City of San Antonio v. Chas. M. Stieff, Inc.
Citation | 83 S.W.2d 357 |
Decision Date | 27 March 1935 |
Docket Number | No. 9437.,9437. |
Parties | CITY OF SAN ANTONIO v. CHAS. M. STIEFF, Inc. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; F. Stevens, Judge.
Action by Charles M. Stieff, Inc., against the City of San Antonio. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
Al. J. Klein and T. D. Cobbs, both of San Antonio, for appellant.
Wm. Aubrey, of San Antonio, for appellee.
Appellee, Chas. M. Stieff, Inc., a Maryland corporation, as plaintiff, instituted this suit against appellant, city of San Antonio, as defendant, seeking to recover the sum of $1,300, together with interest, representing the purchase price of a certain piano delivered to the city of San Antonio by Walthall Music Company, a Texas corporation. Appellee's petition also contained a count seeking in the alternative to recover the reasonable market value of this piano.
The facts are as follows: The Walthall Music Company had been in the retail music business in the city of San Antonio for a number of years. Chas. M. Stieff Inc., was engaged in the wholesale piano business. These two corporations, on March 4, 1929, entered into a contract or agreement, in the form of a letter written by a representative of Stieff, Inc., to Walthall Music Company and accepted by Leon N. Walthall, as president of the Walthall Music Company. This agreement is as follows:
—on consignment for four months. It is understood that Walthall Music Company is to pay the freight from Baltimore and to carry the insurance at our wholesale prices as above quoted. If the instruments shipped under this agreement are paid for within thirty (30) days from date of shipment, a cash discount of three per cent (3%) will be allowed from billing prices.
Pursuant to this agreement, appellee, Stieff, Inc., shipped a number of pianos to Walthall Music Company. These pianos were sold by the Walthall Music Company to various customers and settlement made with appellee by Walthall Music Company executing its trade acceptances to appellee, and attaching thereto as collateral the notes and sale contracts of the various customers. This practice continued until the music company was indebted to appellee in the sum of more than $8,000.
On November 27, 1929, appellee wrote a letter to the music company in which it stated as follows:
On December 2, 1929, the music company wrote a letter to appellee in reply to its letter of November 27, in which reply the music company made the following statement:
On November 29, 1929, appellee sent the music company the following telegram:
On the same day the following reply was telegraphed by the music company:
The piano delivered to the city of San Antonio was a Stieff grand piano, bearing No. 43936, and was shipped by appellee to the music company on December 13, 1929, subject to the provisions of the agreement of March 4, 1929.
A committee of ladies appointed by the mayor of the city of San Antonio called at the place of business of Walthall Music Company and selected, for the city, the type of piano that was finally delivered to the city. However, the particular piano selected by the ladies was not delivered to the city, but another piano of the same make and style was, in fact, delivered. The piano was delivered by Walthall Music Company to the city of San Antonio in January, 1930, and, in due course, the city authorities approved the bill for the piano and ordered a warrant or voucher issued to the Walthall Music Company in the sum of $1,300. The city auditor declined to deliver the warrant to the music company for the reason that he had discovered that the Walthall Music Company was indebted to the city for past-due taxes in a sum far in excess of the price of the piano. Section 114 of the city charter prohibited his delivering a warrant under such circumstances. Mr. Walthall, as president of the music company, demanded payment in cash for the piano from the city authorities, but never, at any time, undertook to reclaim the piano. In February, 1930, the Walthall Music Company was adjudged a bankrupt, and ceased to be a going concern. The wholesale price of this piano was $720, and the difference between $720 and $1,300 represented the gross profit of the music company. After the music company was adjudged a bankrupt, appellee wrote the city demanding not only the payment of the $720, representing the wholesale price, but the entire $1,300. The city refused this demand, stating, in effect, that they had dealt with nobody but the Walthall Music Company, and that appellee was not known in any way in the transaction. Appellee then demanded the return of the piano, which was also refused. Approximately nine months later, in November, 1930, appellee instituted this suit against the city. The trial was to the court, without the intervention of a jury, and resulted in judgment for appellee against the city of San Antonio in the sum of $1,595.75. The city presented this appeal.
It is plain from the above statement of this case that the piano delivered to the city of San Antonio was shipped by appellee to the music company subject to the provisions of the agreement of March 4th, and, therefore, a proper disposition of this case requires a construction of that agreement.
It is contended by appellee that the agreement of March 4th should be construed as a contract between principal and factor, and that the interpretation of this contract should be governed by the customs and usages of factors and commission merchants. We cannot agree with this contention. One of the first essentials of a factoring contract is that the agent, or the factor, must be engaged in the business of factor, or commission merchant. 25 C. J. p. 342, § 4; R. C. L. 11, pp. 753, 754.
There is no contention that the Walthall Music Company was a factor, or commission merchant, but, on the contrary, the record affirmatively shows that it was a retail dealer in musical instruments.
Another reason why this is not a factoring contract is that under this contract the music company is at...
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Charles M. Stieff, Inc., v. City of San Antonio
....... Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and judgment of district court affirmed. . The opinion of Chief Justice Bickett, which was a dissent from the majority decision in 83 S.W.2d 357, herewith adopted, follows: . Chas. M. Stieff, Inc., a corporation, sued the city of San Antonio to recover the price of a piano, which was sold and delivered to the city, or, in the alternative, to recover the possession of the piano and the amount of its reasonable rental value. Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant for ......
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United States v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc.
...of the Court of Appeals, San Antonio, in the same case. In the Court of Appeals the case appeared sub nom as City of San Antonio v. Chas. M. Stieff, Inc. (1935), 83 S.W.2d 357. The facts in that case will first be considered. Charles M. Stieff, Inc., a Maryland corporation, was a wholesaler......
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