City of Seattle v. Crockett, 44061
| Decision Date | 24 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 44061,44061 |
| Citation | 87 Wn.2d 253,551 P.2d 740 |
| Parties | The CITY OF SEATTLE, Appellant, v. Ollie Birt CROCKETT, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
John P. Harris, Corp. Counsel, Richard S. Oettinger, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, for appellant.
Seattle-King County Public Defender, Jerome J. Doherty, Seattle, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order entered by the King County Superior Court dismissing defendant's conviction in Seattle Municipal Court for illegally discharging a firearm in violation of a city ordinance. The conviction was dismissed due to an alleged failure to comply with CrR 3.3(b); the defendant was not given a trial de novo within 90 days from the date his counsel requested and received a trial date from the clerk of the superior court.
The sole issue is whether the time limits of CrR 3.3(b) have been met in an appeal to the superior court for a trial de novo where a person charged with a crime is brought initially to trial in municipal court within 90 days following the preliminary appearance. We hold under these circumstances the requirements of CrR 3.3(b) have been met and reverse the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to the resolution of the issues presented:
February 25, 1975 .. A "Washington Uniform Citation
and Notice to Appear"
was issued to defendant for
discharging a firearm within
the city limits.
June 4, 1975 ....... Defendant was sentenced to
60 days in jail.
June 9, 1975 ....... Defendant filed a notice of
appeal in municipal court.
November 24, 1975 .. The superior court granted the
motion and entered an order
dismissing the criminal
conviction pursuant to CrR 3.3
(g).
CrR 3.3(b) provides:
A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 90 days following the preliminary appearance.
CrR 3.3(g) provides:
A criminal charge not brought to trial as required by this rule shall be dismissed with prejudice.
The defendant contends that the requirements of CrR 3.3(b) have not been met because (1) a trial de novo is a new proceeding in superior court and the plain language of the rule gives him a right to a trial in superior court within 90 days; (2) the 'preliminary appearance' occurred and the 90-day period commenced to run on the day the defendant's case was either set or noted for trial in the superior court; and (3) the reasons for the rule are not obviated by the fact that defendant has appealed to superior court for a trial de novo.
A trial de novo in superior court as the result of a conviction and appeal taken in municipal court does not signal the initiation of an entirely new criminal process or procedure. The state has not been wiped clean as, for example, where the defendant is to b tried again following a mistrial or order granting a new trial. see ABA standards relating to speedy Trial § 2.2(c) (Approved Draft, 1968). The judgment of conviction rendered by the municipal court still exists and the appeal merely suspends operation of the judgment. JCrR 6.02; Goulter v. Huse, 196 Wash. 652, 84 P.2d 126 (1938).
A trial de novo, such as in this case, represents the exrecise of the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court and not its original jurisdiction. Camas v. Kiggins, 120 Wash. 40, 46, 206 P. 951 (1922); see Const. art. 4, § 6. However, when such an appeal is taken, the superior court is vested with jurisdiction to proceed with the case as if it had been commenced originally in the court. State ex rel. Getman v. Webster, 193 Wash. 265, 267, 75 P.2d 124 (1938). The superior court may render such judgment as it deems is warranted.
The trial de novo involved in the present case is an unusual judicial procedure created by statute. RCW 35.20.070. It has the characteristics of both an appellate and a trial action. It cannot be viewed in isolation but must be considered as one step along a juridical continuum.
Similarly, the procedural rules applicable to superior courts and courts of limited jurisdiction must be considered as a whole and cannot be sliced up, then construed and applied piece by piece to the resolution of issues that develop from or are related to the judicial process. The criminal rules must be viewed in relation to both the type of procedure involved and the totality of their purpose, which is to secure simple and fair as well as inexpensive and effective justice. CrR 1.1, 1.2; JCrR 1.02; JAR J2. The rules were designed to operate in conjunction with one another and not to require meaningless and useless duplication. When so considered and applied to this case there is no hiatus between the criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction and the criminal rules for superior courts.
CrR 3.3(a) provides that every person 'charged with crime' is entitled to a speedy trial in accordance with the provisions of the rule. JCrR 2.03(a)(2) provides that a person arrested for any offense is entitled to a preliminary appearance at which time the judge informs the person (1) of the charge for which he or she is arrested, and (2) of the rights of the person charged with the crime.
In this case defendant was given a preliminary appearance pursuant to JCrR 2.03. This appearance triggered the time limits of CrR 3.3(b). State v. Parmele, Wash., 550 P.2d 536 (1976); State v. Elizondo, 85 Wash.2d 935, 540 P.2d 1370 (1975). Subsequently, the defendant was brought to trial within the 90 days after his preliminary appearance in municipal court. Defendant has been accorded a speedy trial pursuant to CrR 3.3(b) which initially fulfilled public policy and satisfied the purpose of requiring a speedy trial. See ABA Standards...
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State v. Brett, 59429-5
...to amend the information. See State v. Wernick, 40 Wash.App. 266, 270, 698 P.2d 573 (1985) (quoting and citing Seattle v. Crockett, 87 Wash.2d 253, 256, 551 P.2d 740 (1976) and Emwright v. King Cy., 96 Wash.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981)). Such harmonization is provided by CrR 2.1(d) whic......
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City of Seattle v. Guay
...we find that consistent interpretation between CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) and CrR 3.3(g)(6) is not feasible. See City of Seattle v. Crockett, 87 Wash.2d 253, 256, 551 P.2d 740 (1976) (the procedural rules "were designed to operate in conjunction with one another and not to require meaningless and usel......
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State ex rel. Moore v. Houser, 44825
...in this particular case the question of justice court jurisdiction was found to be immaterial. In the recent case of Seattle v. Crockett, 87 Wash.2d 253, 551 P.2d 740 (1976), we recognized that, even though a justice court defendant receives a trial de novo in superior court, the court is e......
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State v. Fain, No. 36390-9-II (Wash. App. 9/9/2008), 36390-9-II.
...second time." 12 Washington Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 2109, at 470 (3d ed. 2004); see also, City of Seattle v. Crockett, 87 Wn.2d 253, 255, 551 P.2d 740 (1976) ("A trial de novo in superior court as the result of a conviction and appeal taken in municipal court does not si......