City of Rockford v. Gill, 50845

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: UNDERWOOD
• Citation: 75 Ill.2d 334,26 Ill.Dec. 669,388 N.E.2d 384
• Parties: , 26 Ill.Dec. 669 The CITY OF ROCKFORD et al., Appellants, v. Paul P. GILL, County Clerk, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 50845,50845
• Decision Date: 20 March 1979

Page 384

388 N.E.2d 384 75 Ill.2d 334, 26 Ill.Dec. 669 The CITY OF ROCKFORD et al., Appellants,
v.
Paul P. GILL, County Clerk, Appellee. No. 50845. Supreme Court of Illinois. March 20, 1979.

[75 Ill.2d 337]

Page 385

[26 Ill.Dec. 670] Connolly, Oliver, Goddard, Coplan & Close, Rockford (Robert J. Oliver, Rockford, of counsel), for appellant Board of Library Directors of the City of Rockford.

A. Curtis Washburn, Legal Director, Rockford, Dept. of Law (Stephen W. McCarty, City Atty., Rockford, of counsel), for appellant City of Rockford.

Daniel D. Doyle, State's Atty., Rockford (William H. Gates, Asst. State's Atty., Rockford, of counsel), for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice:

Plaintiff, the City of Rockford, filed suit in the circuit court of Winnebago County, seeking a declaration that an ordinance levying taxes for library purposes in excess of the statutory limit was valid under the city's home rule powers. Defendant Paul P. Gill, the county clerk, had refused to extend the levy provided for by the ordinance on the ground that it exceeded the maximum tax rate for library purposes permitted by section 3-1 of the Illinois Local Library Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 81, par. 3-1). Consequently, the city also sought to enjoin the county clerk from extending for library purposes an amount of [75 Ill.2d 338] tax less than that provided by the ordinance. The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment, the county clerk appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that despite its home rule power to tax, the city could not exceed the library tax rate fixed by the statute (60 Ill.App.3d 94, 17 Ill.Dec. 421, 376 N.E.2d 420). We allowed the city leave to appeal and we now reverse.

At all relevant times section 3-1 of the Act provided:

"In any city of 500,000 or fewer inhabitants, the corporate authorities shall levy a tax for library purposes of not to exceed .15% Of the value of all the taxable property in the city, as equalized or assessed by the Department of Local Government Affairs." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 81, par. 3-1.)

The Rockford Public Library is governed by the Act, which was first adopted in 1965. Despite the statutory limitation of .15%, the library board requested and the city adopted a tax-levy ordinance for library purposes in 1976 in an amount requiring a tax rate of .1604%. The ordinance recited that it was adopted pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 3-1 of the Act, but that the tax-rate limitation was inapplicable because the ordinance was enacted pursuant to the city's taxing power as a home rule municipality under article VII, section 6(a), of our 1970 Constitution. That section provides:

"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt."

In addition to refusing to extend the levy in the amount provided by the ordinance because it exceeded the statutorily mandated rate, the county clerk also contended that the ordinance was void because the city had failed to allow 10 days to elapse between the publication of the appropriation ordinance and the passage of the tax-levy [75 Ill.2d 339] ordinance, as required by section 1-2-4 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 24, par. 1-2-4). The trial court held that because the statutory limitation

Page 386

[26 Ill.Dec. 671] on the library-tax levy had been enacted prior to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, it was superseded by the taxing power that the Constitution granted to home rule units. The court accordingly held the tax-levy ordinance valid, directed defendant to extend the amount levied, and enjoined the extension of any lesser amount.

We agree with the appellate court that the issue here may be stated simply as whether a home rule municipality may levy a tax for library purposes in excess of the .15% Limit imposed by the statute governing local libraries. In our judgment, however, an affirmative answer is clearly required by the earlier decisions of this court.

In Kanellos v. County of Cook (1972), 53 Ill.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240, this court held that pursuant to its power to incur debt (Ill.Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 6(a)) a home rule county could issue general obligation bonds without prior referendum approval by county voters, although a pre-1970 statute required such approval. What the court said about home rule powers in Kanellos bears repeating:

"The concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to...