City of Salamanca v. City of Salamanca Police Unit of Cattaraugus County, Local No. 805, CSEA/AFSCME

Decision Date15 January 1986
PartiesCITY OF SALAMANCA, New York, Petitioner, v. CITY OF SALAMANCA POLICE UNIT OF CATTARAUGUS COUNTY, LOCAL # 805, CSEA/AFSCME, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

EDWARD M. HOREY, Acting Justice.

The facts which give rise to the litigation at bar are interesting and unusual.

One, David A. Turner began employment with the respondent, City of Salamanca on February 17, 1981 as a policeman.

In accordance with applicable rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission, Officer Turner underwent a medical examination on February 24, 1983 in Salamanca, New York. As a part of that examination Officer Turner's vision was tested. The report of the test appears to indicate a 20/20 visual acuity in both right and left eyes. The report makes no mention of the use of contact lenses and thus on its face reports the 20/20 acuity as uncorrected.

On the basis of the February 24, 1983 physical examination in Salamanca, Officer Turner was appointed to a permanent position of police officer effective July 16, 1983.

Thereafter on May 14, 1984, Officer Turner underwent another physical examination in connection with an application for employment with the Jamestown, New York Police Department. Application for employment with the Jamestown Police Department had been made by Officer Turner before he received his appointment with the Salamanca Police Department. However, his physical examination for the Jamestown position followed his appointment with the Salamanca Police Department.

The visual acuity of Officer Turner under the Jamestown physical examination of May 14, 1984 indicated acuity of both eyes at 20/200 without corrective lenses and 20/20 with corrective lenses.

It is not contested that the minimum accepted standard of visual acuity for a police officer is: not worse than 20/40 uncorrected with each eye tested separately; and corrected with both eyes tested together no worse than binocular vision of 20/20. Reference Official Compulation Code, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York, Vol. 9 Executive (F) Subchapter A, Sec. 6000.3(d)(2)(i).

The information that Officer Turner had failed visual examination in Jamestown on May 14, 1984 was relayed to the Cattaraugus County Civil Service Commission and in turn to the Salamanca Civil Service Commission.

An investigation by the Salamanca Civil Service Commission of Officer Turner's visual acuity was ordered. It resulted in demands by the Commission for release of certain medical records of Officer Turner at the Council Optometric Group in Olean, New York. These were not forthcoming. A series of meetings between Officer Turner and the Commission were scheduled. Altercation over the attendance of counsel and other issues ensued and no meeting was ever had.

In July, 1984 the Salamanca Civil Service Commission revoked the certification of Officer Turner. The same Commission has persistently refused to certify Officer Turner to the City of Salamanca as an eligible employee in the State Civil Service. Because of the absence of such certification the City of Salamanca has refused to pay Officer Turner.

Following his termination, Officer Turner opted to proceed under a collective bargaining agreement between his employer the City of Salamanca and Local # 805 CSEA/AFSCME. Accordingly, he filed a grievance. That grievance proceeded to arbitration. Several extended sessions were held before the arbitrator.

Ultimately the arbitrator rendered a tome-like decision of eighty-four pages. The decision was nonetheless detailed and comprehensive although enshrouded to some degree with the mantle of academe.--a comment not a criticism. The decision was in favor of Officer Turner. It ordered the City of Salamanca to reinstate him without loss of benefits or seniority. It further ordered the City of Salamanca to pay Officer Turner the amount of salary lost less any sums received from other employment.

The City of Salamanca, by appropriate motion moved to have the award of the arbitrator vacated. The Union on behalf of Officer Turner moved to have the award confirmed.

The initial determination which must be made in this proceeding is whether or not this court may intervene in a matter which has been determined by arbitration.

Appellate determinations of recent vintage have repeatedly lauded the purposes of arbitration and have indicated a clear judicial policy in favor of non-judicial intervention.

