City of Scottsdale v. Mikitish in and for County of Maricopa
| Decision Date | 31 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1 CA-SA 22-0031 |
| Citation | 71 Arizona Cases Digest 36,512 P.3d 92 |
| Parties | CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Joseph P. MIKITISH, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, Jeffrey Mason, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Wieneke Law Group, PLC, Tempe, By Kathleen L. Wieneke, Laura Van Buren, Counsel for Petitioner
Tiffany & Bosco, PA, Phoenix, By William M. Fischbach, III, Amy D. Sells, Ryan Hogan, Counsel for Real Party in Interest
¶1 In this special action, the City of Scottsdale ("the City") petitions to reverse the superior court's denial of summary judgment on Jeffery Mason's ("Mason") defamation claim. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that absolute immunity protects statements in a police report made by a police officer who is a victim of the reported crime. Accordingly, we accept special-action jurisdiction, and instruct the superior court to enter summary judgment for the City on Mason's defamation claim.
¶2 Mason sued the City for defamation based on statements made in police reports by the City's officers who responded to reports of a disturbance between Mason and a neighbor. In their reports, the police officers stated that Mason pointed a gun either at the officers or in their direction. Mason claims those statements are false and defamatory, relying on body camera footage showing the gun pointed downwards and not directly at the officers. The State charged Mason with aggravated assault, alleging the officers were victims. Mason later pled guilty to felony disorderly conduct and was placed on probation. Mason's wife, Cynthia Mason, was separately charged with failure to follow police orders and ultimately acquitted of those charges.
¶3 The City moved for summary judgment on Mason's defamation claim, arguing that the officers' statements were protected by absolute immunity as crime victims or by qualified immunity as police officers. The superior court found that absolute immunity does not apply because "the statements included in their reports were not complaints made to the police" but "the officers' documentation of their own work in their official capacity." The court also denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, concluding it was for the jury to determine whether "the evidence is clear and convincing that the officers made statements with malice, knowing of their falsity or actually entertaining doubts about their truth." The officers seek special-action review of that denial.
¶4 "Special action jurisdiction is appropriate when a party lacks ‘an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal,’ and ‘the case presents an issue of statewide importance and first impression.’ " Gilbert Prosecutor's Office v. Foster , 245 Ariz. 15, 17, ¶ 5, 424 P.3d 416, 418 (App. 2018) . "Although we normally disfavor accepting special action jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment, questions concerning immunity are particularly appropriate for special action review." Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Borek , 234 Ariz. 364, 367, ¶ 5, 322 P.3d 181, 184 (App. 2014) ; see Henke v. Superior Court , 161 Ariz. 96, 99, 775 P.2d 1160, 1163 (App. 1989) ().
¶5 Mason does not dispute that special-action jurisdiction is appropriate in cases involving claims of immunity. Instead, he urges us to decline jurisdiction and find the issue waived under the doctrine of laches. See Schoenberger v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Phx. , 124 Ariz. 528, 530, 606 P.2d 18, 20 (1980) (). "Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party." Sotomayor v. Burns , 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6, 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000). Mason asserts that the City could have raised the same issues via special action immediately after the court denied its motion to dismiss. But the superior court found dismissal inappropriate "based upon these allegations at this stage of the proceedings ." (Emphasis added.) After the close of discovery, the City moved for summary judgment, timely sought reconsideration when the court denied its motion, and promptly filed this special action after reconsideration was denied. Because the City did not unduly delay in seeking special-action relief, we accept jurisdiction.
¶6 Absolute privileges "recogni[ze] that certain persons, because of their special position or status, should be as free as possible from fear that their actions in that position might have an adverse effect upon their own personal interest." Green Acres Tr. v. London , 141 Ariz. 609, 612, 688 P.2d 617, 620 (1984). Whether and to what extent a privilege applies is a matter of law we review de novo. See id . at 613, 688 P.2d at 621.
