into the Cooperative's assigned service area. The district court held that while the court had jurisdiction over the proceedings in eminent domain authorized by section 216B.47, the MPUC had concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to section 216B.44. However, concluding that the "subject matter involved is not within the traditional knowledge of Court-appointed commissioners whose primary experience is in real estate valuation," the district court invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to decline jurisdiction. By virtue of that determination, the City was directed to proceed in accordance with the agency procedures outlined in Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.44.
The court of appeals affirmed, acknowledging the district court's jurisdiction over the eminent domain proceedings, but deferring to the exercise of its discretion in invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to dismiss the petitions and thereby compel the municipality to initiate proceedings before the MPUC pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.44 to extend its service territory.
Our inquiry is therefore narrowly defined--whether the statutory procedural options available to the municipality may be judicially limited by application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
A specific examination of the regulatory framework created by the legislature is necessary to an understanding of the present controversy. In 1974 the legislature enacted what is now chapter 216B, entitled "Public Utilities," prefacing the chapter with a "legislative finding," announcing its statement of purpose--
to provide the retail consumers of natural gas and electric service in this state with adequate and reliable services at reasonable rates, consistent with the financial and economic requirements of public utilities and their need to construct facilities to provide such services or to otherwise obtain energy supplies, to avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities which increase the cost of service to the consumer and to minimize disputes between public utilities which may result in inconvenience or diminish efficiency in service to the consumers.
Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.01 (1990). In recognition of the effectiveness of municipal and cooperative utilities' self-regulation, the legislature excepted them from general regulation; it reserved regulatory authority to the MPUC, however, in certain specific instances including the assignment of service areas. Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.39.
By operation of this comprehensive service area assignment plan, a utility is afforded an exclusive right to provide service at retail "to each and every present and future customer in its assigned service area." Minn.Stat. Sec. 216B.40. However, the right is not without limitation, for the legislature anticipated the possibility that municipalities experiencing a population growth might expand their geographical boundaries. Section 216B.41. For that apparent reason, there exist two alternative statutory procedures by which an expanding municipality which owns and operates a utility may similarly expand or extend its provision of utility services to annexed territory. Sections 216B.41 and 216B.47. First, the legislature has authorized the purchase by the expanding municipality of the facilities of the assigned service utility by the payment of the appropriate value, a value to be among the terms of the sale or exchange to be determined by the MPUC in the event of a dispute. Section 216B.44. A notable feature of this acquisition process is that the existing assigned service utility is authorized to continue providing service to the area until the value is determined. Id. In practical effect, then, by operation of statute, the Cooperative retains the interim authority to design and construct facilities, unless, after notice and hearing, the MPUC determines that an interim extension of services "is not in the public interest." Id.
Parallel to this regulatory scheme under the auspices of the MPUC is the continuing authority of a municipality to acquire the property of a public utility by eminent domain proceedings, under the jurisdiction of the courts. Section 216B.47. There, the damages to be paid the displaced utility are determined by court-appointed commissioners and are to reflect the same factors which the MPUC would have considered had the acquisition occurred by operation of sections 216B.41 and 216B.44. However, the distinction in the invocation of "quick take" eminent domain procedures is that the municipality thereby acquires the immediate right to service the newly annexed areas before the final compensation is determined or awarded.
Therefore, although sections 216B.41 and 216B.44 authorize a municipality which operates its own electrical utility and decides to provide service to annexed territory to proceed under section 216B.44, the legislature has by its enactment of section 216B.47 provided such municipalities with the option...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co., No. A06-2275.
...especially if an issue before the court requires the particular competence and expertise of the agency. City of Rochester v. People's Co-op. Power Ass'n, 483 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn.1992) (citing United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956)); see a......
-
Siewert v. Northern States Power Co.
...when an issue before the courts requires the particular competence and expertise of the agency. City of Rochester v. People's Coop. Power Ass'n, 483 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn.1992) (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956)). We consider t......
-
State v. Zander, No. A04-496 (MN 12/14/2004)
...stay its proceedings until an administrative agency can rule upon a matter within its expertise. See City of Rochester v. People's Coop. Power Ass'n, 483 N.W.2d 477, 480-81 (Minn. 1992) (declining to apply the doctrine in a quick-take proceeding). The doctrine is used "whenever enforcement ......
-
City of Rochester v. Peoples Co-op. Power Ass'n, Inc.
...the supreme court reversed, concluding the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was inapplicable. City of Rochester v. People's Coop. Power Ass'n, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 477 (Minn.1992). The supreme court concluded that a municipality may extend its provision of utility service to annexed territory e......
-
CLIMATE RISK IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR: LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE RESILIENCE PLANNING BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES.
...(W. Va. 1997). Some states refer to these types of case as "inherently judicial." E.g., City of Rochester v. People's Coop. Power Ass'n, 483 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. (507) E.g., Campbell, 586 P.2d at 991; District of Columbia v. D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 963 A.2d 1144, 1153 (D.C. 2009) (explain......