City of Rome v. Potts

• Decision Date: 12 July 1932
• Docket Number: 21936.
• Citation: 165 S.E. 131,45 Ga.App. 406
• Parties: CITY OF ROME v. POTTS.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

165 S.E. 131

45 Ga.App. 406

CITY OF ROME v. POTTS.

No. 21936.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division

July 12, 1932

Syllabus by the Court.

City is generally not liable for injuries resulting from general slipperiness of streets and sidewalks due to natural accumulations of ice and snow thereon.

Petition alleging that snow had been permitted to remain on crosswalk and had become uneven and a dangerous obstruction by reason of pedestrians and vehicles passing over it and that petitioner slipped thereon held insufficient in action against city for injuries.

Operation of traffic light at intersection constitutes governmental function (Civ. Code 1910, § 893).

Petition is construed most strongly against pleader, and pleader's conclusions are eliminated in ruling on demurrer.

Question of allowance of amendment is rendered moot where petition as amended sets forth no cause of action.

1. "Generally a city is not liable for injuries resulting from general slipperiness of streets and sidewalks due to ice and snow accumulating naturally."

2. Construing the petition as amended most strongly against the pleader, and eliminating conclusions of the pleader, the petition, as amended, sets forth no cause of action, and the court erred in overruling the demurrer thereto.

Error from City Court of Floyd County; John W. Bale, Judge.

Action by T. B. Potts against the City of Rome. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed.

Leon Covington and Wright & Covington, all of Rome, for plaintiff in error.

Paul H Doyal, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HOOPER J.

T. B Potts brought suit against the city of Rome for damages as the result of personal injuries, alleging, in substance, that as he was crossing Broad street in said city he was compelled to walk rapidly or be caught in the street upon the change in the traffic light; that "several inches" of snow had fallen, and the city had negligently permitted it to accumulate and remain in the crossway or walkway across Broad street, which was marked out between parallel lines; that "said snow, after having been trampled under the traffic on the street, froze and became slick as ice"; that petitioner's view of the street directly under his feet was obscured by a sack full of chickens he was carrying; that the ringing of the traffic light bell attracted his attention "away from the walkway or crossway, and petitioner did not see the ice and snow"; and that he slipped upon the same and fell to the street, receiving injuries for which suit was brought. By amendment plaintiff alleged, that the city of Rome is so climatically situated that snow and ice are not permanently on the streets; that about one-fourth of the way across Broad street was shaded, "and the snow had not melted in that part of the crosswalk and had been permitted to remain in the crosswalk, and had become uneven in its surface by reason of pedestrians and vehicles passing over the same, and had become a dangerous obstruction in said crosswalk, all of which was unknown to petitioner, but had been in said condition for a period of at least three days." Petitioner alleged that the municipality was negligent in permitting the ice and snow to accumulate in the crossway; in permitting it to remain there more than a reasonable time after having knowledge of the same; in failing to give a reasonable time between changes in the traffic light; in failing to remove the snow and ice; and in permitting the crossway to become obstructed with snow and ice.

The defendant demurred generally and specially to the original petition, and objected to allowance of the amendment. The amendment was allowed, and the general demurrer overruled and on these rulings defendant assigned error in its bill of exceptions.

The courts of this state have not been called upon to determine under what circumstances a city may be held liable for injuries growing out of its failure to remove ice or snow from its streets or sidewalks. In Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911, 912, decided December 17, 1931, it was said that generally a city is not liable for injuries resulting from general slipperiness of streets and sidewalks due to ice and snow accumulating naturally. And in the opinion of the court it was said "What, if any, duty devolves upon a city to remove ice from its sidewalks is a subject of a great variety of opinions, and, because of this divergence of views, a number of different and contradictory statements of the law have been laid down in the various jurisdictions.

However there is one rule which is almost universal. That is, a city is not liable for injuries resulting from the general slipperiness of its streets and sidewalks due to the presence of ice and snow which have accumulated as a result of natural causes. [Citing authority.] A municipality is bound only to use reasonable care to keep its sidewalks reasonably safe for the amount and kind of travel which may fairly be expected upon them. [Citing authority.] In view of the generality of ice and snow in the wintertime, the doctrine has become quite prevalent that it would be an unreasonable requirement to compel a municipality to remove them from walks and streets. *** The decisions in the various jurisdictions upon this question of liability are so varied and numerous that it would be impracticable for us to attempt to analyze them or to harmonize them, but we have reached the conclusion that the reason which underlies the rule exempting cities from liability because of damages from slippery ice is that of necessity. It is grounded on the fact that it is unreasonable to compel a city to expend the money and perform the labor necessary to keep its walks...