¶7 Arizona law does not extend absolute immunity to all statements made by police officers in reports. See Portonova v. Wilkinson , 128 Ariz. 501, 503, 627 P.2d 232, 234 (1981) (). But, as Mason acknowledges, our Court has extended an absolute privilege to citizen crime victims' statements to the police. See Ledvina v. Cerasani , 213 Ariz. 569, 574, ¶ 14, 146 P.3d 70, 75 (App. 2006). This privilege is part of the common-law's "absolute immunity for statements made in furtherance of judicial proceedings," and is guided, in part, by the Victim's Bill of Rights in Article 2, Section 2.1, of the Arizona Constitution. Ledvina , 213 Ariz. at 572-73, ¶¶ 7, 14, 146 P.3d at 73-74 ; see also Green Acres , 141 Ariz. at 613, 688 P.2d at 621 (discussing judicial-proceeding privilege).
¶8 Mason does not challenge the crime-victim privilege established in Ledvina but argues it does not apply to this case because Ledvina only applies to citizens statements to police and its "narrow holding does not extend to false statements made by police officers." Mason further argues that the crime-victim privilege does not apply because the criminal case has concluded, and the protections of the Victim's Bill of Rights are "limited to the duration of the criminal justice process." We reject both arguments.
¶9 Arizona courts have rejected attempts to treat police-officer victims differently than other crime victims. In State v. Roscoe , our supreme court addressed victim-interview legislation that provided "a peace officer shall not be considered a victim if the act that would have made him a victim occurs while the peace officer is acting in the scope of his official duties." 185 Ariz. 68, 70, 912 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1996) (quoting A.R.S. § 13-4433(F) (1992)). The supreme court found that the legislation was in direct conflict with the constitutional definition of a victim in " Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1 (C), which states, in part, that ‘ "[v]ictim" means a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed ... except if the person is in custody for an offense or is the accused.’ " Id. at 71, 912 P.2d at 1300. Because the conflict between the statute and constitution was direct, the court found the legislature's attempt to exclude police officers from the definition of victim was unconstitutional. Id. at 74, 912 P.2d at 1303 ; see also State v. Matthews , 245 Ariz. 281, 283, 428 P.3d 198, 200 (App. 2019) (); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 13, 46 P.3d 1071, 1074 (App. 2002) (determining that an officer fell "within the definition of ‘a person against whom the criminal offense [of resisting arrest was] committed’ " (quoting A.R.S. § 13-4401(19) ).
¶10 Mason relies primarily on Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles , 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977), and Chamberlain v. Mathis , 151 Ariz. 551, 729 P.2d 905 (1986), to argue that police-officer victims should not be afforded the immunity enjoyed by civilian victims. In Grimm , our supreme court rejected absolute immunity for public officials "acting in other than true judicial proceedings ...." 115 Ariz. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232. In Chamberlain , the court rejected absolute immunity for "high level" executive officials. 151 Ariz. at 556-60, 729 P.2d at 910-14. But the court in Chamberlain recognized the judicial-proceedings immunity set forth in Green Acres for acts with a "close, direct relationship to" judicial proceedings, id . at 558, 729 P.2d at 912, and a victim's complaint to police is a first step in a judicial proceeding, Ledvina , 213 Ariz. at 572-75, ¶¶ 10-12, 146 P.3d at 73-76.
¶11 Mason further argues that officer-victims should be excluded from the protections afforded by Ledvina because their statements are "made in the line of duty." But our cases have rejected similar distinctions. Lawyers are required to report ethical violations by colleagues, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 8.3 (requiring lawyers to report others for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct), but our courts have long applied absolute immunity for Bar complaints filed by attorneys against other lawyers, see, e.g. , Drummond v. Stahl , 127 Ariz. 122, 126, 618 P.2d 616, 620 (App. 1980) (); Sobol v. Alarcon , 212 Ariz. 315, 318, ¶¶ 14-15, 131 P.3d 487, 490 (App. 2006) (...
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