In Matter of Sprinzen (Nomberg), 46 N.Y.2d 623, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456 (1979 Opn., Jasen, J.) our Court of Appeals held that while intervention by the courts was extremely limited it was permitted on the grounds of public policy. Before a court engages in intervention on the grounds of public policy it "must be able to examine an arbitration agreement or an award on its face, without engaging in extended factfinding or legal analysis, and conclude that public policy precludes its enforcement." See 46 N.Y.2d 623 at 631, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456.

Matter of Port Jefferson Station Teachers Association, Inc. v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School District, 45 N.Y.2d 898, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 553 (1978 per curiam) provides further insight into the limited times when judicial intervention in arbitration under consideration of public policy is appropriate. There the court stated the test to be as follows:

"Only when the award contravenes a strong public policy, almost invariably involving an important constitutional or statutory duty or responsibility may it be set aside." See 45 N.Y.2d 898 at 899, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 553. (Italics added)

The respondent, City of Salamanca, urges that the instant proceeding falls within the public policy exception to the general rule against non-judicial intervention in arbitration matters. This court agrees.

Clearly involved in this proceeding are constitutional provision viz., the provisions of Article V, Sec. 6 of the New York Constitution. The provision of that section states that appointments and promotions in the civil service "shall be made according to merit and fitness" to be ascertained as far as practicable by competitive examination, with certain special provisions not here applicable concerning veterans.

It is equally clear that there is involved in this proceeding certain statutory provisions, viz., the provision of Civil Service Law, Sec. 50, subd. 4. That statute provides inter alia that the State Civil Service Department and Municipal Commissions may refuse after examination to certify an eligible who is found to have a physical or mental disability which renders him unfit for the performance of the duties of the position in which he seeks employment, or which may reasonably be expected to render him unfit to continue to perform the duties of such position. See Sec. 50, subd. 4, subparagraph (b).

Section 50, subd. 4, subparagraph (g) further provides that the commission may refuse certification of an employee "who has practiced or attempted to practice, any deception or fraud in his application, in his examination, or in securing his eligibility or appointment."

The same statute, viz., Sec. 50 Civil Service Law in paragraph 4(h) provides that the Civil Service Department or appropriate Municipal Commission "may investigate the qualifications and background of an eligible after he has been appointed from the list, and upon finding facts which if known prior to appointment, would have warranted his disqualification or upon a finding of illegality, irregularity or fraud of a substantial nature in his application, examination or appointment, may revoke such eligible's certification and appointment and direct that his employment be terminated ..." (Italics added) Except in the case of fraud the statute provides for a three-year period of limitation on revocation, an exception not applicable in the instant proceeding.

Two other statutory provisions are involved in the instant proceeding. They are Sec. 100 and 101 Civil Service Law.

Section 100 Civil Service Law prohibits any disbursing or auditing officer from approving any pay or compensation for personal service to any person unless such person is certified by the Civil Service Department or Municipal Commission as being employed in accordance with law and rules made pursuant to law.

Section 101 Civil Service Law provides that any officer who wilful pays or authorizes payment to any person under Civil Service with knowledge that the Civil Service Department or Municipal Commission has refused to certify the payroll of that person is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Having determined that constitutional provisions as well as statutory provisions are clearly involved in the proceeding at bar, the court looks now at the further test for judicial intervention in arbitration matters on the grounds of public policy to wit: that such constitutional provisions and statutes evidence a "strong public policy" and relate to important constitutional and statutory duties. See test stated Matter of Port Jefferson, 45 N.Y.2d 898 at 899, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 553, supra.

In commenting upon the provisions of the New York Constitution referable to Civil Service appointment and implementing statutory provisions which we have noted our Court of Appeals stated in reference to them the following:

"The principle that all appointments in the civil service must be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive examination, is expressed in such broad and imperative language that in some respects it must be regarded as beyond the control of the legislature, and secure from any mere statutory changes. If the legislature should repeal all the statutes and regulations on the subject of appointments in the civil service the mandate of the Constitution would still...

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